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The High Court: Final... But Fallible
Ovid C. Lewis
To effectively maintain the Supreme Court's role in our legal system
as final arbiter of constitutional meaning, Professor Lewis sets forth his
thesis that the craftsmanship and judicial technique employed in the
Justices' opinions must be improved. In developing his thesis, the author initially discusses factors affecting judicial decisionmaking, competing approaches to the law, sources of Supreme Court power, judicial
limitations, and other juridical accoutrements which are then evaluated
to determine the necessary attributes of an "ideal" opinion. Conceding that such a zenith of perfection can neither be adequately defined
nor fully attained, Professor Lewis does demand at least minimal compliance with standards of clarity and consistency - a compliance which he
has found lacking in many Court decisions. Utilizing the second part of
the article to present specific examples of contradictory and incomprehensible rules fashioned by the Court, the author highlights his analysis
with numerous case sequences illustrating the incoherence caused by the
Court's activism. Professor Lewis concludes that, much to the perturbation of the generalpublic, the Court has evolved into a legislative body,
minus the administrative accessories and democratic recourse usually restraining such a body in our governmental system. As the author indicates, to enhance its prestige and maintain its role, the High Court must
successfully cultivate both public and professional confidence by more
diligently focusing on improved craftsmanship.
I.

INTRODUCTION

J

NDOUBTEDLY, Supreme Court Justices agree with the prevailing view that perceives law as an instrument for attaining
socially desired ends.' Yet, questions and criticisms frequently
arise concerning the Justices' performance with that instrument,
prompting the author to analyze and discuss in this article
THE AUTHOR: OVID C. LEWIS (B.A.,
LL.B., Rutgers, The State University;
the validity of such questions
LL.M., Columbia University) is a Profesand criticisms.
Throughout
sor of Law at Case Western Reserve University and is a member of the New
Jersey and Federal Bars and the Tax
Court of the United States.

this panoramic discussion we
shall see that some of the justices are veritable virtuosos at

manipulation of hairsplitting
machines' and dialectic-hydraulic interpretation presses,3 which are
* Illustrations by EDWARD S. FREsKA.
1A functional approach to law is of course nothing new. In 1921, Mr. Justice
Cardozo noted that "[flew rules in our time are so well established that they may not
be called upon any day to justify their existence as means adapted to an end." B.
CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
Rules no longer
tend to persist by "blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897); see Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). See also note 54 infra.
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unfortunately available even outside of Von Jhering's heaven of
legal concepts.'
Professor Kurland suggests that the Court should stick to the
piano rather than attempting to emulate a one-man band, while
also reminding more vehement critics of the advice printed on frontier saloon wall plaques: "Don't shoot the piano player. He's
doing his best."5 After viewing the Court's performance, however, the inescapable conclusion and the thesis presented here is
that the Court is not doing its best. Thus, unless the Court improves its technique, the difficult music placed on its stand by contemporary societal demands will remain beyond its competence,
which will result in its playing to an increasingly unreceptive audience.
The resulting dilution of the Court's effectiveness ironically
would clash with its avowed functional approach and desire to transmute constitutional law-in-books into law-in-action, or living law.'
2 See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), in which the Court used California statutes to establish the relation of the alleged unconstitutional search to the
crime for which the defendant was convicted, thus distinguishing a contrary precedent,
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). The Court then ignored the fact that
the search was made in violation of California statutes, holding that "when such state
standards alone have been violated, the state is free... to apply its own state harmless
error rule to such errors of state [constitutional] law." 386 U.S. at 62. State law is
relevant to determine whether a search is reasonable, but violation of State law is irrelevant to that inquiry. The ultimate result - hairsplitting par excellence!
3In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court was confronted with
the question, inter alia, of whether an agnostic was relieved from combatant service
in the military forces under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 456(j) (App. 1964). The provision exempts those who are opposed to war because
of their religious training and belief, defined as "an individual's belief in a relation to
a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal code." Id. The Court injected into the provision the following test for a
religious belief: "A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption .... ." 380 U.S. at 176.
4 See Von Jhering, Im Juristischen Begriff Schimmel, in SCHERZ UND ERNST IN

DER JURISPRUDENZ (1884).
5
Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branchesof the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 176 (1964).
6See Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REv. 461 (1916). The quest for compatibility between living law and legal doctrine was emphasized by Eugen Ehrlich who
disapproved of development of "lawyers' law" without reference to the needs and

practices of the people.

See E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE Soci-

OLOGY OF LAW 466 (W. Moll transl. 1936). Karl Llewellyn found the same error
in the "formal" period of American law when the law "tended in lawyers' minds more
and more to coincide until it substantially coalesced with 'the law' as discussed by
lawyers in court: the mere rules of law." K. LLEWBLLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 186 (1960) [hereinafter cited as COMMON LAW TRADITION]. Instead, the law should "fit the ways of life" of the people and its observance
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That desire was explicitly enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut,7
in which Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."' These penumbral or peripheral rights constitute
the rules that are "necessary in making the express guarantees fully
meaningful." 9 In recent decades, the Court has implicitly adopted
this approach in numerous cases. The most evident examples involve criminal prosecutions," but the penumbral rights principle
has also been frequently applied in civil rights cases." How incongruous that the Court, apparently dedicated to breathing life
into the Constitution, is not willing to expend the time and effort
necessary to construct artistic opinions that will maintain and enhance the prestige and power of the Court - the very institution
that promulgates the rules that are necessary to make constitutionally guaranteed rights fully meaningful. An examination of particular cases demonstrating that the Justices often deliver opinions
reflecting less than the highest standard of craftsmanship is undertaken in the second half of this article. Unfortunately, the major
be willing "because people feel observance to be good." Id. at 202. See also Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 263 (1942).
7 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8 Id. at 484.
9

1d. at 483.

10 For example, in order to make the fourth amendment's guarantee against un-

lawful searches and seizures fully meaningful it was necessary to apply the exclusionary
rule to the States. Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). To make fully meaningful the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause it was necessary to apply the no-comment rule to the States. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The self-incrimination clause was also made fully meaningful by virtue of the rules propounded in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964),
and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In addition, the sixth amendment's
guarantee of counsel was made fully meaningful in a series of decisions. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
The sixth amendment's right of confrontation was made fully meaningful by requiring
that aid of counsel be provided at the time of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). Further, the Court has implicitly applied the same rationale to the
right of appeal, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); to the right to a fair trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); and to the right to a fair factual determination of the defendant's constitutional rights, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) and Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
11 E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Understanding that the Court
was applying, at least implicitly, the "fully meaningful" rationale in Shelton negates
the charge of a lack of neutral principles in the Court's opinion. See A. BICKEL, TBE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcd 52-54 (1962).
For other examples, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965).
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difficulty in selecting cases is knowing where to stop, since instances
of contradictory and incomprehensible opinions abound.
A.

Necessity and Significance of Sound Judicial Craftsmanship

A brief survey of the reasons why the craftsmanship reflected
in a Justice's opinion is significant will provide us with some criteria for evaluation. It will demonstrate also the complexity of
the relationship between the legal and social systems, evidencing
how little solid knowledge exists concerning the nuances involved.
To begin, the tremendous power exerted by the Court, through
its written opinions, over the norms, mores, and behavior of the
general public must be noted. Even now there exists a popular
tendency to equate what the Court considers constitutional with
that which is moral and right."2 The Court is still perceived by
the public generally as "commanding what is -right and prohibiting what is wrong,"' 3 for, in the religion of constitutionalism, the
Court wears the priestly robes and administers the sacred rites.' 4
The prestige and almost reverential diffidence of a substantial segment of the population for the Constitution and the Court as its
guardian permits the Court to play a rather significant role in legitimatizing democratic goals, such as the egalitarian principles of equal
treatment and opportunity. "' This prestige and veneration enables
the Court to obtain grudging acceptance of unpopular decisions.
The Court is apparently quite unconcerned about winning pop12

See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961).

13 1 BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTARius *43.
14

The Court is viewed as the protector of the Constitution which is treated as
venerable or even sacred by a large segment of the American public. This is not
true in many other countries, such as the republics in South America where there
exists no constitutional "myth" or "even a decent respect" for their constitutions which
are treated with contempt or indifference. See K. WHEARE, MODERN CoNsTrruTnoNs
114 (rev. ed. 1964). Justice Black's view of our Constitution is not atypical: "[The)
Constitution is my legal Bible; itsplan of our government is my plan and its destiny
my destiny. I cherish every word of it, from the first to the last, and I personally deplore even the slightest deviation from itsleast important commands." Address by
Justice Black, Columbia University Law School Carpentier lectures, Mar. 20, 21, 23,
1968.
15 Legal philosophers have written almost too much about the influence of
societal attitudes and community morality on the content of law's prescriptions and have given too little attention to the ways in which the maintenance
of law powerfully influences community attitudes and institutions. Whatever the merits may be on the long-standing jurisprudential debate concerning the supposed "separation" of law and morality, the imperatives of the
legal order carry at least prima fade ethical rightuess to most members of
the community. Jones, The Creative Power and Function of Law in Historical Perspective,27 VAND. L. REV. 135, 138 (1963).
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ularity contests, frequently promulgating constitutional rules that
are met with hostile public reaction.
The Supreme Court in recent years has been the prime mover in
a social and political reordering of enormous proportions which
was opposed by many diverse and powerful political interests. It
has brought about a complete reapportionment of the states' legislatures against the wishes of conservatives in both national
parties. It has pushed the Negro revolution at a rate far faster
than the political groups would have permitted. It has completely changed the administration of criminal justice and brought the
Constitution into the police stations all across the country. It
has offended conservative church and religious groups by its treatment of school prayer.16

The Court's active role in many areas is under constant fire
from various disgruntled groups. 7 Even though an enfilade of
16 Friedman, The Ginzburg Decision and the Law, 36 AM. ScHOLAR 71, 79 (1966).
The leading cases in each area of activism are as follows: (1) Reapportionment: Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Swann v.
Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). See generally Strong, Toward an Acceptable Function
of Judicial Review?, 11 S.D.L. R v. 1 (1966); (2) Equal treatment: Brown v. Board

of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For an informative review of the cases from Scott v. Negro London, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 324
(1806), to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), see L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS:
THE STORY OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO

(1966); (3) Criminal procedure: cases cited note 10 supra; (4) Prayer cases: Engel v.

Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Chamberlin v. Dade County, Board of Public Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964). Other
areas of activism not mentioned by Friedman include the following categories: (5)
Censorship: New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); (6) Congressionaland State subversion investiga-

tions: Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957); Scull v. Virginia ex rel. Committee on Law Reform & Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344 (1959); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962); Yellin v.
United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825
(1966); (7) Loyalty oaths: Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); (8) Enlargement of the substantive power of Congress under (a) U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 5 5: Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966); and (b) the interstate commerce clause U.S. Const. art. I, § 8: Heart of Atlanta

Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); United States v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966). See generally Bartholomew,
The Supreme Court of the United States, 1956-1966, 53 A.B.A.J. 729 (1967); Bennett & Quade, The Court as Legislator: A Crucial Symptom, 10 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 92

(1965).
17 See, e.g., C.

BLOCH, STATES' RIGHTS: THE LAw OF THE LAND (1958); OPEN
OCCUPANCY VS. FORCED HOUSING UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: A SYMPOSIUM ON ANTI-DIscRIMINATiON LEGISLATION, FREEDOM OF CHOICE, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HOUSING (A. Avins ed. 1963); Bloch, The School Segregation Cases:

A Legal Error That Should Be Corrected, 45 A.B.A.J. 27 (1959).

"By being in step
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strictures has been directed at the Court from its inception 8 through
the present decade,' 9 some suggest that now criticisms are not directed only at the merits of the decisions, but at "the competence
of [the Courtl . . . to decide at all."2 Thus, in "light of recent
Court activism, and the resulting chorus of complaints and proposals for change, it seems that the time is upon us to undertake
the task, before such complaints produce hasty and disruptive
changes. '' 21 While the Court is in no real danger of experiencing
an excision of its constitutional powers since the consensus generally supports its actions,12 it is probable that lack of craftsmanship
in constructing opinions detracts from its public image and effectiveness.23
with current political fashions, the Court is necessarily out of step with the Constitution.
The basic document, framed in 1789 and 1791, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
framed in 1866, were enacted to reflect the political philosophy of those days, not
ours." VIRGINIA COMm'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE 1964 TEEM 58 (1965). See
generally L. DOZELL, THE WARREN REVOLUTION (1966).
18
Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 53 (1795), evoked a commentary
to the effect that the case involved "the most unjust demands that ever disgraced the
annals of our Nation.... By this decision the sovereignty of New Hampshire is completely annihilated, its right of legislation controverted, and properties of its subjects
invaded .... ." New Hampshire Gazette, May 26, 1795, cited and quoted in 1 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 123 (1922). President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous attempt to control the Court by enlarging its membership is presented in great detail in J. JOIINSEN, REORGANIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURT (1937). See also C. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL
84-93 (1963); L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 15-18 (1965).
19 As a reaction to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Council of State Governments proposed three constitutional amendments that would have drastically curtailed the jurisdiction of the Court and would have subjected its decisions to review
by a "Court of the Union." After the public became aware of the proposal it "evoked
such widespread popular condemnation that it was speedily buried. It was quite dear
that notwithstanding the unpopularity of some of its decisions, the American people
would sanction no tampering with the Supreme Court." L. PFEFFER, supra note 18,
at 425.
20 Bennett & Quade, supra note 16, at 97.
21Id. at 108.
does not arouse effective opposition from both of
22 "So long as [the Court] ...
the other branches of the national government at the same time, it is in no serious danger of being curbed." Kurland, supra note 5, at 175. "In the immediate future, the
only real threat to the Court's power is the possibility of a political victory for the
forces who conscientiously affirm extremism in defense of liberty and oppose moderation in pursuit of justice." Id. at 176.
23
Craftsmanship has undoubtedly played a role in what has occurred in the resolution of commercial conflicts in New York. The business community, finding judges
not expert enough in commercial matters, the delay in settlement too great, and the rules
of evidence a burden, has brought increasingly fewer cases before the New York courts.
Instead, arbitration is used extensively. 'There could be no more obvious sign of a
serious procedural flaw in our legal system, than the prospect of citizens disdaining to
bring their disputes before the courts for settlement. Yet this practice is becoming more
and more customary among businessmen." NEW YORK JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, FIFTH
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Certainly, the Court through its opinions fosters the impression
that it is merely another -legislative body. Therefore, the people
may appropriately ask what justifies the potential frustration of the
majority will in a democracy by an appointed body of nine men who
hand down edicts from on high. Everyone knows that whatever
the Court thinks the Constitution demands, even implicitly as in the
case of penumbral rights, becomes essentially a constitutional provision, subject to formal revocation only by resort to the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. If the opinions of the
Court do not provide visible evidence that reasoned elaboration,
rather than personal predilections of the Justices, dictated the decision, why then should people dance to its tune? If the people respect the Court as an institution because it is composed of competent, impartial, and learned men who arrive at their decisions by
rational and just application of principles transcending personal
views, they will dance even though they dislike the particular tune,
because they respect the skill of the musicians. The Court's skill is
manifested in written opinions, too many of which are masterpieces
of cacophony rather than a harmonizing of principles. Hence, the
Court's image is degraded and its effectiveness is diluted, as becomes
even clearer when the sources of the power and authority of the
Supreme Court are considered.
B.

Sources of Supreme Court Power

(1) Grants of Power Emanating from the Constitution and
Statutory Enactments. -It is first necessary to briefly comment on
several obvious sources of judicial power, such as constitutional
provisions" and statutory enactments," which explicitly vest subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., the power of certain tribunals to hear
and decide specific types of cases. In the federal system, courts
established under article III ("constitutional" courts as distinguished
from "legislative" courts vested with power by Congress under artiANNUAL REPORT, THE NEW YORK SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE FOR COURT SETLEIMENT

OF DIsPUTEs 96, 99 (1960). In an attempt to regain the confidence of the commercial
community in the judicial settlement of business disputes, New York enacted a simplified court procedure. For discussion, see id. at 96; Callahan, Editorial, 146 N.Y!..J.
4 (Oct. 24, 1961); Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes, 146
N.Y.L.J. I (Oct. 25, 1961); Jaffe, Simplified Procedurefor Determination of Disputes
Compared with Arbitration and Ordinary Litigation, 146 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Dec. 14, 1961),
146 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Dec. 15, 1961).
4

2 U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
25 E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-6, 451, 1251-58, 1651,2241 (1964).
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cle 1)26 exercise and are limited to jurisdiction granted by article
III of the Constitution.2" Closely related is the power to interpret
the Constitution and legislative enactments.28 In this regard the
significance of Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall's contributions are
too well known to require discussion, except to note that Marbury
v. Madison29 not only stated the case for judicial review but also
built on "political conceptions which had already gained some measure of general support."8 "
It is not especially surprising to see that the Constitution establishes the Court as the protector of fundamental rights and in certain respects as an antidemocratic institution, since the Constitution
itself expressly sets out areas not subject to simple majority control.
For example, the Constitution attempts to place forever beyond
the amending power the right of each State to "equal suffrage in
the Senate."'"
[Constitutional] ... provisions set the boundaries of each federal
department's power vis-a-vis that of the others, of federal power
vis-a-vis that of the states, of governmental power vis-a-vis that of
the individual. The Constitution commands that these powers
may not be exceeded by simple majority will; that a special marshalling of the people's forces is required to alter the boundaries,
i.e., to amend the Constitution. Our written Constitution establishes certain "enduring general values," ultimately subject to
democratic modification, but only if the "buffer zone" of the
26 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 11 (1963).
27Thus, the federal courts can hear only justiciable cases or controversies. See
C. WRIGHT, supra note 26, §§ 12-15.
28
The Supreme Court very early assumed the power to interpret the Constitution
and strike down State statutes inconsistent with the Constitution, Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), or inconsistent with treaties, Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199 (1796), to set aside State court decisions inconsistent with the Constitution,
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821), and to vitiate acts of Congress
that do not square with the Constitution, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
295 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that
the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art VI of the Constitution
makes it of binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
3
0 F. CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUsTIcE 66 (1962).
For similar attempts to place constitutional provisions out1 U.S. CONST. art V.
side the scope of the amending power, see H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 243
(1961).
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amending process is crossed. This "buffer zone" - the difficult requirement of action by majorities of two-thirds and threefourths - protects these enduring values against hasty, ill-considered, emotion-ridden32 action and demands sober, deliberative,
reflective consideration.
Actually, the Court's historical power to decide cases or controversies in a way antipodal to prevailing sentiments was in some
measure justified by the notion that the process was one of discovering the law (the declaratory theory, discussed below) and the
"true" interests of society. Hamilton could thus contend in The
Federalist papers that "[w]hen occasions present themselves, in
which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be
the guardian of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and
sedate reflection." 3 The rationale was not that "judicial review
is the people's institutionalized means of self-control,""4 although
we must admit that it does serve that function. Nor was the basis
35
for justification that judicial review "fulfills popular desire."
Instead, judicial review was justified as an "impersonal enlightened
search for the law, 38 a view manifested as late as 1936 when Mr.
Justice Roberts wrote:
It is sometimes said that the Court assumes a power to overrule
or control the action of the people's representatives. This is a
misconception .... When an act of Congress is appropriately chal-

lenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty -

to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares

with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its
considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has,

if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court

37
neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy.

(2) Power Evolving from the Conception of the Supreme
Court as a Unique Institution. -Another source of power, often
overlooked, rests on the awareness that the Court performs functions
32

Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REV.
20, 38 (1967).
33
THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 465 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (Hamilton).
34 C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 107 (1960).
3

5Id. at 117.

3

6See text accompanying notes 47-61 infra.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).

37
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for which "elected institutions are ill fitted,""8 such as maintaining
enduring social values and meeting other functional prerequisites
for maintenance and survival of our society, 9 including conflict
resolution and integration of the component segments of a highly
specialized and splintered society.4" The enlightened recognition
of the necessity of maintaining institutions to perform activities
required for the survival and maintenance of a going society ought
to provide a source for judicial power. On reflection, it is also
clear that whatever functions are served by a legal system generally,4 1 the Supreme Court is a unique institution with special
3

8A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 27, quoted and discussed in Choper, supra note 32,
at 38.
3 See Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy & Sutton, The Functional Prerequisites of a
Society, 60 ETHICS 100 (1950); Parsons, An Outline of the Social System, in THEORIES OF SOCIETY 30, 38 (J. Parsons, E. Shils, K. Naegele & J. Pitts eds. 1961). For
the primary objections to the functional approach, see Functionalism in the Social Sciences: The Strength and Limits of Functionalism, in ANTHROPOLOGY, ECONOMICS,
POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND SOCIOLOGY 7, 9, 14, 22-25, 30, 33, 78, 87, 121-24, 140,

142-43, 157-59 (D. Martindale ed. 1965).
40

Talcott Parsons suggests that there are four principal functional imperatives that
a society must meet to survive: pattern maintenance, goal attainment, adaptation, and
integration. Parsons, supra note 39, at 38. Although the law is relevant to all four,
it is the means of achieving integration, which
concerns the mutual adjustments of [the relatively autonomic units and subsystems of society] ... from the point of view of their "contributions" to the
effective functioning of the system as a whole. This, in turn concerns their
relation to the pattern-maintenance problem, as well as to the external situation through processes of goal-attainment and adaptation. Id. at 40.
Concerning Parsons' theory, see D. MARTINDALE, THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORY 421-25, 484-90 (1960); W. MITCHELL, SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICS: THE THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS (1967); J.STONE, SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS OF LAw AND JUSTICE 20-28, 609-16 (1966). For a functional analysis
of law using Parsons' approach, see Bredemeier, Law as an Integrative Mechanism, in
LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 73 (W. Evan ed. 1962). It has been suggested that Bredemeier's analysis "can be reduced to the propositions of the Interessen school in continental Europe ...... Dror, Book Review, 77 HARv. L. REV. 398, 399 (1963).
Concerning the appropriateness of systems analysis for law and legal institutions, see
Herndon, The Role of the Judiciaryin State Political Systems, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
153 (G. Schubert ed. 1964); Blumstein, Systems Analysis and the Criminal Justice
System, 374 ANNALS 92 (1967). See generally W. BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY (1967).
41 Karl Llewellyn lists six basic juristic tasks:
[1] There is first of all the cleaning up of those grievances and disputes
which societies secrete as surely as babies produce a diaper problem. [2]
Intimately related, but distinct, is the problem of channeling conduct in situations fraught with potential tension and conflict, so that, negatively, grievances and disputes are avoided, and positively, men's work is geared into
team play. [3) In any mobile society, the needed rechanneling along new
lines is hardly less important. [4) The fourth great job centers around allocation of that say which in case of doubt or trouble is to go, and around the
procedures for making the say a binding and official say. [5] The fifth
altogether too little studied as a job of law, has to do with producing a net
organization and direction of the work of the whole group or society, and in
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functions imposed by the needs of our federal system. Although
these functions vary with time,- minimally they include acting as
umpire of the federal system," interpreting federal statutes, and
construing or creating (depending on how one views it) the Constitution," all in the process of deciding justiciable cases or controversies. To the extent that Court decisions protect the rights of
minorities, freedom of expression, and the democratic process, Dean
Rostow contends that they also maintain the pluralistic equilibrium
of our society, thereby inhibiting revolutionary or other violent
means of attempting social change.45 Obversely, the Court fosters a
national free economy within which the pluralistic society functions.
To achieve a proper balance within the federal system, the Court
has had to
call upon a people to achieve a unity sufficient to resist their
common perils and advance their common welfare, without undue
sacrifice of their diversities and the creative energies to which
diversity gives rise. [Federalist values) ....
call for government

responsive to the will of the full national constituency, without

a fashion which unleashes incentive. [6] And, as the last . . . the job of
juristic method, that of building and using techniques and skills for keeping
the men and machinery of all the law-jobs on their jobs and up to the job.
Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 253.
42 See Freund, The Supreme Court in Contemporary Life, 19 Sw. L.J. 439, 440
(1965).
43 "By standing ready to adjudicate suits between states over such conflicts as
boundaries, the apportionment of interstate waters, and the escheat of intangible
property, the Court has served ... as a substitute for diplomacy and war." Id. at 439.
44 IT)he historian Charles Warren cautions us not to forget that, "however
the Court may interpret the provisions of the Constitution, it is still the Constitution which is law and not the decisions of the Court." The Constitution
itself, Justice Frankfurter declares, is the "ultimate touchstone of constitutionality." Against all such reminders stands Charles Evans Hughes blunt assertion of 1907, "the Constitution is what the judges say it is." "The Supreme
Court," Professor Frankfurter used to tell his law students, "is the Constitution." A. MAsoN & W. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE
SOCIETY 1 (1959).
45
See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1952). It is true that the Court has produced an awareness of rights and possible
alternatives to privation among the Negro and other minorities which perhaps contributes to acts that border on the violent in that insurrections occur only when there is some
hope of success. As Leon Trotsky once stated: "In reality the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would always be in
revolt." C. BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION 33 (rev. ed. 1965). During
the transitional decades ahead it is important for society to appreciate that certain dislocations, tensions, and conflicts will necessarily be produced. See J. STONE,supra note
40, at 575. This is not to justify rioting and disregard for the rights of others, but rather
to recognize that any reordering of societal norms and patterns of behavior produces
dysfunctional conflicts "as surely as babies produce a diaper problem." Llewellyn, supra
note 6, at 253. But see M. JANOWITZ, SOCIAL CONTROL OF ESCALATED RioTs 7
(1968).
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loss of responsiveness to lesser voices, reflecting smaller bodies of
opinion, in areas that constitute their own legitimate concern.4"

(3) Power Resulting from the Supreme Court's Charisma.
The bases of judicial power discussed thus far rest on notions of
legality, tradition, and reason. But there is a very important basis
that is relatively nonrational - what Max Weber termed "charismatic."
Tradition, legality, and reason are relevant to nonrational charismatic sources of power, but additional irrational variables combine to produce an aura of wisdom and infallibility
ascribed to the Court by the "cult of the robe." Two myths the declaratory theory and the notion that judges are entirely ob40 Freund, supra
note 42, at 439. See generally Wechsler, PoliticalSafeguards of
Federalism, in SELECrTD ESSAYS ON CONSTTUOONAL LAW 1938-1962, at 185-86
(E. Barrett, N. Nathanson, E. Brown, G. Gunther, P. Kurland, M. Merrill & F. Ribble
eds. 1963). The fact that the proper balance has not been achieved and that we are
now in a "God-awful state" is not entirely the Court's fault.
Exponentially viewed, it will not be long before the earth's surface is packed
solid with humans, the whole mass standing in individual refrigerated capsules on a thick layer of immovable automobiles. Babies will issue from this
mass in a constant stream to stand on the shoulders of their parents. Suddenly, atomic fusion is achieved by the central computer which runs this
horror and the mass dissolves into a small exploding universe of positive
and negative electrons, neutrinos and antineutrinos, baryons and leptons, all
moving apart at relativistic speeds. Before this, of course, we shall have all
killed one another off by the exponential rise in the crime rate, by radiation
diseases, and, lacking all exercise, by dying shortly after birth from the ultimate pollution, namely, the inability to move away from our own excrement
Cowan, Law and Technology: Uneasy Leaders of Modern Life, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 120, 122 (1967).
47
Tradition as Max Weber uses the term, refers
to the fact that a particular policy is in harmony with historic practice [legality] ....
[and) consists of an appeal... to a rational set of rules which
have been given the force of law in a community. [Charismatic factors are
involved where individuals] ... govern by the force or sanctity of their personalities rather than by applying traditional or legal rules. W. MURPHY
& C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE

JJDICIAL PROCESS 160 (1961).
Eugen Ehrlich stressed the importance for the law of usage, which means "the
custom of the past shall be the norm for the future." E. EHRLICH, supra note 6, at
85. W.G. Sumner would agree that usage provides the impetus for the "pattern of
culture" of a primitive society. "If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases,
primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have
done so." W.G. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 3 (1906). It is now common knowledge that
in primitive societies men consider, as Jellinek says, any state of affairs that is established as morally right or justified. Within the limits dictated by the minimal order
required for survival of an ordered society, the customs developed by a primitive
society may be as diverse as the stimuli that are effective in conditioning behavior patterns. This was true of early European law as well as that of contemporary primitive
tribal societies. M. SMITH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN LAW 68 (1928).
Vinogradoff apprises us that: "In rudimentary unions, in so-called barbaric tribes, even
in feudal societies, rules of conduct are usually established not by direct and general
commands, but by gradual consolidation of opinions and habits." P. VINOGRADOFF,
CUSTOM AND RIGHT 21 (1925).
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jective - are chiefly responsible for the tremendous charisma that
surrounds the Court.
(a) The DeclaratoryTheory. -The declaratory theory, which
we have noted was in ascendancy at the time of the Constitutional
Convention, was popularized by Blackstone who believed that it
was the duty of courts "not . . . to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one [and] . . . if it be found that
the former decision is manifestly absurd and unjust, it is declared,
not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law." 8
Under this approach, judges discover rather than create the law.4"
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal' 50contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed."
Professor Mishkin, who has dealt extensively with the symbolic role of the declaratory theory, persuasively contends that:
Despite ...

its shortcomings as a description of reality, the "de-

claratory theory" expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial proc-

ess on which much of courts' prestige and power depend. This is
the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges are bound by a
body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that they exercise no individual choice
and have no program of their own to advance. It is easy enough
for the sophisticated to show elements of naivete in this view and no more difficult to scoff at symbols generally. But the fact
remains that symbols constitute an important element in any socie-

tal structure - and that this symbolic view of courts is a major
factor in securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions.
If the view be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and
which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost; consider, for example, the loss involved if judges could not appeal to the idea that
it is "the law" or "the Constitution" -

who command a given result.51

and not they personally

-

48 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
623-24 (1964).
49
See J.C. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 222 (1909).
50
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). The Supreme Court
qualified its endorsement of the declaratory theory in 1940 when it noted that the existence of a law, prior to a decision finding it unconstitutional, "is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be

erased by a new judicial declaration.

The effect of the subsequent ruling as to in-

validity may have to be considered in various aspects." Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940). Chicot held that where a party
had an opportunity to attack the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal district court,
and failed to do so, res judicata barred a later collateral attack even though the statute
creating such jurisdiction had been declared unconstitutional. See RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS S 10 (1942).

51 Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of

19681

THE HIGH COURT

The declaratory theory has been largely discredited, thereby
annulling much of the original justification for judicial review and
detracting from the charismatic foundation of the Court's prestige.
The law is no longer regarded as "a brooding omnipresence in the
sky."52 Today we all realize that "judges do and must legislate
[even if] only interstitially."" Supreme Court Justices themt..
selves view the law functionally as "a body of ideals, principles,
and precepts for the adjustment of the relations of human beings
and the ordering of their conduct in society."'
This change in
attitude is partially responsible for the shift in the Court's position
concerning the application of federal common law in diversity cases
from Swift v. Tyson,55 to the Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 6 doctrine - since federal courts during the ascendancy of Swift followed
the same practice in equity cases, even though section 34 of the
Rules of Decision Act by its terms was not applicable in equity actions." Under Swift, State law was binding on federal courts in
diversity cases except
Tiwe and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 62-63 (1965). "Is it not possible that the
'myth' of objectivity of the Court and courts is quite functional for this or for any
society? What if it is a key function for stability and/or equilibrium?" Becker, On
Science, Political Science, and Law, Am. BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIST, Dec. 1963, at 11, 12.
See also Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CII 1. REV. 501 (1948).
52
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
531d. at 221.
54 iL PouND, LAw FINDING TBROUGH EXPBRIENCE AND REASON 1 (1960).

In
a study conducted by the author in the summer of 1967, a questionnaire was submitted
to all the State and Federal Supreme Court Justices and judges requesting that they indicate which of a series of definitions of law most adequately exemplified their view of
the concept of law, which was least adequate, and the additions or corrections they
would make to the definition selected. Approximately one-third of the judges and
justices completed the questionnaire, and of them, 75 percent selected a functional
definition of law, while an additional 14 percent chose H.L.A. Hares language: "[Law
consists of] ... (i) rules forbidding or enjoining certain types of behaviour under penalty; (ii) rules requiring people to compensate those whom they injure in certain ways;
(iii) rules specifying what must be done to make wills, contracts or other arrangements
which confer rights and create obligations .... ." H.L.A. HART, supra note 31, at
3 (1961). In the quoted language, actually Hart was discussing the essential elements of a legal system, and added: "(iv) courts to determine what the rules are and
when they have been broken, and to fix the punishment or compensation to be paid;
(v) a legislature to make new rules and abolish old ones." Id. Hart views a fusion of
primary and secondary rules as "the most fruitful way of regarding a legal system,"
id. at 114, but he never explicitly defines law. See King, The Basic Concept of Professor HartsJurisprudence,21 CAMBRIDGE i.J. 270,271 (1963).
541 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
56 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
57 At the time of Swift and Erie the statute provided that "ftjhe laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat 92. Subsequently the statute was amended to apply to

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 19: 528

insofar as the law of the state on a particular matter was common
law in what was considered to be its more general aspect, as where
it dealt with contracts or torts or commercial transactions - [the
"general law" concept of Swift]
. - a federal court deemed
itself as competent as a state court to "find" and "declare" the legal
principle applicable to the case.58
Naturally, the discrediting of the declaratory theory removed this

basis; thus, Professor Hill correctly concluded that "the difference
between Swift v. Tyson and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins reflects essentially a changed jurisprudence rather than a changed view of the
Constitution."5
The same "changed jurisprudence" apparently
accounts for the prospective overruling cases,6" although the relationship is not as dear as in the case of the Swift-Erie shift. 6
The work of the realists62 and the behavioralists6" has not
"civil actions" generally. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). Since the language relevant to
Swift-Erie was retained, whether Mr. Justice Brandeis was correct concerning the statutory interpretation of section 34 [see, e.g., Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary
Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949)] is perhaps now irrelevant since Congress may be
said to have adopted the judicial construction enunciated in Erie. See James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 225 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1931).
58 Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution,53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 443 (1958).
59 Id. at 443. See also Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective
Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 224 n.72 (1965).
60 E.g. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Short, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
61 See text accompanying notes 339-402 infra.
62 Early studies characterized as realist oriented by Garlan specifically relating to
constitutional law include Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1-2), 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928); Hale, Our Equivocal
Constitutional Guarantees, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1939); Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); see J. STONE, supra note 40, at
68-69.
63 [The behavioral approach] ... calls for an effort ... to advance hypotheses
about relationships, to discover uniformities or regularities or laws, and to
suggest theories; the higher the level of generalization, the better. At the
same time [there is] . . . an insistence that the generalizations be verified
or verifiable. Normative propositions are avoided; the object is description,
including explanation and descriptive statements about normative attitudes.
If prescriptive statements are made, their normative component falls outside
the realm of science. The requirement that the generalizations be verified
or verifiable calls for empiricism - for reliance on observation and refusal
to rely on alleged a priori truths. It also calls for precision in the definition
of concepts, clarity in the formulation of hypotheses, and, in effect, restraint
about calling a generalization anything other than a hypothesis until it has
been demonstrated to be true. In addition to generality and verifiability,
the notion of a scientific purpose connotes system; that is, the object is to
develop a set of verified generalizations that fit together in a coherent system
a coherent interlocking network - giving a comprehensive description
and explanation of the realm of behavior in question. V. VAN DYKE, POLITICAL SCIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 159 (1960).
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only devastated the declaratory theory but the myth of objectivity
as well." In fact, some fear that attitudinal studies65 will reveal
that judges are nothing but "glorious rationaliers" of their own
predilections, thereby destroying their image as objective and rational decisionmakers. Mendelson categorically states that the
thrust of behavioral studies of the United States Supreme Court is
that "all of the Justices are frauds or fools." 66
(b) Does Judicial Objectivity Exist? -With our increasingly
sophisticated knowledge about the judicial process, the declaratory
Jurimetric studies reflect behavioralist goals. Even in electronic data retrieval projects,
hypotheses concerning regularities in judicial behavior are made. For example, where
full text encoding is used, legal material is retrieved on the basis of word frequencies,
the hypothesis being that "the more often a certain word appears in a document the
more it becomes representative of the subject matter treated by the author." Luhn,
Auto-Encoding of Documents for Information Retrieval Systems, in MODERN TRENDS
IN DOCUMENTATION 45, 47 (M. Boaz ed. 1959). The high level of generality sought

is perhaps best exemplified by attitudinal studies such as that of Spaeth, 'in which he
analyzed 155 business regulation cases decided during the 1953-1959 Supreme Court
terms, and concluded: "[The scaling of the business regulation cases, and the confirmation that these are a subset of the larger variable of economic liberalism, provides
further evidence that the great bulk of the Court's decision-making may be reducible to
a small number of attitudinal variables." Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward
Business: The "B" Scale, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 79, 100 (G. Schubert ed.

1963). The stress placed on verification is also readily discernible in jurimetric
studies. 'The conclusions of jurisprudence are merely debatable; the conclusions of
jurimetrics are testable." Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry,
28 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 5, 8 (1963). Unless reliable predictions are made, it is
argued, a scientific explanation of judicial behavior is lacking, for "how can one be
certain of understanding behavior, unless he is willing to make predictive judgments?"
Eldersveld, Theory and Method in Voting Behavior Research, in POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 267, 273 (H. Eulau, S. Eldersveld
& M. Janowitz eds. 1956). See also Schubert, Introduction to JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

1, 4 (G. Schubert ed. 1964); Krislov, Theoretical Attempts at Predicting Judicial Behavior, 79 HAiV. L. REV. 1573 (1966). On the problems of defining behavioralism,
compare Easton, Introduction: The Current Meaning of "Behavioralism" in Political
Science, in THE LIMITS OF BEHAVIORALISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 7 (J. Charles-

worth ed. 1962), with Davis, Behavioral Science and Administrative Law, 17 J. LEGAL
ED. 137, 138-41 (1965).
64
That it is a myth is argued persuasively in Miller & Howell, Myth of Neutrality
in ConstitutionalAdjudication,27 U. CHi. L REV. 661, 664-83 (1960).
65

See, e.g., C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947 (1948); Schubert, Civilian Control and Stare Decisis
in the Warren Court, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 55 (G. Schubert ed. 1963);

Spaeth, supra note 63, at 79; Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis, 56 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 90 (1962); Schubert, A Solution to the
Indeterminate PactorialResolution of Thurstone and Degan's Study of the Supreme
Court, 7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 448 (1962); Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 28 LAw & CONTEmP.
PROB. 100 (1963); Ulmer, Analysis of Behavior Patternsin the United States Supreme
Court, 22 J. POL. 629 (1960); Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, 13
WESTERN POL. Q. 288 (1960).
0

6Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique,

57 AM. POL. Scr. REV. 593, 597 (1963).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19: 528

theory and notion of total judicial objectivity are dead and not
likely to be resurrected. Nonetheless, there remains some truth
to the view that judges in a sense "find" the law, and that they
are relatively objective in arriving at decisions. "7
The millennium of judicial behavorialism has not yet arrived.
Glendon Schubert has noted that just as most sciences have moved
from speculation (theory without facts), to empiricism (facts without theory), to maturity (theory empirically verified), so too jurisprudential analysis of judicial behavior has passed from the traditional approach, i.e., philosophical, analytical, historical, and sociological jurisprudence (theory without facts), to legal realism (facts
without theory), to judicial behavioralism.6" Sociological jurisprudence has long evinced an interest in both theory (the law-inbooks) and facts (the law-in-action)."
None of the traditional
schools of jurisprudence, however, have attained an organization
and classification of knowledge about judicial behavior on the basis of a systematic and coherent set of principles constituting a scientific explanation, i.e., an "explicit formulation of determinate
relations between a set of variables in terms of which a fairly extensive class of empirically ascertainable regularities can be explained."7
67 [E]ven the highest courts, in the most novel cases, may properly be viewed
as subject to the law, if "the law" is seen not simply as composed of rules
and doctrines but in terms of institutions and processes of which rules and
doctrines are merely a part. Judges - including Supreme Court Justices
- in fact do not have completely unfettered choice, even as to issues clearly
within their province. The choices they do have, though substantial and
important, are still necessarily conditioned by traditions, processes, and institutions of law. Mishkin, supra note 51, at 63; see Krindle, The Law Making
Process, 2 MANITOBA L.J. 167 (1967).
It is relevant to note that judges tend to have less discretion in societies with a democratic political organization than in those with a dictatorial political organization. See
Nagel, Culture Patternsand Judicial Systems, 16 VMAN. L. REV. 147, 154 (1962).
68 Schubert, supra note 63, at 2-3. Actually, theory and empirical research are
so closely related that they "go together like a horse and carriage." See A. KAPLAN,
THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY § 7, at 57-60 (1964); Bierstedt, A Critique of Empiricism
in Sociology, 14 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 584 (1949); Meadows, Models, Systems,
and Science, 22 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 3 (1957); Merton, The Bearing of Empirical
Research Upon the Development of Social Theory, 13 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 505
(1948); Sewell, Some Observations on Theory Testing, 21 RURAL SOCIOLOGY 1
(1956).
69
See T. COWAN, THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE READER 135-246 (1956); E.
EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (W. Moll transl.
1936); Page, Professor Ehrlich's Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law, in 1914 PROCEEDINGS: AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS 46; Nussbaum, Fact Research
in Law, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1940).
70 Nagel & Hempel, Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formulation
in the Social Sciences, in 1 SCIENCE, LANGUAGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 159-60 (1960).
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When scientific explanations of judicial behavior are finally
offered"' they will not necessarily prove that judges are biased
rather than disinterested and competent decisionmakers who engage in reasoned elaboration in resolving the issues in the cases
before them. The fact that judges are influenced by their subconscious,7 2 their beliefs,73 their political74 and religious 75 affiliations,
and their socioeconomic class membership,7 must be weighed in
71
Numerous critics do not consider jurimetric and behavioralistic studies as scientific; indeed, some characterize behavioralism as "intellectual masturbation." Bush,
The Application of Learning Models to Interactive Behavior, in MATHEMATICAL
METHODS IN SMALL GROUP PROCESS 69, 70 (J. Criswell, H. Solomon & P. Suppes

eds. 1962); see, e.g., Strauss, Epilogue, in ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
POLITICS 312 (H. Storing & W. Berns eds. 1962); Becker, Inquiry into a School of

Thought in the Judicial Behavior Movement, 7 MIDWEST J. OF POL Sci. 254 (1963);
Berns, Law and Behavioral Science, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185 (1963); Davis,
supra nore 63; Mendelson, supra note 66; Spengler, Machine-Made Justice: Some Implications, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1963); Weiner, Decision Prediction by

Computers: Nonsense Cubed -

and Worse, 48 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1962).

But see T.

BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAvIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE: A WORKING
THEORY AND STUDY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (1964).
72
Ranyard West proposes that Mr. Justice Black forgot to robe prior to delivering
the opinion in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), because the logical inference of the holding of Bridges is that judges are in general to be treated as other men.
R. WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY (1945). For a proposal to psychoanalyze judges,
see Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 89

(1918).

See also Kessler, The Psychological Effects of the Judicial Robes, 19 AM.

IMAGO 35 (1962).
73 "ETjhe directions taken by analyses of specific intellectual problems are frequently if subtly controlled by the expressed or tacit beliefs philosophers hold concerning the over-all nature of things, by their views on human destiny, and by their conceptions of the scope of human reason." Nagel, Naturalism Revisited, in LOGIC WITHOUT METAPIHYSICs 3, 5 (1956). There is no such thing as an immaculate perception, for even what one perceives and recalls is influenced by his beliefs. See, e.g.,

Levine & Murphy, The Learning and Forgetting of ControversialMaterial, 38 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 507 (1943); Postman, Bruner & McGinnies, Per-

sonal Values as Selective Factors in Perception, 43 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 142 (1948).
74 See Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges" Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 843 (1961); Nagel, Political Parties and Judicial Review in American History,
11 J. PUB. L. 328 (1962); Ulmer, The PoliticalParty Variablein the MichiganSupreme

Court, 11 J. PUB. L. 352 (1962). Ulmer, in the article cited, reports that Democrat
judges favor workmen's compensation claimants more than Republican judges do.

Probably, however, certain underlying attitudes influence a judge to favor both workmen's compensation claimants and the Democratic Party.

See Nagel, Political Party

Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, supra at 847; Goldman, Politics, Judges and the
Administration of Justice 256 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University
Library 1965).
70

ee Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities,24 J. POL. 92 (1962).

76

See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES,

AND PROCEDURES (1960); Nagel, The Relationship Between the Political and Ethnic
Affiliation of Judges, and Their Decision-Making, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 234 (G.
Schubert ed. 1964); Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court, A Collective
Portrait, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SC1. 1 (1959). Schubert hypothesizes that given decisional, attitudinal, attribute, and cultural variables, prediction is most accurate when its
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light of the emphasis our legal system places on conscious and
rational decisions. Indeed, American judges immersed in legal
doctrine feel strongly that they must conform to the rule of law."
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court has remarked that
"Lolur great creative judges have been men of outstanding skill,
adept at discounting their own predilections and careful to discount
them with conscientious severity.""8 Regardless of the strength of
personal attitudes and attributes that affect the judge's perception
of his role79 and the case before him, Traynor's conclusion that
judges consciously discount their own predilections is valid because
the attitude of impartiality and the rule of law is incorporated into
the judicial process at every level. Karl Llewellyn stressed that
judges are law-conditioned officials," pointing out that the adverbasis is a variable in a class contiguous to the variable to be predicted. Thus, attitudinal variables are the best basis for prediction of judicial decisions or attributes,
attribute variables are best for prediction of attitudinal or cultural variables, and cultural variables for attribute variables. Schubert, supra note 63, at 5; Schubert, Introductory Note to Chapter V, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 443, 447 (G. Schubert ed. 1964).
Schubert contends that the success of investigators who base their predictions of judicial decisions on content analysis of relevant opinion precedent, see, e.g., Kort, Content
Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 133
(G. Schubert ed. 1963); Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically:
A Quantitative Analysis of the "Right to Counsel" Cases, 51 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1
(1957), is due to the fact that they were really working with the attitudinal variable
since "an examination of their work makes it clear that the relationship they were investigating was judicial perception of facts." Schubert, Introductory Note to Chapter
V, supra. This suggests that the content analyst is working with an intervening variable
more remote from the hypothetical construct attitude than the behavioralist using scaling techniques. See MacCorquodale & Meehl, On a Distinction Between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables, 55 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 95 (1948).
77 See R. WEST, supra note 72, at 169-70; COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note
6, at 46. Gordon Allport's view seems more appropriate than classic psychoanalytic
theory insofar as the judicial process is concerned. "[Miotives are contemporary
[and] . . . whatever drives must drive now ....
[The 'go' of a motive is not bound
functionally to its historical origins or to early goals, but to present goals only .... "
Allport, Motivation in Personality, Reply to Mr. Bertocci, 47 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV.
533, 545 (1940). On the development of the concept of the rule of law, see E. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY 31-52 (1955).
78
Traynor, Comment on Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 51, 52 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959). See discussion in
Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE
FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 101, 116 (1963).
79 On the significance of the judge's view of his role, see Becker, The Fall and Rise
of Political Scientific Jurisprudence: Its Relevance to Contemporary Legal Concerns,
45 N.C.L. REV. 642 (1967); Grossman, Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial
Behavior:The Case of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,11 J. PUB. L. 285 (1962).
8
0 See COMMON LAW TRADITION 19. Judges are conditioned to a tradition of
decision
embodying at least three indispensable elements: first, that every person
whose interests will be affected by a judicial or administrative decision has
the right to a meaningful "day in court"; second, that deciding officers shall
be independent in the full sense, free from external direction by political and
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saiy system tends "powerfully both to focus and to limit discussion,
thinking, and lines of deciding."'" Justice Traynor's conscientious,
independent judge frequently will take as his point of departure
the written and oral arguments presented by counsel, 2 perhaps
even confining himself to the issues raised by counsel.8 " The case
method and general approach of American law schools condition
lawyers, who later become judges, to search for cases analogous to
problems presented to them and to subject the problem-case to traditional forensic techniques.8 4
administrative superiors in the disposition of individual cases and inwardly
free from the influence of personal gain and partisan or popular bias; and
third, that day-to-day decisions shall be reasoned, rationally justified, in terms
that take due account both of the demands of the general principle and the
demands of the particular situation. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 143, 145 (1958).
81
COMMON LAW TRADITION 29. Llewellyn also once observed that "courts are
made and shaped more by the character of the bar before them than by any single
factor. Courts, over the long haul, tend in their standards and in their performance
to fitthe character of the bar with whom they deal." Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes
With What Results?, 167 ANNALS 177, 179 (1933); see Broeder, The Impact of
the Lawyers: An Informal Appraisal, 1 VALPAAISO U.L REV. 40 (1966). See also
Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law,
16 J. LEGAL ED. 127, 142-43 (1963). On the value of an adversary system, see Report
of the Joint Conference on ProfessionalResponsibility, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958).
82
Mr. Justice Brennan confesses that "often my whole notion of what a case is
about crystallizes at oral argument. . . . Often my idea of how a case shapes up is
changed by oral argument" HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PROCEEDINGS IN HONOR OF
MI. JUSTnCE BRENNAN 22 (Occasional Pamphlet No. 9, 1967). Mr. Justice Brennan's experience is consistent with the finding that if a "problem is stated verbally
the meaning which the words convey is the starting point for the solution." E. GLASER,
AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL THINKING 26 (1941). And
even though arguments of counsel are countered by memoranda of the judge's law
clerk, the order of presentation and correlative mental set is a variable of appreciable
effect. See Bruner & Postman, Perception, Cognition and Behavior, 18 J. PERSONALITY 14 (1949); Hall, Perceiving and Naming a Series of Figures, 2 Q.J. EXPIuME3NTAL PSYCHOLOGY 153 (1950). The role of the law clerks is significant. Mr.
Justice Clark has expressed his high regard and appreciation for law clerks "to whom
[judges] ... are so indebted both for intellectual stimulus and practical collaboration."
Clark, "Practical"Legal Training an Illusion, 3 3. LEGAL ED. 423, 424 (1951); see
Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 ORE.
L REv. 299 (1961).
83
See COMMON LAW TRADITION 26. A final judgment of a State court decision
involving a substantial federal question will not be heard by the Supreme Court unless
the federal question was "brought to the attention of the state court with fair precision
and in due time." New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928).
Of course, this is no longer entirely true. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
84
If the law school fails to emphasize the social context and consequences of the
legal process, the probability increases that the lawyer and judge so educated will not
rake into account, or even recognize, the total array of pertinent social issues and ramifications embedded in the case presented for decision. See Barnhart, The Law School's
Relation to General Education: Observations on Legal Education, in THE LAw
SCHOOLS LOOK AHEAD 157, 158 (Conference on Legal Education, Ann Arbor, Michi-
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These factors, and others,8 5 lend predictability to the judicial
process and credence to the view that rules of law do play a part
in judicial decisionmaking and that judges are relatively objective.
As a criterion for deciding cases, rules of law or legal doctrines
are clarified by viewing the judicial opinion as a device for justifying judgments, thereby conveying the impression that rationality
is the key to the decision.86 By writing opinions demonstrating
that the judgment is the result of principled" and reasoned 8 decisionmaking - not a mental toss of dice89 - judges retain and
exhibit their objectivity, enhancing the prestige of the legal process
and reenforcing the consensus of legitimacy, the main source of
power for courts in a strong legal system, i.e., a legal system that
is "the product of a ... substantial consensus and ... willing obedience" rather than the product of coerced submission."
In our
gan 1959); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943); Rostow, The Study of
Economics in Relation to Education in Law, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 335, 342 (1950). Fortunately, there is a trend toward a "closer working relationship between legal scholars
and scholars from other disciplines." Jones, Some Current Trends in Legal Research,
15 J. LEGAL ED. 121, 123 (1962).
See also Young, The Behavioral Sciences, Stability, and Change, 17 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1963). However, much resistance to interdisciplinary work still remains. "The legal profession has had previous flirtations
with psychologists and sociologists, and now the computing sciences. The first two
did not contribute anything of great value, and I don't think the last named will do
much better." Dean Maxwell, quoted in Schorr, The Law and the Computer, DATAMATION, July 1962, at 25; see Cohen, Factors of Resistance to the Resources of the
Behavioral Sciences, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 67 (1959); Cowan, Some Problems Common
to Jurisprudenceand Technology, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 3, 6 (1964).
85
See COMMON LAW TRADITION 19-61.
86 On justification and the judicial opinion, see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISIoN 172-73 (1961).
87 "Briefly put, the requirements for principled decision are: (1) that a reason for
the case be given; and (2) that the case be so decided because it is held to be proper
to decide cases of its type in this way." Golding, PrincipledDecision-Making and the
Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 35,41 (1963).
88 "Reasoned" decision is more inclusive than decision "on principle" and
has more meaning in administrative context. We forget sometimes that
"arbitrary" action can be either an unjustified departure from general policy
or an undiscriminating and unjust application of general policy to a concrete situation within its letter but not within its spirit. Jones, supra note
80, at 145 n.5.
89 The requirement of apparent rationality is often overlooked. Justice must not
only exist, it must be visible and apparent to the governed. Judge Bridlegoose, Rabelais' man on the bench, decided cases by the toss of dice, large ones for easy cases and
small ones for the more difficult cases. Yet the litigants respected and abided by his
decisions because his method was apparently rational. See RABELAIS, excerpts from
GARGANTUA, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 440 (M.
Cohen & F. Cohen eds. 1951).
90 An authoritative act asserts a claim to obedience, and the reach of that claim
determines whether and to what extent a legal system exists. A weak legal
order rests on a narrow base of consent, yet it may be able to mobilize very
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country, coercion is available to enforce judicial decrees, but ordinarily "education, symbolism, and the appeal to reason," 1 are sufficient.
The difficulty in maintaining the appearance of impartiality
and objectivity is that although legal doctrine does play an important role in the judicial process, a decision is not "worked out like
mathematics from some general axioms of conduct.""2 "Rules of
law, alone, do not, because they cannot, decide an appealed case
which has been worth both an appeal and a response."93 If judges
could arrive at decisions by deduction from preexisting rules, the
conclusion might be that a computer fully programmed with all
statutes, precedents, rules of adjudication, and other relevant material, could provide "an accurate, composite view of the current
case in light of previous decisions and modern circumstances" and
an "objective" decision unadulterated by the "humanness" of
judges. " A quest for the just and rational decision in rules of law
alone is reminiscent of the inebriate who, having lost his house
key, continued to search for it in vain on the sidewalk around a
lamppost because, in his words, "it's light here." 5 Analogously,
it is easier to search for justice in books than in life. How does
one capture the nuances of justice and imprison them in the bowels of a computer, to be egested on command? If justice is the
product of a system of rules, then a computer might replace fallible hairless biped judges that blush, empathize, and engage in various similar "subjective" activities. But how do you program a mechanical idiot-savant to take into account equality of treatment,
large resources of intimidation and thus command wide, if grudging, submission. A strong legal order is the product of a more substantial consensus

and summons more willing obedience. It is correspondingly less dependent
on the machinery of coercion.

There is thus an important difference be-

tween the strength of a regime and the strength of a legal order, although
the sheer persistence of the former may greatly influence acceptance of its
claim to speak with authority. Selhnick, Sociology of Law, INT'L ENCYC.
Soc. SCr. (forthcoming 1968).
See Skolnick, The Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends, in LAW AND
SOcIETY 4, 29 (SocIAL PROBLEMS Summer Supp. 1965); Williams, Recent Developments in Research on Social Institutions, 374 ANNALS 171, 179 (1967).
91 Selznick, supra note 90.
920 O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 180 (1920).
93

-

COMMON LAW TRADITIoN 189; see Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism
Responding to DeanPound,44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931).
94
Bartholomew, The Supreme Court and Modern Objectivity, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 157

(1961).
9

5 The analogy of the drunkard's search was suggested by A. KAPLAN, supra note
68, at 11.
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due regard for the particular case, just desert, respect for human
dignity, proper restriction of governmental functions, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations?9" How do you tell a computer
that it is "just" for Negroes and whites to receive equal treatment
before the law, but that the State is under no affirmative legal duty
to bring about an actual equality of opportunity? Explain to it
why it is "just" that the physician is afforded higher status and
income than the laborer, that children and the insane are not held
to the same standards of conduct as others, and that "justice" is
giving each man his due. It is possible that "justice" subsumes a
complex of ineffable ideas and interrelationships incapable of expression in linear form, such that just as the contrapuntal harmony
of a Bach fugue can never be rendered on a solo bassoon, justice
cannot issue full-grown in computer output. Professor Stone, with
his characteristic verve, discounts the idea that decisions result
from mere application of a preexisting rule, stating that judges,
by linking instant cases with precedents, and elaborating, by resort
to rhetorical arguments, [produce] fresh solutions in single cases.
In these parts the legal system is "open," in the sense that it does
not offer mechanical keys to determinate solutions. This ...does
not mean that choice is at large, or that decisions may not command some degree of conviction springing from their anchorage
in the97topoi, the truths taken as common grounds for the time
being.
No matter how well a doctrine is explicated, the judge will
reach his decision as the result of a number of factors," although
a doctrine is, perhaps, the only one expressed.9 9 Felix Cohen has
96 This sentence reflects Edmund Cahn's catalogue of some of the most significant
elements of justice. See E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE - AN ANTHROPOCENruC VIEW OF THE LAw (1949).
97 Stone, Reasons and Reasoning in Judicial and Juristic Argument, 18 RUTGERS
L. REV. 757, 775 (1964). The importance of rhetorical argumentation and topoi
for the law is stressed by Tammelo as well as Stone. See Tammelo, Syntactic Ambiguity, Conceptual Vagueness, and Lawyers Hard Thinking, 15 J.LEGAL ED. 56, 58
(1962). Kuhn has applied the concept of topoi to scientific advances: "In a science
... a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification
under new or more stringent conditions." T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 23 (1962).

OsSee notes 72-76 supra & accompanying text. Actually many more variables are
involved than mentioned herein; in fact many of the factors that influence behavior are
so subtly extensive that they resist identification. See Rosenthal, Unintended Communication of Interpersonal Expectations, 10 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Apr. 1967, at
24. Stuart Nagel has proposed a fairly detailed and comprehensive scheme based on a
mediational S-R model for relating variables that influence judicial decision. See Nagel,
A Conceptual Scheme of the Judicial Process, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Dec. 1963,
at 7.
99 "Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and impor-
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described a judicial decision as "a product of social determinants
and an index of social consequences."1 ' These social determinants
and consequences, although not easily ascertained, 1"' inevitably
must influence the legal process, for in our dynamic society law
"cannot be stable, in any effective sense, if it stands still."'0 2
The more one elaborates on the requirements and factors that
enter into judicial decisionmaking, the more apparent it becomes
that the actual process is so complex that it is not going to yield
to simplistic theories or traditional behavioralist techniques. The
most elegant jurimetric project published as yet, Glendon Schubert's The Judicial Mind (1965), was evaluated as treating "the
most complex questions of constitutional adjudication, not as delicate problems of weighing competing considerations, but as a test
of whether a justice is for or against civil liberties, or whether he
prefers big business; nothing explains a justice's vote except his
ideology."'0 3 One suspects that the "law of the instrument"'0 ° is
tance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment,
it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding." Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
100 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLJM.
L REV. 809, 843 (1935). Ehrlich believed that it is the duty of legal science "to
examine the origin, nature, effect, and value of the tendencies that become apparent
in legal decisions, and thus to furnish a picture of what is going on in the administration of justice and what the case thereof may be." Ehrlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, 9 MODERN LEGAL PmLOSOpHY SERmS 47, 78-79
(1921).
101 Although Mr. Justice Story wanted to strengthen the impairment of contract
clause, see Dowd, Justice Story, The Supreme Court, and the Obligation of Contract, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 493 (1968), in the Dartmouth College case, he stated that as to
the power of the State over corporations "[ijf the legislature mean to claim such an
authority, it must be reserved in the grant" Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 712 (1819). The States thereafter accepted this suggestion - thus frustrating Mr. Justice Story's goal. See A. MASON & W. BEANEY,
THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCiET 200 (1959). See discussion at note 228
infra.
102 Jones, The Creative Power and Function of Law in Historical Perspective, 17
VAND. L REV. 135, 139 (1963). In this connection, on the unavoidable vagueness
of law and need for judicial creativity, see Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the
Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255
(1961); Friedmann, supra note 78, at 106-14; Pannam, Professor Hart and Analytical
Jurisprudence, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 379, 386-92 (1964); Symposium - Stability and
Change Through Law, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1963).
Rosenthal con103 Rosenthal, Book Review, 81 PoL. Sci. Q. 448, 449 (1966).
cluded:
Whether the computer here employed, "Glendon Schubert," might be rehabilitated, or whether warped indoctrination has been so intensive as to be
incurable, is not clear. As of now, the human students of the Court obviously have nothing to fear from computer competition .... Unfortunately,
the resounding failure of The Judicial Mind, the most ambitious effort of
its kind thus far, may postpone for a considerable time the possibility of
any further attempts. Id. at 451.
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the motive-force for much of the work labeled "jurimetric." None
of the methods appears sufficiently sophisticated to shoot the rapids
between the behavioral Scylla and Charybdis of reffication and reductionism.
Thus far, the discussion has spoken of "the Court" and "the
Justices." "The Court" is composed of Justices, who after all are
really human beings not radically different from most men.0 5 But
membership on "the Court" alters the behavior of men who are
transformed into Justices with unique social relationships. Neither
"the law" nor "the Court" exists except in the minds and artifacts
of men, but the perceived role of each is of vast import for judicial
104

"Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters
needs pounding." A. KAPLAN, supra note 68, at 28.
105 Donning the judicial robes, however, may change an individual's conception of
his role and thus may drastically alter his personality. See Lake, Book Review, 19 CASE
W. R.s. L. REv. 804 (1968). The fact that the opinions of the Court are written by
individual Justices and not by the Court is the reason why Reed Lawlor draws a distinction between traditional and personal stare decisis. He notes that
[o]ne of the syndromes of personal stare decisis at the pinnacles of our legal
systems exists in the frequent appearance of dissenting opinions of individual justices, especially where justices cite their own prior dissenting opinions in support of their current dissenting opinions. . . . [I)t sometimes
seems that many judges assume that they are entitled to their own opinions,
especially if they are not required to account to a higher court. Lawlor, What
Computers Can Do: Analysis and Prediction of Judicial Decisions, 49
A.B.A.J. 337, 341 (1963).
See also Lawlor, PersonalStare Decisis, 41 SO. CAL. L. REv. 73 (1967); Lawlor, Foundations of Logical Legal Decision Making, 63 M.U.L.L. 98 (1963). Concerning prediction of judicial decisions, see Mermin, Concerning the Ways of Courts: Reflections Induced by the Wisconsin "Internal Improvement" and "Public Purpose" Cases, 1963
Wis. L. REv. 192, 205-237; Mermin, Computers, Law and Justice: An Introductory Lecture, 1967 WIs. L. REV. 43, 72-87. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was well aware of personal
stare decisis:
The volume of the Court's business has long since made impossible the
early healthy practice whereby the Justices gave expression to individual
opinions. But the old tradition still has relevance when an important shift
in constitutional doctrine is announced after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court. Such shifts of opinion should not derive from mere
private judgment. They must be duly mindful of the necessary demands of
continuity in civilized society. A reversal of a long current of decisions can
be justified only if rooted in the Constitution itself as an historic document
designed for a developing nation. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 48788 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Perhaps it was the desire to emphasize the congruence of personal and traditional
stare decisis concerning the edict of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
that motivated the Court to publish the opinion of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958), in the following form: "Opinion of the Court by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Burton, Mr. Justice
Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Whittaker." Id. at
4. This form does, unfortunately, tend to give the impression that it is the personal
views of the Justices that are crucial, rather than the law. See Mishkin, Foreword:
The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 56, 63 n.7 (1965).
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behavior.106 "There is," says Hanson, "more to seeing than meets the
'
eyeball.
(c) Ideal Opinions. -That judicial behavior cannot scientifically be explained, does not restrain us, however, from describing
the process by which a judge ideally should decide a case. Facetiously, after a judicial decision is rendered, a judge who deviates
from the ideal could be punished,'0 7 thereby tending to make the
actual congruent with the ideal. Karl Llewellyn starts us down the
path to judicial virtue with the advice that a judge ought to make
(1) the effort to diagnose the significant problem involved, and
(2) the effort to mark out the life-situation which gives rise to
the problem. Distinct from either is (3) the effort to determine
an, or the most, appropriate line of solution or treatment, and
then (4) the specific prescription which may be called for.'08
100 N. HANSON, PATTERNS or DiscovERY 7 (1958).
107 This is what the French try to do. The French Civil Code provides:
"'A judge who refuses to decide a case, under pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, may be prosecuted as being guilty of a
denial of justice.'
'Any judge or tribunal, any administrator or administrative authority, which,
under any pretext, even of the silence or obscurity of the law, refuses to
render justice to the parties, as is his duty, after having been so requested,
and who perseveres in his refusal, after warning or order of his superiors,
may be prosecuted and punished by a fine of 48,000 francs minimum and
120,000 francs maximum, and by being prohibited from exercising public
duties for from five to twenty years.'
'Judges are forbidden to decide cases submitted to them by way of a general and rule-making (rigleaentaire) decision.'
See also the following Articles of the Law of August 16-24,1790:
Art. 10. 'Courts may not take part directly or indirectly in the exercise
of legislative power * * * on pain of forfeiture.'
Art. 12. 'They may issue no rules (riglenzents), but must address themselves to the legislative body whenever they believe it necessary either to
interpret a law (une lo) or to make a new one."' L DAvID & H. DE Vins,
THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 20 an. 5 & 6 (1958).
108
COMMON LAw TRADITION 450 (emphasis added). This theme was often repeated by Llewellyn:
The wise place to search thoroughly for what is a right and fair solution
is the recurrent problem-situation of which the instant case is typical. For
in the first place this presses, this drives, toward formulating a solving and
guiding rule; and to address oneself to the rule side of the puzzle is of necessity both to look back upon the heritage of doctrine and also to look forward
into prospective consequences and prospective further problems and to
account to each.... [T]he immediate equities fall into a wider, paler frame
which renders it much easier both to feel and to see how much and what
parts of them are typical and so are proper shapers of policy, how much
and what part on the other hand is too individual for legal cognizance or
appeals rather to sentimentality than to the sensitivity and sense proper to a
legal-governmental scheme. Id. at 44.
"Every legal concept represents... in [the] first instance an effort at diagnosis of a
recurrent social trouble of some particular kind." K. LLEWELLYN & B. HOBBL,
THE CHEYENNE -WAY 42 (1941).
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The Court ought to "see and weigh first the relevant problemsituation as a type, holding meanwhile so far as may be in suspense
its reactions to the fireside equities or to other possibly unique attributes of the case in hand."' ° The result should be a case fairly
decided, as demonstrated in an opinion expressing a rule of "singing reason," wearing "both a right situation-reason and a clear
scope-criterion on its face [yielding] . . . regularity, reckonability
and justice.""'
And since the law is viewed instrumentally as a
means for achieving socially desired ends, the judge must both
settle the dispute and provide a guide to positive action in the future."' So viewed, the social consequences of decisions are the
criterion by which the utility of legal doctrine is measured. 1 2 As
Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in 1921: "Few rules in our time are
so well established that they may not be called upon any day to
113
justify their existence as means adapted to an end.
The preceding paragraphs may convey the impression that
there is an ideal way to arrive at a judgment and write an opinion.
Probably, most judges do tend to believe in an "ideal" method,
and that cases are like puzzles" 4 for which there is "one single
right answer,"" 5 - presenting simply a variation on the declara10 9 COMMON LAW TRADITION 268.
110ld. at 183.
111 See note 41 supra. 'The judge in deciding cases is not merely laying down a
system of minimum restraints designed to keep the bad man in check, but is in fact
helping to create a body of common morality which will define the good man." L
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF

137 (1940).

112 "It is true that a participant in decision may refuse to consider probable consequences - but if this be neutrality it cannot be distinguished from irresponsibility."
Lasswell, Interplay of Economic, Politicaland Social Criteriain Social Policy, 14 VAND.
L. REv. 451, 469 (1961). "[B]efore any particular decision is deemed to have been
truly justified, the rule upon which its justification depends must be shown to be itself
desirable, and its introduction into the legal system itself defensible." I. WASSERSTROM, supra note 86, at 173. But, "it cannot be gainsaid that once such factors
[social and economic antecedents and consequences] are introduced into a study, the
research technique closest to the heart of the lawyer - documentary collection and
interpretation - become painfully inadequate." Derber, What the Law Can Learn
from Social Science, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 145, 147 (1963).
113 B. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICrAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
114 Llewellyn seems almost to suggest this when he writes "and to address oneself
to the rule side of the puzzle is of necessity ... to look back upon the heritage of doctrine. .. ." COMMON LAw TRADITION 44 (emphasis added). Weldon believes also
that easy cases are puzzles to which one must find the solution. See T.D. WELDON,
THE VOCABULARY OF POLITICS 75-83 (1953). Mr. Justice Cardozo too observed that
"[of] the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority ... could not, with
semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one." B. CARDozo, supra note 113, at
164. But most cases that reach the Supreme Court pose difficult problems, for which
there are any number of possible solutions.
115 COMMON LAw TRADITION 24. The effect of this is to encourage "taking the
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tory myth."1 ' Adlai Stevenson was fond of telling the story of the
youngster who, after telling his mother he was drawing a picture
of God and receiving her frank revelation that no one knew what
God looks like, gave the assured response: "Now they will!" '
For a variety of reasons, we know that we do not know what the
ideal opinion looks like. That does not mean we cannot recognize
the absence of craftsmanship anymore than in "order to judge
what is bad in human conduct, we must know what is perfectly
good."'1 8 It is submitted that the Justices frequently display egregious lack of craftsmanship which, if it persists, will inevitably
first seemingly workable road which offers, thus giving the more familiar an edge up
on the more wise." Id. at 25. There is in this also "a certain sound economic quality
of thinking. The expenditure of intellectual labor which undoubtedly is always involved in seeking norms for decision can often be avoided by rendering a decision
according to a norm which has already been found." E. EHRLICH, supra note 69, at
132. Drawing on G. TARDE, THE LAW OF LlMTATION (E. Parsons transl. 1903),
Mr. Justice Holmes put it thus: "Most of the things we do, we do for no better reason
than that our fathers have done them or that our neighbors do them ....
The reason
is a good one, because our short life gives us no time for a better, but it is not the
best." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 92, at 468. And John Dewey stated: "It is practically
economical to use a concept ready at hand rather than to take time and trouble and
effort to change it or to devise a new one." Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10
CORNELL L.Q. 17, 20 (1925). "If asked why they act in a certain way in certain
cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always
have done so." W.G. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 3 (1906). See also M. SMITH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN LAW 68 (1928); P. VINOGRADOFF, CUSTOM & RIGHT
21 (1925).
116See discussion notes 48-66 supra & accompanying text. Natural law lawyers
are guilty of a similar fallacy of reification when they seek "to offer absolute answers
where only the tentative or relative would serve." E. CAHN, supra note 96, at 12; see
Kelsen, Plato and the Doctine of Natural Law, 14 VAND. L REV. 23 (1960); Nielsen,
An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law, 4 NATURAL L.F. 44
(1959).
117 In the same vein:- Computer Programmer: Naive Behavioralist. Computer
Input: Is there a God? Output: There is now! See Bartholomew's comments, text accompanying note 94 supra. Another example: "Why pay more for a good lawyer if the
ambulance chaser can push a button and obtain the same file of relevant precedences
[sic]?" Steel & Marzocco, New Horizons for Computer Usage, DATA PROCESSING FOR
ScIENCE/ENGINEERING, Jan.-Feb. 1964, at 11. Actually, the "brain appears to embody a structure of rules of operation which is far more powerful than the structure
of currently conceived artificial machines." E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, GODEL'S
PROOF 100-01 (1958). But see Wiener, The Mathematics of Self-OrganizingSystems,
in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INFORMATION AND DECISION PROCESSES 1, 15-16
(R. Machol & P. Gray eds. 1962); Newell, Shaw & Simon, Elements of a Theory of
Human Problem Solving, 65 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 151, 152 (1958).
11 8 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 10 (1964). So too we may not know
what is just, although the unjust is quite discernible. J.S. Mill believed that justice
"is best defined by its opposite." Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 365, 371 (C. Morris ed. 1959). Edmond Cahn finds that where "justice
is thought of ... as an ideal mode or condition, the human response will be merely
contemplative . . . But the response to a real or imagined instance of injustice is
something quite different, it is alive with movement and warmth in the human organism." B. CAHN, supra note 96, at 13.
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dilute the Court's effectiveness. Whether the Justices write great
opinions is left for others to discuss." 9 We ask rather, in Part II,
do they meet the minimal standards required for effective maintenance of the Court's role in our legal system?
C.

Juridical Limitations

Before turning to specific examples of poor craftsmanship, in
fairness to the Court, one must admit that the fault is not entirely
that of the Justices. Presenting the appearance of neutrality and
12 0objectivity - what Hart calls "characteristic judicial virtues'
is quite different from making the optimal or rational decision that
119 For the task of great judging Ehrlich suggested that the genius, "the more
highly developed man in the midst of the human race that has remained far behind
him," would be the best judge. E. EHRLICH,supra note 69, at 207. Llewellyn desires
judges who are
right-minded, learned, careful, wise, to find and voice from among the still
fluid materials of the legal sun the answer which will satisfy, and which will
render semisolid one more point, as a basis for a further growth. And the
certainty in question is that certainty after the event which makes ordinary
men and lawyers recognize as soon as they see the result that however hard
it has been to reach, it is the right result. COMMON LAW TRADITION 185-86.
But, "often a trial judge cannot state all his 'real reasons,' since some of them, espedally as to the facts, are 'reasons' of the 'heart,' the promptings of inexpressible, incommunicable intuitions - at their best, poetic insights, moral insights." Frank,
Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L Roy. 20, 41 (1951). On the role of
intuition and creativity in judicial decisionmaking, see COMMON LAW TRADITION
293-94; Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645 (1932); Hutcheson,
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
See also D. JOHNSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT
AND JUDGMENT 167 (1955); THE CREATIVE PROCESS, A SyMpOsrm (B. Ghiselin
ed. 1952).
120H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 200 (1961). 'These virtues are: impartiality and neutrality in surveying the alternatives; consideration for the interest of
all who will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle
as a reasoned basis for decision." Id. Does this not subsume Professor Wechsler's
criterion for a principled decision, based on neutral principles: "A principled decision,
in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues
in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959); see notes 87, 88, 107 supra. For reaction of Wechsler's plea for application of neutral principles, see T. BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE: A WORKING THEORY AND STUDY IN
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (1964); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 1083 (1960); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CH. L. REV. 661 (1960); Pollak, ConstitutionalAdjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, 11 J. PUB. L. 48 (1962); Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959);
Shapiro, The Supreme Court and ConstitutionalAdjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1963); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and
the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and PoliticalScience, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 169 (1968).
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will result in the best course of action in any given set of specific
circumstances. 2 ' First, it is far easier to analyze the language of
cases and statutes than to determine the impact of a judgment on
the behavior and values of those affected, 22 even though long ago
it was known that "wonderful results [could] . . . be achieved'" 23
by making such a determination."
Policy decisions evolve as little
more than fortuitous unless knowledge is obtained concerning the
present state of law and fact, along with the consequences and cor121

See Ackoff, Towards a Behavioral Theory of Communication, 4 MANAGESCi. 218, 233 (1958). Modern decision theory itself constitutes "an attempt
to find criteria for selecting 'optimal' decisions among a set of alternative actions where optimality is based ... on some measure of the values of various outcomes that
may result from selecting each of the actions." Churchman, Science and Decision
Making, 23 PHILOSOPHY ScL 247 (1956). The difficulty (impossibility?) involved
in defining rationality is illustrated by Mukerjee: "Rationality... consists in selecting
and consciously striving for more adequate, enduring and harmonious values." MuBNT

kerjee, Values in Social Science, in A NEw SuRvEY oF TH

SOCIAL SCIENCEs 221

(B. Varma ed. 1962). But why are some values more adequate, enduring, and harmonious than others? Because they are rational? One ought to act in a rational
manner, and rationality consists of acting as one ought to act. Ergo, one ought to
act as one ought to act. Rapoport views rationality operationally: "[If a man is faced
with N mutually exclusive alternatives, we will assume that if he is rational, he is able
to arrange the alternatives in the order of preference, allowing, perhaps for indifference among alternatives." Rapoport, Introduction to 1 DECISIONS, VALUES AND
GROUPS xiv (D. Willner ed. 1960). But is the ordering rational? See generally C.
CHmc-MAN, PaRwclIoN AND OPTIMAL DECISION (1961).
122 "Evidence is hard to come by. In order to recognize it, you must think. In
order to collect it. you must work. It does not flow automatically through the doors
of the senses into the mansion of the mind." Miller, Book Review, 3 CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY 241, 243 (1958).
123 Page, supra note 69, at 58.
124
In 1957, Gordon Patric commented that "in all the vast literature on [the
Supreme Court] nothing significant appears which sets out in detail what impact a
Court decision has. No empirical study devoted to assessing the influence of a Court
statement exists." Patric, The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of the McCollum Case, 6 J. PuB. L. 455 (1957). This lack of decision-impact data may be due
to legal research's problem-orientation with "the emphasis on cases as the unit of
study and instruction, the facility of publication of articles dealing with a single problem, the problem-solving nature of law practice, the pragmatic temper of modern
common-law ideology." Brown, Legal Research: The Resource Base and Traditional
Approaches, AM. BEHAViORAL ScEmSr, Dec. 1963, at 5; see note 84 supra. Patrics
impact study was followed by similar projects, e.g., studies cited in Jones, Some Current Trends in Legal Research, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 121, 125-27 (1962). See generally
Miller, On the Need for "Impact Analysis" of the Supreme Court Decisions, 53 GEO.
L.J. 365 (1965). Even without impact studies it is clear that the
most creative, driving, and powerful pressures upon our law emerged from
the social setting. Social environment has two aspects. First, it is what men
think: how they size up the universe and their place in it; what things they
value, and how much; what they believe to be the relations between cause
and effect, and the way these ideas affect their notions of how to go about
getting the things that they value. Second, it is what men do; their habits,
their institutions. 3. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 11 (1950).
For impact studies, see generally I LAw & Socy REv. (1966); 2 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
(1967).
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relative possibilities which flow from selection of possible alternatives.
Professor Adolf Berle has proposed creation of a "Council of
Constitutional Advisers" to advise the executive, legislative, and
judicial departments in matters of constitutional law. The council
would consist of from three to five omniscient members who, "as
a result of training, experience, and attainment, [arel exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret constitutional developments, to appraise programs and activities of the federal government and of the states, and to formulate and recommend policies
to promote the effective realization of constitutional rights."' 5
The council would, in addition to other duties, "make and furnish
such studies, reports, and recommendations with respect to constitutional rights as the Supreme Court may request, and, upon its
request,. . . act as master for the purpose of determining and making recommendations as to decrees."' 26
The constitutional issues raised by such potential delegation of
judicial power are beyond the scope of this article, but will undoubtedly be the subject of subsequent analysis in the law reviews.
Common sense dictates that if the Court is to judiciously legislate,
it needs some institutional means of obtaining the requisite information and "feel" for public sentiment. The Court has extremely
limited resources for determining such data 2 . and implementing
its decisions.'
Time itself is a scarce resource:
125 A. BERLE,

THE THREE FAcES OF PowER 61 (1967).
1261d. at 62.
127 Contrast the Court's resources with those of Congress, such as: the Legislative
Reference Service, see G. GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 40709 (1953); E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 87 (3d ed. 1961);
the Office of the Legislative Counsel, see G. GALLOWAY, supra at 409; Jones, BillDrafting Services in Congress and the State Legislatures, 65 HARV. L. REV. 441, 44445 (1952); Lee, The Office of the Legislative Counsel, 29 COLriM. L REV. 381 (1929);
the Coordinator of Information, see GALLOWAY, supra at 409-10; the Committee Staffs,
see id. at 410; E. GRIFFITH, supra, at 86-89; GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE
421-22 (1953); and the General Accounting Office, see G. GALLOWAY, supra at 4243; N.Y. Times, July 8, 1962, at 42, cols. 3-5. New Jersey Chief Justice Weintraub
has also asked that the judiciary, when acting as a policymaker [quasi-legislature),
have some of the aids afforded to a legislature. See Weintraub, Judicial Legislation,
81 N.J.L.J. 545 (1958).
128 The limitations on judicial policy capabilities which stem from inadequate
resources include those of problem detection and legitimacy; but they also
include (a) lack of adequate information on which to base broad policy
judgments, (b) lack of means to control the actions of all parties to a particular problem, (c) lack of effective devices for implementation, (d) lack
of capacity for continuous surveillance of policy impacts and effectiveness,
and (e) lack of capacity to absorb policy feedback and make corrective ad-
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The volume of work of the Court is staggering. When one adds
to that the factual complexity, the intellectual and legal intricacy
of many of the questions, the public importance of the problems,
and the difficulties inherent in reaching mutual understanding in
any group of nine men, the burden seems to me to be insupportable, and to be a fair explanation of the source of some of the
problems that some thoughtful persons have found in the work
of the Court in recent years.' 29

Walter Murphy, in his excellent text, Elements of JudicialStrategy (1964), takes into account these limitations when he discusses
the tactics and strategies employed by various Justices to achieve a
particular array of policy objectives. Commenting on the model
constructed on the basis of his research, Professor Murphy concludes:
Thus a policy-oriented Justice in this model acts much like the rational man of economic theory. He has only a limited supply of
such resources as time, energy, staff, prestige, reputation, and good
will, and he must compute in terms of costs and revenues whether
a particular
choice is worth the price which is required to attain
30
it.

Second, given the facts, "they do not evaluate themselves."''
justments. Wells & Grossman, The Concept of Judicial Policy-Making: A
Critique, 15 J. PUB. L. 286, 305 (1967).
On implementation, Austin long ago observed that "it is far easier to conceive justly
what would be useful law, than so to construct that same law that it may accomplish
the design of the lawgiver."

2 j. AusrIN, LECTuRES ON JURISPRUDENCE 1136 (4th

ed. 1879).
120 Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes - Professor Hart and fudge Arnold, 74 HAReV. L. REV. 81, 84 (1960). Mr. Justice Douglas, however, apprises us
that the Justices "have fewer oral arguments than we once had, fewer opinions to
write, and shorter weeks to work. I do not recall any time in my twenty years or more
of service on the Court when we had more time for research, deliberation, debate and
meditation." Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNE3LL L.Q. 401,
411 (1960). Mr. Justice Brennan concurs: "[Ihe magnificent contribution of Chief
Justice Taft's, which has given the Court discretionary power to select the cases it will
hear and decide, functions very effectively to keep the workload within manageable
proportions." PROCEEDINGS, supra note 82, at 9. The workload of the Court would
be eased considerably if some way could be found to stem "futile appeals raising questions which have been long or well settled ....
R
R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE
IN CIVIL CASES 379 (1941). In regard to groundless petitions for certiorari, Mr.
Justice Harlan proposes that
the best hope for safeguarding the future lies in the Bar taking hold of the
situation by discouraging abuses of the certiorari procedure, whether born
of ignorance of the nature of the process or of lack of responsible abstention
on the part of lawyers in seeking to bring "uncertworthy" cases to the Court.
Looking ahead, it is hard to think of any greater contribution that the Bar
could make to the effective functioning of the Court. Harlan, Misnving
the Dikes, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 561 (1958).
A prudent exercise of the certiorari power by the Court would also prove helpful.
See generally Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARev. L. REv. 40 (1961).
:30 W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 35-36 (1964).

131J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 387 (1950); see Hart

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19: 528

The truly demanding task is evaluation of the case having due regard for the ethical, legal, and moral complexities of life. The
inscrutable face of justice has already been illustrated and the criteria for evaluation could be endlessly generated. Is the hierarchy
of values and solutions ascertained by resort to some synoptic
method, such as Bentham's felicific calculus? 82 Should the criterion be "to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can?"' 33
Or, is it to provide "as much as we may of the total of men's reasonable expectations in life in civilized society with the minimum
of friction and waste"?.. 4 Or is the choice dictated by natural law
and "man's natural and initial inclination to the good"? 13 5 Sta& McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, 87 DAEDALUS 62 (1958). "Naturally, the facts exist only as contemplated by [the judge] . . . and are unavoidably
colored by the reception given." Miller & Howell, supra note 120, at 680-81.
18 2 See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS (1963).
Messrs. Braybrooke and Lindblom reject synoptic methods as fictions and suggest that policy analysts actually can realistically attempt
no more . . . than to understand the respects in which various possible
states differ from each other and from the status quo.... [The policy analyst] concentrates his evaluations on what we call margins or increments,
that is, on the increments by which value outputs or value consequences
differ from one policy to another. He need not ask himself if liberty is
precious and, if so, whether it is more precious than security; he need only
consider whether an increment of the one value is desirable and whether,
when he must choose between the two, an increment of one is worth an increment of the other. Id. at 85.
This method of analysis is termed "the strategy of disjointed incrementalism." See
id. ch. 5. For a direct application of this concept to the law, see Lindblom, The Science
of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
133 James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, in POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 205
(1898).
1-4 Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19 (1954).
Earlier
Pound sounded more like William James: "Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust, [and] . . .to give effect to the
interests that weigh most in one civilization with the least sacrifice of the scheme of
interest as a whole." Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39
(1943).
13 5 See T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 123
(d'Entreves ed. 1948). For a different view of natural law see Goldschmidt Preface
to KEITIK DES ENTWURFS EINES HANDELSGESETZBUcHS, KIRiT. ZEITSCHiR F.D. GES.
RBCHTSWISSENSCI-IAFr, Vol. 4, No. 4 cited in COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 n.155.
See also P. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE

13 (1959). The choice, it appears, is dictated by the cultural base.
[E]thical concepts, no matter how detached they are felt to be in consciousness, have cultural roots and cultural functions, and their meaning is to be
found in the offices they perform. And criteria [H.L.A. Har's "critical
morality"] would seem to have a similar character. The criteria in any
evaluation of virtues, goals, ideals, needs, and so on, are other virtues, goals,
ideals, needs, more abstract or more concrete, which have become enlisted
on behalf of the ethical concepts to carry out their office in the given context.

M.

EDEL & A. EDEL, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS 226 (1959); see
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bility and change, collectivism and individualism," 6 the general
rule and the unique case,' 37 order and freedom - these and other
conflicting demands in difficult cases present polycentric problems138 that are perhaps not even amenable to resolution by a process of reasoned elaboration.
The prevailing functional approach to judicial decisionmaking
requires judges to take into account that "unruly horse," public
policy, which "when once you get astride it you never know where
it will carry you."' 39 No matter how unruly the horse, however,
judges are obliged to ride as well as they can. As early as 1853
Lord Chief Baron Pollock, in Egerton v. Brownlow,'40 queried: "am
I not justified in saying that, were I to discard the public welfare
from my consideration, I should abdicate the functions of my office?"''
This idea that judges, in rendering decisions, are under
H.L._A.

HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY

20 (1963); J.

HURST,

supra

note 124, at 11.
On the terminological problems of value inquiry, see Handy & Kurtz, A Current Appraisal of Behavioral Sciences, AM. BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIST, at 131-35 (Mar. Supp.

1964).
13 6
See E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
234-35 (W. Moll transl. 1936); Pound, Fundamental Law in the Society of Today, 1
CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 1, 7 (1935).
237 The tension between the general rule and the particular case received its classic
formulation in Aristotle's definition of equity as "a rectification of the law where law
is defective because of its generality." Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE GREAT
LEGAL PHILOsOPHERS 16, 25 (C. Morris ed. 1959). "[Ihe judicial process is most
at home when it disposes of a unique conflict situation uniquely." Cowan, Decision
Theory in Law, Science and Technology, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 499, 500 (1963).
138 A problem is "polycentric" when it involves a complex of decisions judgment upon each of which depends upon the judgment to be made upon
each of the others. Such problems characteristically present so many variables as to require handling by the method either of ad hoc discretion or of
negotiation or of legislation. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:

BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION oF LAW 669 (tent.

ed. 1958).
139 Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229,252 (1824) (Burrough, J.). On the history
of the concept and antecedents of public policy in English law, see Knight, Public
Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207 (1922); Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1928). Professor Winfield artfully uses
Justice Burroughs metaphor:
That animal has proved to be a rather obtrusive, not to say blundering,
steed in the law reports.... And at times the horse has looked like even
less accommodating animals. Some judges appear to have thought it more
like a tiger, and have refused to mount it at all .... Others have regarded
it like Balaam's ass which would carry its rider nowhere. But none, at any
rate at the present day, has looked upon it as a Pegasus that might soar be-

yond the momentary needs of the community. Winfield, supra at 91.
140 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (1853). Lord Chief Baron Pollock's opinion begins at 412.
1411d. at 419. He later adds: "[I]t may be that judges are no better able to dis-

cern what is for the public good than other experienced and enlightened members of
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an obligation to ascertain and apply public policy, which is essentially a "principle of judicial legislation or interpreton, "' was
forcefully presented by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1897, when he admonished that
the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is
inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very
ground and 143
foundation of the judgements inarticulate, and often
unconscious.
In further inquiring as to how the Court is to determine relevant public policy, Mr. Justice Cardozo thought that the judge
must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here,
indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and
his. The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in
the end be guided by like considerations for the one and for the
other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits
144 for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps.
Truthfully, however, the Court has few reliable means of determining public sentiment. On occasion, due process is delineated
by reference to the values expressed or implied in federal and
State constitutions and documents, federal and State court decisions, and the relevant norms and values of other countries.4 5
Where a statute is in point, then of course "public policy in such a
case is what the statute enacts."'14 Because of its great potential
the community; but that is no reason for their refusing to entertain the question, and
declining to decide upon it." Id. at 421.
14 2 Winfield, Ethics in English Case Law, 45 HARv. L. REV. 112 (1931).
143 Holmes, supra note 99, at 467. To the same effect, see Hand, The Speech of
Justice, 29 HARv. L. REV. 617-18 (1916).
144 B. CARDOZO,supra note 113, at 113.
145 See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 329-33 (1957). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), the Court pointed out that the roots of the privilege against selfincrimination "go back into ancient times." Id. at 458-59. The Court supported
this assertion with the following:
Thirteenth Century commentators found an analogue to the privilege
grounded in the bible. "To sum up the matter, the principle that no man
is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree." Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of Jewish Law), Book of Judges, Laws of the
Sanhedrin, C. 18, 5 6, III Yale Judaica Series 52-53. Id. at 458 n.27.
146 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897). The
basis for this policy is that
the immediate representatives of the people in legislature assembled would
seem to be the fairest exponent of what public policy requires as being
most familiar with the habits and fashions of the day, and with the actual
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for ascertaining public sentiment, a powerful electronic data retrieval system [E.D.R.S. might have an enormous impact on the
evaluation phase of the judicial process. 47
[An] . . .interesting possibility was first conceived of by Heck
(1932), who regarded legal norms as value judgments or pronouncements as to which one of the conflicting interests of opposing social groups shall prevail over the other, or whether the interests of both must yield to the interest of third groups or to the
community as a whole. The results of these value judgments are
expressed in statutes and judicial precedents. Heck contended that
it is the task of legal science to discover these value judgments
and to develop a method of applying them to "new" cases. If the
E.DR.S. retrieves all generic levels embodied in legal material,
then these value judgments would be available to judges. Whether
they would then merely interpolate on the basis of these prior
value judgments is speculative. Perhaps a differentiation might
be made on the basis of legislative as opposed to judicial value
judgments. In any case, the ideal E.D.R.S., for that matter any
practical E.D.R.S., will have a far reaching impact on value determinations, a potential
impact that deserves more attention than it
48
has yet received.1
No
on the
provide
such an

basis exists for predicting that an ideal E.D.R.S. will appear
scene in the near future, or that behavioral scientists will
the Court with solid estimates of relevant values, or that
inquiry is practically feasible.149 Probably,

(mlajor dependence for guidance ... will of necessity continue to
be ... [common sense, folk wisdom, and amateur experimentationi. Yet, there are weaknesses in such informally derived generalizations.... Because any principle derived from common sense
has its roots in a traditional value system and loosely generalized
undefined experience, there is a very good chance that whatever
validity it may possess has relevance to some other time, place,
social system or purpose than the one immediately at issue.'8 0
considerations of commerce and trade, their consequent wants and weaknesses.
That legislation is least objectionable, because it operates prospectively, as a
guide in future negotiations, and does not, like a judgement of a court, annul
a contract already concluded. McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454, 460-61,
36 N.W. 218, 221 (1888).
The prospective overruling cases negate a blanket retroactive operation objection. See
text accompanying notes 339-402 infra.
147
See Lewis, Phase Theory and the Judicial Process, 1 CALIF. W.L REV. 1, 20-

26 (1965).
148Id. at 24; see Heck, Jurispradence of Interests, in 2 TwENTIETH CENTURY
LEGAL PHILosoPHY SERmEs 31 (1948).
149 See Hazard, Limitations on the Uses of Behavioral Science in the Law, 19

CASH W. REs. L. REV. 71 (1967); Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66

COLUM. L. REv. 1080 (1966).

150Young, The Behavioral Sciences, Stability and Change, 17 VMAD. L. REV. 57,

59 (1963).

On attempts to ascertain "scientifically" the moral sense of the commu-

nity, see note 222 infra.
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Granted the above limitations, the question remains as to
whether the Justices do what is expected of craftsmen, that is, do
they write opinions that enhance the Court's prestige and effectiveness, as well as that of our legal system. It is interesting that
among the instruments of judicial power, Professor Murphy includes the rhetoric of the opinion and the prestige of the Court. 5 '
Both are related, one to the other, and to the efficacy of the law
generally. Naturally, if the law is not efficacious, i.e., if the law
is not generally obeyed by the populace, almost everyone would
agree that we would not have simply "a bad system of law [ratheri
...something that is not properly called a legal system at all."' 52
It would seem fair, then, to require the Court to decide cases in
such a way as to meet at least the minimal standards required to
maintain the legal system. 5 Professor Lon Fuller in his provocative little book, The Morality of Law (1964),... sets forth the
15 Murphy lists five instruments of judicial power: (1) the adjudication of the
case; (2) the rhetoric of the opinion; (3) the power to issue writs; (4) the contempt
power; and (5) the prestige of the Court. W. MURPHY, supra note 130, at 18-19.
For his discussion of limitations on that power, see id. at 19-28. Some of the methods
used to effectuate the goals of a Justice or bloc of Justices are discussed id. at 37-78.
On the significance of a court's prestige for its influence, see Mott, Judicial Influence,
30 Amvt.POL. Sci. REv. 295 (1936).
15 2L. FULLER, supra note 118, at 39. Even Kelsen, for whom potential sanction
constitutes the essence of the law, agrees that law is efficacious only if generally obeyed.
See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 25 (1945); Kelsen, The
Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1941).
15 3 Llewellyn maintains the "job of juristic method [is] that of building and
using techniques and skills for keeping the men and machinery of all the law-jobs on
their jobs and up to the job." Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in
Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 224, 253 (1942).
15 4 The heuristic impact of this book has been striking. In a little more than one
year it generated an amazing number of book reviews and articles. See, e.g., Dworkin,
Philosophy, Morality, and Law Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel
Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 668 (1965); Sturm, Lon Fuller's Multidimensional Natural Law Theory, 18 STAN. L. REV. 612 (1966); Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1965); Campbell, Book Review, 28 MODERN L
REV. 370 (1965); Dias, Book Review, 1965 CAMB. L.J. 157 (1965); Hanft, Book
Review, 43 N.C.L. REV. 238 (1964); Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 128
(1965); Hosking, Book Review, 40 CALIF. ST. B.J. 90 (1965); Hughes, Book Review,
17 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1965); Mandelbaum, Book Review, 10 N.Y.L.F. 648 (1964);
McDowell, Book Review, 44 B.U.L. REv. 587 (1964); Meyer, Book Review, 10 McGILL L.J. 380 (1964); Rose, Book Review, 39 TUL. L. REv. 387 (1965); Savarese,
Book Review, 53 GEO. L.J. 250 (1964); Tucker, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 270
(1965); Wasserstrom, Book Review, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 581 (1965). The book,
to some extent, is part of a continuing debate between Ernest Nagel, LL.A. Hart, and
Lon Fuller concerning the relationship between the is and the ought. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958); Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958); Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NATURAL L.F. 68 (1958); Nagel,
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following eight ways in which these standards are not met: 55 (1)
absence of rules; (2) lack of promulgation; (3) an excess of retroactive legislation; (4) incomprehensible rules; (5) contradictory
rules; (6) rules impossible to perform; (7) too frequent alteration
of the rules; and (8) lack of congruence between the law-in-books
and the law-in-action. Other requirements could be generated, but
there exists a longstanding agreement among jurisprudents that
these eight are significant."
In considering the Supreme Court's craftsmanship in constructing opinions, six of the above elements are especially pertinent:
(1)

(2)

The lack of congruence between the law-in-books
aid the law-in-action. Since the task of trying to
attain this congruence is endless the element is put
1 57
under the rubric of the "Ixion ploy.'
Rules impossible to perform. The "Danaides ploy"
appropriately describes this element.'

On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NATURAL L.F. 83
(1958); Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATURAL L.F. 26 (1959). Professor Hart elaborates on his position in H.L.A. HART, supra note 120, which is criticized by Fuller in a chapter entitled The Concept of Law, in L. FULLER, supra note
118, at 95. Hart responds in Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965).
10 See L. FULLER, supra note 118, at 39.
156 Fuller's eight elements were set forth either explicitly or implicitly in T. AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA (circa 1250). Aquinas emphasized: the rule element, "law is
a rule and measure of acts, a rule of reasons," Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in THE
GREAT LEGAL PMtLOSOPHlERS 56, 57 (C. Morris ed. 1959); promulgation, "[Iln
order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be
applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being
notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law
to obtain its force," id. at 60; and, by implication, the need for comprehensible and
consistent rules, see id. On too frequent changes in the law he noted:
[HMuman law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to
the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of
itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the
observance of laws .... Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding
power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore
human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this
respect. Id. at 77.
On the possibility of performance Aquinas states: "Wherefore laws imposed on men
should also be in keeping with their condition, for . . . law should be possible both
according to nature, and according to the customs of the country." Id. at 74. Finally,
we can infer that Aquinas believed that the law-in-action should comport with the
law-in-books, since he stressed that "it is better that all things be regulated by law,
than left to be decided by judges.'" Id, at 71.
3r 7 lxion was chained to a wheel that forever rolled down an endless road as punishment for murdering his father-in-law and displaying disrespect for the gods.
15s The Danaddes, the daughters of Danadis, as punishment for murdering their
husbands, were forced to attempt to carry water in a sieve.
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Too frequent alteration of the rules. For obvious
reasons this is termed the "Tantalus ploy."' 59
(4) Contradictory rules. Since inconsistent rules look in
different directions, the relevant cases shall be considered illustrative of the "Janus ploy."
(5) Incomprehensible rules. In honor of Robert Hutchins' creation, Dr. Alexander Zuckerkandl, an Adlescent from the country of Adle, the relevant cases
shall be considered Zuckerkandlites, the products of
the "Zuckerkandl Syndrome."' 6 ° Dr. Zuckerkandl's
chief goal in life was to reduce communication to
the minimum. Former President Eisenhower provided us with a typical Zuckerkandlite when he replied to questioning concerning school integration
in the South by saying: "However, when the Federal
Court gets into the thing, you have got a judicial
thing, or I mean a legal thing, that I have gone as
161
far as I know the answer."'
(6) Lack of promulgation. Again, for obvious reasons
this element is characterized as the "Caligula ploy."
As shall be illustrated, the Court's failure to perform any of
the enumerated elements gives rise to the valid conclusion that it
is not a virtuoso in execution of juristic method.
(3)

A.

The Ixion Ploy
"A slow sort of country!" said the
Queen. "Now, here, you see, it takes all
the running you can do, to keep in the
same place. If you want to get somewhere
else, you must run at least twice as
fast as that."
LEwis CARROLL
THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

The Court cannot, and does not, ignore the relationship between law and behavior. As already shown, the Court has attempted to transmute the Constitution into living law by pro59

Tantalus was punished for murdering his son by being forced to stand in water
up to his chin. Above his head was fruit. Tortured by hunger and thirst, when he
reached for the fruit it moved from his grasp, and when he attempted to sip the water
it always receded.
160 See Hutchins, Living Vithout Guilt, 18 CENTER DIARY 37 (May/June 1967).
'

161 Id. at 38.
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pounding whatever ancillary rules are necessary to make express
constitutional rights "fully meaningful." 1 2 On the other hand,
the Court cannot impose rules too disparate from the existing norms
of society. Mr. Justice Cardozo put it this way:
The judge as the interpreter for the community of its sense of law
and order must supply omissions, correct uncertainties and harmonize results with justice through a method of free decision....
[The judge's] ...duty to declare the law in accordance with reason and justice is seen to be a phase of his duty to declare it in
accordance with custom.10
In 1913, Eugen Ehrlich wrote:
A limitation exists ... beyond which the judge must not go. [Hisl
*.. decision must be in harmony with the principles of the existing valid law and of juristic science.... The power of the judge
is not sufficient to overcome the enormous powers of resistance
inherent in society on a new foundation by means of a judicial
pronouncement; and a judge requires knowledge of the world

sufficient to be able correctly to estimate these powers of resistance
as well as his own power.164

The Court may alter social norms,6" but without the concurrence of other social forces, law would be futile. It would not
be "right" law, for "right law which touches people must live
in them. If law does not so exist, it goes first technical; it then
goes formal and remote. Remote law is not law to love, but law
to dodge, or to use . . .""'

The necessity of a concurrence of

social forces to constrain behavior is wonderfully exemplified by
the limerick about
the young lady named Wilde
Who kept herself quite undefiled
Through thinking of Jesus
162 See notes 9-11 supra & accompanying text.
163 B. CARDozo, THE GRowTH or THE LAw 16, 106 (1924). Mr. Justice Cardozo also observed that: "[s]ooner or later, if the demands of social utility are sufficiently urgent... utility will tend to triumph ... . 'Jurisprudence has never been able
in the long rim to resist successfully a social or economic need that was strong and
just."' Id. at 117-18, quoting E. EBHtrc, GRuNDLEGuNG DER SOZIOLOGIB DEs
RECasTS 346 (1913). Dissatisfaction with the law is generally due to "its failure to
conform to contemporary conceptions of social justice." Brandeis, The Living Law,
10 ILL. L REv. 461, 463 (1916). See also T. WELDON, TH-E VOCABULARY OF
PoLiTcs 67 (1953).
104.
E-M1Uci, supra note 136, at 181. For an interesting discussion of the relevance of Ehrlich's philosophy to civil rights cases, see O'Day, Ehrlich's Living Law
Revisited - Further Vindication for a Prophet Without Honor, 18 W. Rus. L. REv.

210 (1966).
5
16
See note 15 supra,
66

1 Llewellyn, supra note 153, at 263.
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And social diseases
67
And the dangers of having a child.'

In a democratically oriented society it is reasonable to assume
that legal norms comport with social norms and the consensus of
the governed.' 68 All too frequently one finds sociologists viewing
law as "a device for inculcating appropriate habits by compelling
appropriate behavior."' 6 9 Such statements bring to mind the imposition of the governors' law during the ascendancy of the Third
Reich. Hitler had decided that the law must be truly representative of the Volksgeist (Volk limited to Aryan). The Nazis were
enraptured with Savigny's Volksgeist concept that law is "something living in the blood and at the same time something lived by
a people,"'7 ° but in actuality little attention was paid to the cusQuoted in A Symposium on Morality, 34 AM. SCHOLAR 347, 360 (1965).
168 The basis of all our law-rules of conduct, whether legislative, judicial, or
administrative in origin, behind which is the coercive power of the state is consensual. We are willing and ought to be willing to pay a limited price
only in coercing minorities, and whenever, therefore, a minority is sufficiently large or determined or strategically placed we are not quite in a position to have law on whatever the subject may be on which the minority is
constituted and situated as I have described it. We resort, then, to other
methods of social action - methods other than law, methods of persuasion
and inducement, by appeal not only to reason but to interests, not only to
material but to political interests, rather than methods of attempted coercion.
It is especially true of judge-made constitutional law, and ought to be, ..,
that both its basis and its effectiveness are essentially consensual. A. BICKEL,
POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 11 (1965) (emphasis added).
See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). On what constitutes,
"We the people," see Forkosch, Who Are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitution?, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 644 (1968).
169 Gregor, The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14
W. RES. L. REV. 621, 622 (1963). Professor Gregor supports this contention by
citing M. DEUTSCH & M. COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING - A PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 128 (1951).
Technological developments
make it feasible to control individuals directly without going through the tedious process of brainwashing.
What does this imply? One hypothetical possibility probably has already
occurred to the reader: the 100-socket, 600-electrode human being controlled by a transistor-timed stimulator worn, perhaps, in the form of a
lapel pin by men and of a jeweled brooch by women. Each individual's
program would be pre-set and tailored to assigned functions and duties, but
it could be changed instantly by overriding radio signals sent out by local
(75-socket) controllers, who would be controlled by a Master Controller (no
sockets) who, in his wisdom, would control the behavior of everybody. LIFE,
March 8, 1962, at 104.
See Note, Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwztzgebel's Machine, 80 HARV. L. REV. 403
(1966). On the problems of technology and privacy, see A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967).
Perhaps, development of antiaggression pills will obviate the
need for certain aspects of criminal law and war. See B. BARBER, DRUGS AND SoCIETY 161-64 (1967); N.Y. Times, May 10, 1967, at 27, col. 1.
179Jones, The Nazi Conception of Law, 21 OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD
AFFAIRS 3, 32 (1959).
167
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toms and beliefs of the people during this period, the law in Nazi
Germany being what the Fiirer decreed.'
The totalitarian state's most ominous aspect is its ability to obtain complete compliance with its doctrines - justifying infliction
of death and extreme invasion of individual freedom and integrity
as necessary for the "good of society." Unfortunately, the atrocities that were committed on this basis are recalled too clearly. At
the Nuremberg trials, counsel for defendant Gebhart attempted to
justify inhuman medical experiments performed on prisoners by
contending that
the experiments to test the effectiveness of sulfanilamide were
necessary to clarify a question which was not only of decisive importance for the individual soldier and the troops at the front but
above and beyond this care for the individual, it was of vital importance for the fighting power of the army, and thus for the
whole fighting nation. All efforts to clarify this question by studying the effect of casual wounds failed. 172

The "father knows best" doctrine has been most recently practiced in Russia and in her satellites.Y Professor Berman writes:
The implication of the Soviet concept of... [law] is that people
in general do not know their rights and duties but must be taught
them, and that these rights and duties are not something which

they possess, but rather are instruments used by the state to inReference was had to public opinion, at least theoretically, in some cases. For
example, in the criminal law, if the court "could find no statute directly in point...
[the object was] still to convict, if the accused's act... [seemed] to be covered by the
general idea underlying some statute and ought to be punished according to sound
popular sentiment." Jones, supra note 170, at 30. See also Dickman, An Outline of
Nazi Civil Law, 15 Mss. L.J. 127 (1943). In West Germany today, however, the
"danger of a judge acting through personal notions unrelated to prevailing views or
atypical of them is largely eliminated by the duty imposed upon him to examine the
actual behavior of the community, coupled with the plurality of judges in German
Courts." J. GOUGH, THE ROLE OF USAGE IN GERMAN LAw 82-83 (1950). See also
Von Mehren, The judicial Process: A Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. J.ComP. L. 197
(1956). On the situation in East Germany, see Kirchheimer, The Administration of
Justice and the Concept of Legality in East Germany, 68 YALE LJ.705 (1959).
171

1722 TRIALS OF WAR CRnMNALS 5
73

(1946).

See Berman, Soviet Justice and Soviet Tyranny, 55 COLUM. L.REV. 795 (1955);
Kirchheimer, supra note 171, at 748-49. Mao Tse-Tung's view is curiously democratic:
To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs
and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from
their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change,
but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or
determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently.
We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses
have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry
it out. MAO TsE-TuNG's QUOTATIONs: THE RED GuARD's HANDBOOK
1

(1967) (emphasis added).
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culcate the legal
and social psychology which the leaders believe
174
to be proper.

For the Free World, with a jurisprudence and social ethos diametric to the Nazi and Soviet notion of inculcating appropriate behavior through law, Eugen Ehrlich's suggestion that law comport
with the "living law," the inner ordering of society, is more apropos.
Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson once remarked: "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because
we are final."' 75 In a very real sense the Court is not final, since
it is subject to reversal by the Court of Public Opinion."
Consider briefly the problem of equal treatment and opportunity for
the Negro. To produce an enlightened attitude among both white
and Negro citizens wherein individuals are evaluated on the basis
of merit rather than ascription, requires more than the force of
law. 7 The major thrust will have to come from the family and
public schools,' 78 and as greater equality of treatment becomes
more pervasive and the expectations of disadvantaged minority
groups grow, there will arise a correlative increase in the need for
effective teaching by family, school, and court.1 9 In recent years,
174 Berman, supra note 173, at 803.
Some Southerners may consider the doctrine
extant in the United States A.B. (after Brown).
175W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHEIT, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 510 (1961).
6
17 See notes 152, 163, 164 supra & accompanying text. Ibn Khaldun as early as the
14th century observed that reformers would have a difficult time overcoming the resistance of powerful social forces. See D. MARTINDALE, THE NATURE AND TYPES OF
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 132 (1960).
177 The most potent comparison in this regard, that of prohibition to racial integration, is discussed in Marshall, Fasone & Dotson, Prohibition and Anti-Discrimina-

tion Legislation in Housing

Thinking,

-

The Moral and Pseudo-Scientific Approach in Legal

in OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FORCED HOUSING UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 216 (A. Avins ed. 1963).
178"[P]ublic school secularism is not just another among our many sects. It has
cohesive national content. That is the whole of its content, and its function is unique.
[The public school] . . . is the sole means by which the state is permitted to draw
people to its schools and away from centrifugal [cultural influences] ....... .A.
BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 203 (1965). Religious institutions
have generally lagged behind the Court in demanding racial equality. See K. CLARK,
PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 105 (1955); F. LOESCHER, THE PROTESTANT CHURCH
AND THE NEGRO A PATTERN OF SEGREGATION (1948); N.Y. Times, Sept. 26,
1966, at 35, col. 1. Of course, until this century Christian churches were far from
leaders in man's quest for freedom. Instead, they "authorized the persecution of Jews,
infidels, heretics, dissenters, free thinkers. On principle they denied freedom of conscience, freedom of the speech and press, so long as they had power to do so." H.
MULLER, FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN WORLD 51 (1963).
179 James Hamilton, Associate Director of the National Council of Churches, commenting on the reaction of churchgoers to the 1966 Civil Rights Bill, stated: "We've
got a bill now that is affecting the whole country, not just one region. I've been
amused by some of the people who were so enthusiastic in other years. Suddenly
they don't have as much to say." Cleveland Press, Sept. 21, 1966, § A, at 12, col. 1.
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the Court has operated effectively as "an educational force in helping to mold a state of opinion far more sensitive to civil liberties
than that which prevailed in the United States thirty or fifty years
ago.' 8 0 Yet, in a different era such an approach would have been
virtually impossible. The defiant statement of President Jackson
comes to mind: "John Marshall has made his decision: - now let
him enforce it!"'
Loren Miller. 2 contends that Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall
and Mr. Justice Story "were conservatives with a strong bias in favor of property rights. Their recognition of constitutional tolerance of slavery carried with it a correlative belief that the property
rights of slaveholders were paramount in a judicial determination
of questions affecting slavery."' 83 But, if the decision in Worcester v. Georgia'I was unenforceable, how effective would the Court
have been after it invalidated slavery? Mr. Chief Justice John
Marshall was astute enough to appreciate the necessity of building
a strong judiciary and national government. Although the slavery
issue undoubtedly perplexed the great Chief Justice, "[hle never had
but one, and that a splendid, vision. The American Nation was
his dream; and to the realization of it he consecrated his life."' 88
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's opinions relating to slavery and
civil rights must be viewed in the context of that era's social matrix
and not as if the culture of the early 19th century was the same as
that existing today. Apparently, he was acutely aware of the func180

Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DA E LAW.
573, 583 (1958).
181A statement reportedly made by President Andrew Jackson regarding Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 4 A. BEVERDGE, THE IIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 551 (1919).
Analogously, if the Court were today to hold that there is
no constitutional power that authorizes the Vietnam War, President Johnson might
well echo President Jackson's remarks. Professor Lerner has observed in this regard
that it is "a wise court that appreciates the fragility of the base of support upon which
it otherwise relies." Danger Ahead for US. Supreme Court?, TRIAL, Dec.-Jan.
1967-1968, at 6.
1 82
Mr. Miller has appeared as counsel before the Supreme Court in numerous
civil rights cases. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
83

1 L MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SuPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATEs AND THE NEGRO 30 (1966).

184 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515; see note 181 supra.
185 4 A. BmVERIDGE, supra note 181, at 472. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall believed
that the best solution to the Negro problem was to induce and aid Negroes in migrating to Africa. Id. at 473-74. His repugnance to slavery "led him to support in his
later years various schemes for gradual emancipation and to accept the presidency of
the Virginia Colonization Society." Holcombe, John Marshall As Politician and Political Theorist, in CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL 26 (W.M.
Jones ed. 1956). See also K. UMBEtIT, OUR ELEVEN CHIEF JUSTICES 185 (1938).
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tional prerequisites of an effective legal system, and his opinions
reflect an interest in establishing the judiciary as an effective coordinate branch of the government. In cases involving the rights
of Negroes, none of his opinions did more than apply and interpret
the existing law - including the Federal Constitution - which
recognized the institution of slavery and the right of individuals
to own slaves."' 0 Scott v. Negro Ben 87 is illustrative of Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's disposal of these cases. Mr. Miller contends that
in Scott, the Chief Justice circumvented a Maryland law which required any person bringing a slave into that State to prove "to the
satisfaction of the naval officer or collector of taxes that such slave
had resided three years in the United States," by holding that such
proof was adequate if offered at the trial of the suit for freedom.'8 8
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall did not circumvent or ignore the law;
he interpreted and applied it according to its manifest purpose, unquestionably a proper method for interpreting statutes.'8 9 He correctly reasoned that the
great object of the proviso certainly was to permit persons, actually

migrating into the state of Maryland, to bring with them property

of this description, which had been within the United States a
sufficient time to exclude the danger of its being imported into
America for the particular purpose [slavery]. This great object
of the proviso was, that the fact itself should accord with this in-

186 Loren Miller cites and discusses a number of the cases involving rights of the
Negro in which Marshall participated. See L. MILLER, supra note 183, at 29-42.
Cases involving Negro rights not mentioned by Miller and decided by the Court during Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's tenure, without a written opinion filed by him, include the following: United States v. The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406
(1804); The Brigantine Amiable Lucy v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 330 (1810);
The Emily and The Caroline, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381 (1824); The St. Jago de Cuba,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409 (1824); The Josefa Segunda, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 312 (1825);
Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361 (1826); Mason v. Matilda, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 590 (1827); United States v. Preston, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 57 (1830); Menard v.
Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505 (1831) (a case that should be read in conjunction with
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)); Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 44
(1834); Fenwick v. Chapman, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 461 (1835). Cases not mentioned by
Miller in which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court include
Spiers v. Willison, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 398 (1808); Brent v. Chapman, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 358 (1809); Beverly v. Brooke, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 100 (1817); Lagrange
v. Chouteau, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 287 (1830). In none of these opinions can one discern
more than an honest and reasonable effort to apply the existing law. The same is true
of opinions written by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall while on circuit. See, e.g., Bond
v. Ross, 3 F. Cas. 482 (No. 1623) (C.C.D. Va. 1815); Backhouse v. Jett, 2 F. Cas. 316
(No. 710) (C.C.D. Va. 1821); Byrd v. Byrd, 4 F. Cas. 947 (No. 2268) (C.C.D. Va.
1825).
187 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 3 (1810).
188 L. MILLER, supra note 183, at 31.
189 See Heydons Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1584); Jones, Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1940).
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tention. The manner in which that fact should be proved was a
very subordinate consideration. 190

In considering the attitudes of that time, an attempt to implement a higher law vitiating constitutional and statutory provisions
supporting slavery would have been an exercise in futility. With
a new social climate more hospitable to civil rights, the Court can
now act vigorously and affirmatively on ,behalf of disadvantaged
minorities. But even now, it is questionable how effective the law
can be in elevating the condition of the Negro. Visible improvements are apparent: Negroes appear frequently in public activities
and all communication media,' their political power has grown
enormously,' 9 2 prejudice and discrimination directed at the Negro
in the South has decreased, 9 3 and through it all the Supreme Court
has steadfastly adhered to its proscription of all racial classifications
inimical to the interests of the Negro if the State is involved to
some significant extent.9 4 Actually, however, in many respects
the Negro's position is probably worse now than in 1954, when
the Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education.9 5 The
190 10 U.S. at 6-7. In retrospect it seems that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the 1783 Maryland statute was correct, since the superseding act clearly
adopted his view.
Provided nevertheless, and be it enacted, that it shall and may be lawful
for any citizen or citizens of the United States who shall come into this
state with a bona fide intention of settling therein, to import or bring into
this state, at the time of his or her removal into this state, or within one
year hereafter, any slave or slaves the property of such citizen at the time of
his or her said removal, which slave or slaves, or the mother or mothers of
which slave or slaves, shall have been resident of the United States, or some
one of them, three whole years next preceding such removal, and the same
to retain as slaves. Act of Dec. 31, 1796, ch. 67, § 2.
191 The significance of the increased exposure of the Negro individual cannot be
overemphasized. Such exposure is one of the primary means of eliminating commonly held stereotypes concerning the "inherent" nature of "the Negro." See Lewis,
Parry and Riposte to Gregor's 'The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An
Assessment," 14 W. RES. L REv. 637, 676-77 (1963). There are social scientists who
contend that Negroes are inherently inferior. An excellent discussion and refutation
of "scientific racism" appears in I. NE BY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL

ScIENTIsTs AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGAION, 1954-1966 (1967).

192 See IL WARREN, THE CoMMUNITY IN AImmCA 45 (1963).
193 But see SouTHmu, JusTicE (L. Friedman ed. 1965). "White backlash" is
reflected in a recent Gallup Poll that indicated that 52% of all adults feel that integration is moving at too fast a pace. In 1962, only 32% of all adults expressed the
same opinion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1966, at 3, col. 3. On white backlash, see N.Y.
Times, Sept 19, 1966, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1966, at 1, col. 4; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1966, at 1, col. 2. See note 195 infra.
9
1 4 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
:95 347 U.S. 483 (1954). L Brant Dozell voices a pessimistic view concerning
the advisability as well as the effect of Brown:
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computer revolution, automation, and other technological advances
have combined to reduce sharply the demand for unskilled laborers.
This reduction in demand, in conjunction with the annual increase
during the 1960's of 11 million individuals to the labor force,
places a premium on skills and education,' and on both counts
Negroes are relatively deficient.'97 In an era of exponential population growth and technological development, 9 with a concomitant decrease in demand for, and increment in, unskilled Negro
laborers, the Negro unemployment program can only become exacerbated. If the Negro is, as Loren Miller suggests, a ward of
Our experience with race conflict during the past decade speaks for itself.
Before the desegregation decisions withdrew the problem from the organic
processes, the country's practices by and large had kept abreast of the country's attitudes; the progress that had been made toward improving race relations was thus progress in depth, progress bound to endure because it was
rooted in the consent and behavior of those directly concerned. After the
decisions, the possibilities of consensual adjustment and accommodation were
greatly diminished because of the wide gap between what was commanded
and what was desired; and that gap inevitably became filled with hostility.
Before the desegregation decisions, our society could respond relevantly to
the concrete challenges that changing times produced: it could develop a
living law on the race issue because the law, by definition, was attuned to
the lives of the people. After the decisions, the people, Negroes and whites
alike, were required to conform their lives to the prescriptions of ideology.
Before the desegregation decisions, different sections of the country could
deal with the race problem according to the capacities of their own districts
which had been destined by history and geography to be disparate. After
the decisions, dissimilars were treated as similars, diversity was expunged in
favor 'of a superficial uniformity. Before the desegregation decisions, the
country had approached the race issue as part of a multi-dimensional problem: there was not only the matter of giving the Negro his due, but also
the matters of preserving the integrity of community life, of maintaining
the country's federal political structure, of improving the country's schools,
of maintaining the public order, of keeping the country's economic system
flourishing, and so on. After the decisions, the issue became single-dimensional: all related problems became subordinate to the goal of satisfying the
Negroes' claims. L. DOZELL, THE WARREN REVOLUTION 33-34 (1966).
196 In this regard, consider Professor Sovern's appraisal:
[Almong all the varieties of racial discrimination in employment, racially
closed training systems stand out for their perniciousness. They cut off hope,
stifle growth, and block merit; and they lend specious credence to claims
that Negroes can not do skilled work. In the building trades, where most
of the nation's registered apprentices are to be found, unions are too frequently responsible for these wrongs. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

200 (1966).

19 7 For statistics comparing the educational and socioeconomic
groes and whites, see Lewis, supra note 191, at 660-71.
39 8 See note 46 supra. It appears that population is increasing
gains in productivity. See N.Y. Times, April 1, 1966, at 1, col. 2;
21, 1966, at 21, col. 1. Therefore, to transfer jobs from whites to
lead to greater dissension. More jobs and better living conditions
for all citizens, and the disparity between Negro and white, based
a caste system, must disappear.

situations of Nemore rapidly than
N.Y. Times, Sept.
Negroes will only
must be achieved
on ascription and
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the Court, it is society and not Mr. Chief Justice Marshall or the
Court that has placed him in that posture. Certainly, the delay in
offering affirmative protection is a product, at least in part, of the
Court's awareness of the limitations placed on it by the attitudes
and practices of the society upon which its precepts must act, and
be acted on, if its decisions are to become living law.
It is largely because of this awareness that the Court adopted
the "deliberate speed" formula in Brown v. Board of Education,'9 9
a formula that resembles "poetry... and equity techniques of discretionary accommodation between principle and expediency, but
which fits precisely one thing only, namely the unique function
of constitutional adjudication in the American system ....,2200
On occasions, the Court in recent years has misjudged the effective limits of its power. A classic example is provided by the
reversal, within the short space of 4 years, of McCollum v. Board
of Education0 1 by Zorach v. Clauson:2° The McCollum case held
invalid the Champaign, Illinois released schooltime program for
religious instruction, whereas the Zorach case upheld the New
York program even though the only distinction was the location of
the place for instruction." 3 The Illinois program, unlike the New
York program, provided for conducting religious classes in public
school buildings. Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in McCollum, dissented in Zorach and remonstrated: "As we
199 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
200

Bickel, Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50 (1961). But
see note 195 supra.
201333 U.S. 203 (1948).
202 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
203
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, found this distinction significant:
In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction
and the force of the public school was used to promote that instruction.
Here, as we have said, the public schools do no more than accommodate
their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction. We follow the
McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present released time
program unless separation of Church and State means that public institutions
can make no adjustments of their schedules to accommodate the religious
needs of the people. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion. Id. at 315.
It has been contended that coercion, rather than mere accommodation, was involved
in Zorach, the decision being "clearly wrong in having refused to permit the plaintiffs
to prove the coercive operation of the program." W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERiCAN CONSTrUTIONS 50 (1964). Professor Kauper believes that Zorach propounds
a new theory (accommodation) and that the Court "was making a distinction based
on the relative degree of involvement by the public school system in the program,
finding that the involvement here [Zorach] was not too great when public school
property itself was not used for this purpose." P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 67 (1964).
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attempted to make categorically clear, the McCollum decision would
have been the same if the religious classes had not been held in
the school buildings." ' 4
Mr. Justice Jackson, in a separate dissenting opinion, prophetically concluded:
The distinction attempted between that case [McCollum] and this
[Zorach] is trivial, almost to the point of cynicism, magnifying
its nonessential details and disparaging compulsion which was the
underlying reason for invalidity. A reading of the Court's opinion
in that case along with its opinion in this case will show such difference of overtones and undertones to make clear that the McCollum case has passed like a storm in a teacup. The wall which
the Court was professing to erect between Church and State has
become even more warped and twisted than I expected. Today's
judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and
of the judicial processes than to students of constitutional law.20 5
The public furor following McCollum dictated the Zorach
switch in time. Professor Kurland's critical comment constitutes
an apt appraisal: "If it is not fair to say that the Supreme Court
follows the election returns, it may nonetheless be true that there
are times when some of its members may seem to anticipate
them. 20 6
2
7
Are Ginzburg v. United States and Mishkin v.New York 11
also examples of retreat in the face of public reaction and resistance? Is it possible that "not very far back in the justices' minds
is an awareness of the danger in frustrating too often the conservative elements of the country in every area that concerns them?
Why not throw them a bone once in a while? Who cares about
Ralph Ginzburg?"20 9 Actually, Ginzburg and Mishkin propound
principles that are really ancillary to the greater protection given
to freedom of expression by the standard for obscenity enunciated
in the prevailing opinion in A Book Named Memoirs v.Attorney
General."' That this was not generally appreciated raises the per343 U.S. at 316.
05 Id. at 325.
20
6 Kurland, Of Church and State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 73 (1961). Again, the Court is going against public opinion on the subject of
religious exercises in public schools - an area where "feelings run deep and thoughts
tend to be shallow." See the prayer cases cited note 16(4) supra.
207 383 U.S. 463, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 934 (1966).
208 383 U.S. 502, rehearingdenied, 384 U.S. 934 (1966).
209 Friedman, The Ginzburg Decision and the Law, 36 Am. SCHOLAR 71, 79
(1966).
210 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
204
2
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plexing question of how the Court can better communicate with its
readers. Or perhaps the camouflage of Mishkin and Ginzburg
presents judicial craftsmanship at its best with the Court preparing
the public for the ultimate denouement of the sequel."' In any
event, the relationship between behavior and the Court's decisions
is complex and, given the limited resources of the Court, 12 in many
cases really not amenable to empirical inquiry.
If court proceedings and constitutional limitations on the use
of evidence at trial are involved the Court does have a direct means
of determining the effect of its judgments. Thus, by 1961 the
Court was able to discern that the application of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures to the
States in 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado," was "to grant the right but
in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment."' 4 But, in situations where the impact of the Court's rules is not directly observable, the behavioral and normative dimensions are largely unknown. Perhaps, in some instances the Court can state with assurance the consensus on a particular moral issue. In Cleveland v.
United States,215 taking as a point of departure the premise that
polygamy is "odious,"21 6 long "outlawed in our society," 217 a "return to barbarism,"2'18 and "contrary to the spirit of Christianity
and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world,""1 9 the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas,
concluded that interstate transportation of plural wives by members of the Fundamentalist Mormon sect constituted a violation of
the Mann Act, since transportation of a woman for polygamy was
for an "immoral purpose.1 20 With all that has transpired since
21lThe Court later restricts Ginzburg and Mishkin to their facts and virtually
vitiates what impact these decisions may have had. See Bickel, Obscenity Cases, NEW
REPUBLI, May 27, 1967, at 15, 16; Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), dis-

cussed notes 466-69 infra& accompanying text. See also note 514 infra.
21 2

See notes 124, 127-28 supra.

213 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
214 Mapp

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
21r 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
216Id. at 18, quoting from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
217 329 U.S. at 18.
218 Id. at 19, quoting from Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889).
219 329 U.S. at 19.
2 20
The Mann Act prohibits transportation in interstate commerce of "any woman
or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1964). Cleveland seems especially striking in light of
Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), where the Court held that the
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1946, however, it is questionable whether Mr. Justice Douglas
could approach even the Cleveland case in the same way today.
Further, most cases require a resolution of conflicting values and
norms for which no sound evidence of the community's moral sense
is available; instead, the Court resorts to "conjecture, hunch or intuition." ''
Studies that attempt to ascertain community norms
and "to gauge the extent to which legal norms are in harmony or
at variance with the moral sense of the community," do exist.222
Unfortunately, serious questions arise concerning the adequacy of
such studies. Of special relevance to our discussion is the continuing dialogue between law and morality. Commenting on the Cohen, Robson, and Bates study,2" Professor Skolnick notes:
[The study] .

.

. asks the respondent whether he believes in his

own mind that the law should allow parents to have complete
supervision of the way in which the child spends his earnings?
But this is very different from telling subjects that this is what
the law states and asking if they agree or disagree with it. The
point is not a quibble but is suggestive of
224 an important concern the opinion-creating force of law itself.

Admittedly, "[clomplete conformity of the value judgments of
governors and governed would only exist in an ideally complete
and homogeneous democracy - which never has existed,' ' 22 while
above provision of the Mann Act was not violated when a husband and wife, who ran
a house of prostitution, went on an interstate trip with several of their prostituteemployees, even though on the return trip it "was easy to argue that ... the girls were
being transported . .. for an immoral purpose." E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 47 (1949).
221

J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY

AND THE LAW 13 (1958).
2 22
1d. The study of Messrs. Cohen, Robson, and Bates is one example.
K.

BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES

See also

OF ExPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW

BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1957); Oikawa, Application of Beutel's Experimental
Jurisprudence to Japanese Sociology of Law, 39 NEB. L. REv. 629 (1960). See generally T. COWAN, THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE READER 189-229 (1956). Four
decades ago, Ehrlich outlined a project similar to that of Cohen, Robson, and Bates.

See E.

HRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 506 (W.

Moll transl. 1936). His major interest, however, was in "the actual practice of the
community, and not its abstract moral standard." Page, Professor Ehrlich's Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law, 1914 PROCEDINGS: AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW
SCHOOLS 60.
223 Note 221 supra.
224 Skolnick, The Sociology of Law in America: Overview and Trends, in LAw
AND SOCIETY 4, 31 (SOCIAL PROBLEMS Summer Supp. 1965).
22 5
Rheinstein, Sociology of Law. Apropos Moll's Translation of Eugen Ehrlich's
Grundlegung Der Sociologie Des Rechts, 48 INT'L J. ETHICS 232 (1938). Rheinstein considers it to be a "demand of political prudence that the norms for decision
which are prescribed to the judges by the lawmakers (or by judges to lawmakers)
conform to the value judgments held by the people whose controversies the judges
decide." Id.
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at the same time it should be recognized that the governors can
alter the values and behavior of the governed,2 ' although most
often "legal rules are behind, but eventually catch up to social
needs.""2 7 Courts may use legal propositions and rules as a lever
for social progress (as determined by the courts). The danger lies
in not knowing whether the weight of popular opinion constitutes
too great a load for the lever to bear. Several strategies are available: the Court can (1) do nothing;22. (2) prepare public opinion
by moving incrementally, step by step, "a sort of judicial inocula22 0

A nation which fought to make the world safe for democracy, believed

that German soldiers were bloody barbarians organized to rape women, fear
athletes' foot and pink tooth brush, knows that communism is against the
will of God, and is satisfied that public ownership of utilities is a greater
source of corruption than private ownership, offers little solace to one who
wishes to argue that mass human actions are neither controllable nor predictable. There is no reason why the arts of propaganda, applied economics, and advertising, can rest on scientific data while the art of the lawyer
must forever be founded on the occult mysteries of judicial hunch and professional dogma. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence,
48 HARV. L. REV. 169, 176-77 (1934).
227
Skolnick, supra note 224, at 32. Professor Skolnick is here setting forth the
view of Jerome Hall presented and documented in J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (1952). Llewellyn identifies, as a plank in the realists' platform, "[t]he conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the law, so that the probability is always given that any portion of law needs reexamination to determine how
far it fits the society it purports to serve." Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism
-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222,1236 (1931).
228Doing "nothing," however, may effectively result in making law. Thus, in
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), the
Court's conclusion that "it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules
of contribution [among mutual wrongdoers) and that the solution of this problem
should await congressional action," id. at 285, illustrates the "paradox of making law
by refusing to make law." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 515 (tent ed. 1958). In fact,
Halcyon made law that was inconsistent with the inarticulate premise of the case. See
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 135 (1956)
(Black, J., dissenting); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra at 515-46. The Court may display
"passive virtues" and deny certiorari as it has done frequently in cases raising de facto
segregation issues, e.g., Addabbo v. Donovan, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); Downs v. Board of
Educ., 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Balaban v. Rubin, 379 U.S. 881 (1964); Bell v. School,
City of Gary Indiana, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); see A. BICIL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962). It is generally agreed that denial of certiorari "imports nothing as to
the merits of the case."

C. WEIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 431 (1963).

But, in Ross v.

State, 246 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 969 (1952), where
a Negro defendant was convicted by an all-white jury and Negroes were precluded,
in effect, from participation as jurors by the prosecutor's exercise of his peremptory
challenges, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed: "The identical question
was decided adversely to the appellant in McMurrin v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 239 S.W.
2d 632. This was also a case from Galveston County ....
The Supreme Court of the
United States refused writ of certiorari ....
In our view their holding is conclusive

against the contention in the instant case." 246 S.W.2d at 886. See Harper & Pratt,
What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During The 1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
439, 444-46 (1953).
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tion calculated to give the public a partial immunity to the afflic'
tion [sooni . . . to ensue;"229
(3) increase the tensile strength of the
lever. The latter requires, in our society, enhancing the prestige
of the Court, which in turn is served by leading, but not by forcing,
and by the Court's knowing the effective limits of its reach - a
task that requires "right-minded, learned, careful, wise [judges who
can] ... find and voice from among the still fluid materials of the
legal sun the answer which will satisfy, and which will render
semisolid one more point, as a basis for a further growth,"' ' ° in
short, a prescience greater than that we mortals generally possess.
It seems that the sensible approach is to move cautiously, by
margins or increments,23 as the Court has done in cases involving
racial discrimination," 2 with corrective adjustments being rendered
229 Pollak, Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (1963).
Professor Pollak suggests that Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), was possibly an
inoculation to prepare the public for Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963), since "the public outcry sure to be engendered by a seeming judicial
assault on the Lord's Prayer and the Bible might in some degree be mitigated by the
prior decision of a kindred but less unsettling case .... " Pollak, supra. Professor Shapiro makes a similar suggestion regarding Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its
progeny. See M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROAcHES TO POLITICAL JuIuSPRUDJNCB 250-52 (1964).
2
30 COMMON LAW TRADITION 185.
231
See note 132 supra.
232 The Court upheld as constitutional a Louisiana statute requiring racial segregation in railroad passenger cars in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The
Court also held that the 14th amendment requires "absolute equality of the two races
before the law," id. at 544, thereby giving birth to the invidious "separate but equal"
doctrine. From its inception, this doctrine was a fiction. Initially, there existed virtually a conclusive presumption that facilities were equal. Given the basic fact of
racial classification, the presumed fact of equality of facilities followed, evidence to
the contrary being considered irrelevant. The next major step was to regard racially
segregated facilities as only prima facie equal. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
Finally, in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it was held that racially
segregated facilities are conclusively unequal. Thus, equality of facilities again becomes irrelevant. "The sufficiency of Negro facilities is beside the point, it is the
segregation by race that is unconstitutional." Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S.
526, 538 (1963). A parallel incremental approach was used to develop the constitutional fiction that the term "citizen" in U.S. CONST. art. III includes corporations
for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. A corporation was held not to be such a
"citizen" in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). The
next step: the members of the corporation are prima facie citizens of the State of incorporation, therefore allowing the corporation to institute actions in federal courts
based on diversity of citizenship, unless it was shown that one or more members were
citizens of the same State as that of the opposing litigant. Commercial & R.R. Bank
v. Slocomb, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60 (1840). Finally, it was conclusively presumed that
the members of a corporation are citizens of the State of incorporation. Marshall v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853); see FED. R. CIrv. P. Form 2.
For the commerce clause sequence, see Note, An Appropriate Constitutional Prorision
for Dealing With Problems of Discrimination, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 964, 971-76
(1967). On the more recent, and much shorter, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 sequence, see id. at 977-82.
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in the process. On occasion, however, the Court takes giant steps
unnecessarily. The clearest example is provided by contrasting
Gideon v. Wainwright"33 with Douglas v. California.23 4 Both
cases were decided on the same day and both could have been
disposed of on due process grounds. Gideon held that the due
process clause of the 14th amendment "requires appointment of
counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in
a federal court."2'35 Douglas, instead of relying on due process, held
that the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment was violated "where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has
"236 The
as of right are decided without benefit of counsel ....
to
failure
to
appoint
counsel
Court in Douglas could have held that
assist an indigent accused in his one and only appeal as of right was
a denial of the due process clause of the 14th amendment."7 Application of the due process rationale to Douglas would have constituted only a step along a well-travelled path. The use of the
equal protection clause was a leap into the unknown!
The unqualified right to counsel at the trial level was a long time
in coming, but when that day finally arrived it may have found
the Court in a most expansive -

explosive, if you will -

mood.

[Douglas does not) . . . stop at discretionary review and post-

conviction proceedings. Indigent persons may find that they also
have been awarded absolute rights to assigned counsel in justice
courts, juvenile proceedings, probation revocation hearings everywhere a rich man may appear with counsel.

to be
The case may signify that an indigent defendant is2 entitled
38
furnished various forms of aid other than Couansel.
The Supreme Court's use of broad principles, where narrower
ones would suffice, has occurred in numerous other instances.2 39
233

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

284 372

U.S. 353 (1963).

235 372 U.S. at 340.
236372 U.S. at 357.
237 Note, Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Appeals,

1959 DuxE LJ. 484, 489-90. The Court also could have held that having provided
an appeal, due process required the State to furnish the indigent accused with counsel
to make the appeal meaningful. This is analogous to the holding of Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
238
Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
andLegal-Policy Observations,48 MINN. L REy. 1, 7 (1963).
239
1n some circumstances, use of the equal protection clause constitutes an approach more moderate and restricted than other avenues open to the Court. Mr. Justice Jackson was sensitive to the value of using the equal protection clause to invalidate
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The failure of the Court to fashion appropriate and precise rules,

sufficiently differentiated for guidance in administrative law situations, led Professor Kenneth Davis to suggest:
(1) The Court probably should write fewer general essays in its
opinions and it should give more meticulous care to the ones it
does write. (2) The Court should take greater advantage of the
values of case-to-case development of law. (3) The Court should
make further effort to reduce the frequency of contradictory holdings, and it should check its apparently growing tendency to indulge in easy generalizations that are misleading if read literally.
(4) The Court should have greater respect for its holdings and for
its own opinions; without restricting its freedom to overrule, it
should restrict its freedom to violate its own doctrine. (5) The
Court should inquire whether it is often too lighthearted about the
manipulation of technical doctrine2in
40 order to produce desired substantive results in particular cases.
B.

The Danaides Ploy
Alice laughed. "There's no use
trying," she said; "one can't believe
impossible things."
"I daresay you haven't had much
practice," said the White Queen.
"When I was your age, I always did it
for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes
I've believed as many as six impossible
things before breakfast."
LEWIS CARROLL

THROUGH THE LooKING-GLAss
Equity judges have long respected the requirement that a decree is ineffective unless enforceable. Therefore, equity orders will
not issue if impossible standards must be imposed or extraordinary
court supervision is necessary for enforcement of the decree.2 4'
State action where it would "not disable any governmental body from dealing with the
subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a
broader [or narrower] impact." Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 112 (1949); see Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATHOLIC U.L Rnv. 20, 32-34 (1967). On the Court's use of the equal protection clause
generally, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341 (1949).
240

Quoted in A. MASON & W.

BEANEY,

THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SO-

CIETY 318 (1959).
241
See W. DEFuNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 165-69 (2d ed. 1956).
Although it follows that equity will not affirmatively enjoin an opera singer to perform pursuant to his contract, a decree will issue prohibiting the singer from breaching
explicit or implicit negative covenants in his contract by performing for others. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
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Usually, the law recognizes the requirement that it cannot command the impossible:
common sense [compels one to accept] . . . the ruling, cited by
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II., which enacts that a
prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire, "for
he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'242
The most notable exception is the M'Naghten standard which imposes criminal responsibility if a defendant, at the time of the criminal act, "had that competent use of his understanding as that he
knew that he was doing, by the very act itself, a wicked and a
wrong thing... [and was] ... capable of distinguishing between
right and wrong."2'43 The criminal defendant whose cognitive facilities are relatively intact but whose volitional or affective apparatus is nonfunctional, and whose aberrant behavior cannot possibly be controlled, is criminally liable, and in fact, may be required
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that he is insane.'
If
the justification for the criminal law and other restraints on our
freedom is that the penalties imposed will deter antisocial acts and
thus inure to the public welfare, then the M'Naghten standard is
patently absurd. 'Nothing can more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting insanity than the proposition equally objectionable in its humanity and its logic, that the insane should be
punished for criminal acts, in order to deter other insane persons
from doing the same thing."4 5
Of course, other grounds do exist for sustaining the use of the
M'Naghten standard. 6 To satisfy substantive due process, State
242Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892).
PRNcIPLES OF CRMNAL LAW 377-426 (1947).

See gen-

erally J.HALL, GENRAL
2 43

The Queen v. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).

SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE or INsANiTY (1967).
244 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The State

See generally R.

must, however, afford the

defendant a fair hearing on the issue of his sanity. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966); United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). But see Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948), on remand, 34
Cal. 2d 144, 208 P.2d 668, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949).
245 I. RAY, TRHATISH ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANIrY 56 (5th
ed. 1871).
246
It is possible to consider the criminal law as "an instrument for reenforcing
and celebrating the moral prindpiles of sodety." Sacher, Behavioral Science and Crimial Law, ScmNTIFIc AM., Nov. 1963, at 39, 40. Given this view, M'Naghten might
make sense, since the common law required "concurrence of an evil-meaning mind
with an evil-doing hand," Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952),
for conviction. Negation by reason of insanity of the mens rea requisite for the crime,
fits nicely as a test for criminal responsibility. An obvious alternative for reenforcing
and celebrating the community's moral sense is civil commitment to a mental hospital
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laws must have a purpose reasonably related to some legitimate
subject of governmental action, be reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that purpose, and not be arbitrary or excessive.
Statutes enacted to advance the public health, safety, morals, prosperity, welfare, or convenience are valid and constitutional,247 unless they attempt to achieve their purpose "by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." '48 The M'Naghten test is reasonably related to a legitimate
subject of governmental action - protection of society and its
moral code. Whether it is too broad and invades an area of protected freedom - a peripheral or penumbral right emanating from
the Bill of Rights - has not yet been determined by the Court. 4 9
This would reenforce the community values, rehabilitate the mentally ill "wrongdoer,"
and protect society, without requiring the sacrifice of a mentally ill individual. Of
course, the vindictive element of the populace would be deprived of its satisfaction.
247 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (White J., concurring).
Thus, even though one cannot demonstrate that exposure to obscenity results in antisocial behavior, see Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of
Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009 (1962);
cf. note 444 infra, society may validly legislate against obscenity because it "offend[s]
the moral concepts of the people as a whole, and the people have the right to establish
codes of right conduct for literature as well as for other forms of community conduct."
State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ohio C.P. 1948). This basis satisfies the requirement that "[i]n a democratic state those who would justify . . . [censorship],
even as applied to seemingly worthless or offensive material, should be required to
assume the burden of proving that regulatory action is necessary for the welfare of
society." Note, Entertainment: Public Pressures and the Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 326,
367 (1957).
248
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). The State can legislate what
amounts to "a significant encroachment upon personal liberty .. . only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960).
249
An argument can be made that the eighth amendment's proscription of "cruel
and unusual punishments" bars conviction of the mentally ill, for "however insanity
is defined, it is in end effect treated as a disease. While afflicted people may be confined either for treatment or for the protection of society, they are not branded as
criminals." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Robinson, the Court held unconstitutional as conflicting with the eighth
amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" a California statute making it
a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for any person to be "addicted to the
use of narcotics." Mr. Justice Fortas, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Budd
v. California, 385 U.S. 909 (1966), observed:
Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Robinson makes it dear that
a State may not constitutionally inflict punishment for an illness, whether
the illness be narcotics addiction or "the common cold." [370 U.S. at 667)
.... Our morality does not permit us to punish for illness. We do not impose punishment for involuntary conduct, whether the lack of volition results from "insanity," addiction to narcotics, or from other illnesses. The
use of the crude and formidable weapon of criminal punishment of the
alcoholic is neither seemly nor sensible, neither purposeful nor civilized.
This Court should determine whether it is constitutionally permissible, or
whether, as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit [Driver v. Hinnant,
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Closely related to the M'Naghtez problem is the issue of strict
liability. Although one acts with "due care and with an innocent
intent,'' 250 in certain instances liability is imposed.

Although Pro-

fessor Fuller believes civil liability without fault can be justified
"by the economic principle that the foreseeable social costs of an
enterprise ought to be reflected in the private costs of conducting
that enterprise," ' ' he views criminal liability without fault as
"the most serious infringement of the principle that the law should
not command the impossible. ' 52 The Court justifies strict criminal liability on public policy grounds:
The purposes of this legislation [Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. § 301-92 (1964)1 thus touch phases of the lives and
health of people which, in the circumstances of modem industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection. .

.

. The prosecution to

which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now familiar type
of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct - awareness of some wrongdoing. In
the interests of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
253 innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger.
The most appropriate response is that of Professor Sayre who
warned:
When the law begins to permit convictions for serious offenses
of men who are morally innocent and free from fault, who may
even be respected and useful members of the community, its restraining power becomes undermined. Once it becomes respectable to be convicted, the vitality of the criminal law has been
sapped. It is no answer that judges convinced of the actual moral
innocence of the defendant, may impose only a nominal punishment. The harm is wrought through the conviction itself ....
For true crimes, it is imperative that courts should not relax the
requirement of the mens rea or guilty intent.2" 4
At times the Court propounds rules that cannot be performed
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966)] and four of the eight judges of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966)] have held, it is cruel and unusual
punishment - punishment in the absence of volitional fault, punishment
which our Constitution forbids. 385 U.S. at 911-13.
25
0L.FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (1964).
251 Id.at 75.
2521d. at 77.
253United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943).

An excellent
history of the doctrine of strict liability is supplied in Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952).
- Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLUm. L REv. 55, 79-80 (1933).
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because either they are incomprehensible25 5 or they set an impossible standard. A perfect example of the latter is the federal harm25
less error rule enunciated in Chapman v. California.
Chapman
proclaimed that "the beneficiary of a constitutional error [must]
...prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained. '" '
Rejecting a rule requiring reversal whenever federal constitutional errors are committed, the Court declared that "there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant
and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed harmless, not resuiting in the automatic reversal of the conviction." 218 The Court
apparently believes that in some instances comment on the failure
of the defendant to take the stand to testify in his own behalf may
constitute harmless error, even though the no-comment rule was
applied to the States to make the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination fully meaningful in Griffin v. California in 1965. In Chapman, which itself involved a Griffin problem, the Court found harmful error since
the state prosecutor's argument and the trial judge's instruction to
the jury continuously and repeatedly impressed the jury that from
the refusal of petitioners to testify, to all intents and purposes, the
inferences from the facts in evidence had to be drawn in favor of
the State - in short, that by their silence petitioners had served
as irrefutable witnesses against themselves. And this was a case
that, while presenting a reasonably strong "circumstantial web of
evidence" against petitioners .... was also a case in which, absent
the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts. Under
these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that
the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
25 5

See notes 443-90 infra & accompanying text. If sufficiently vague the law
may of course be declared unconstitutional. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
256386 U.S. 18 (1967), noted in 19 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 157 (1967).
257 386 U.S. at 24.
For purposes of criminal law, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is generally defined as "that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition
that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth
of the charge." Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850). This definition is adopted in 1 F. WHARTON, CEIMINAL EVmDNCE § 12 (12th ed. 1955).
258 386 U.S. at 22.

259 380 U.S. 609 (1965). One reason why the Court may have hesitated to find
comment always harmful is that previously it held that "the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth" and
applied the Griffin rule prospectively. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 416 (1966); see discussion notes 339-402 infra & accompanying text.
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prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioners' convictions. 260

Would it ever be possible for the State to demonstrate beyond
a reasonable doubt that a Griffin proscribed comment was harmless?.. 1 In the petition for rehearing, counsel for the respondent
contended that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in effect
makes all constitutional errors harmful, necessitating an automatic
reversal. 22 The difficulty in demonstrating that a Griffin error is
harmless is exemplified by the situation that arose in a recent Ohio
case."6 8 An official booklet of the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County, entitled Informaion for Trial Jurors, prepared
by the County over a decade ago, contained the following language:
"Q.Should consideration be given to the failure of the defendant
to take the stand as a witness? . .. [Tihe failure of the defendant
to testify may be considered by the Court and the jury and may be
made the subject of comment by counsel.."26 4 Each week the
County distributed the booklets to prospective jurors prior to the
time that they reported to various courtrooms for selection to serve
on juries in specific cases. Therefore, it is not surprising that neither defendants nor their counsel were aware of the improper comment contained in the booklets, "5 although they were in use at
200 386 U.S. at 25-26.
261 Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Chapman advocated an automatic reversal in Griffin situations since it "would seem best calculated to prevent
clear violations of Griffin v. California." Id, at 45.
262Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 2, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
rehearingdenied, 386 U.S. 389 (1967).
263 Lewis v. Janis, No. 17,880 (6th Cir. May 25, 1967). The jurisdictional basis
for the petition for habeas corpus addressed to a federal circuit judge is of interest,
but not directly relevant to this article, except insofar as to note that since no State
remedies were effectively available to the defendants or petitioner for habeas corpus,
see OmIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1966); Lindsay v. Green, 9 Ohio
St. 2d 102, 223 N.E.2d 913 (1967); Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N.E.
2d 885 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1017 (1966), the federal habeas corpus action
ought to lie since the Great Writ "has been over the centuries a means of obtaining
justice and maintaining the rule of law when other procedures have been unavailable
or ineffective." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 583 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Where "federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
264 CUYAHOGA COURT OP COMMON PLEAS, INFORMATION FOR TRIAL JURORS

16-17 (undated). OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10, as amended September 3, 1912, authorized such comment.
205
The submission of written instructions to the jury out of the presence and
knowledge of counsel undoubtedly also violated the sixth amendment's guarantee of
right to counsel, made applicable to the States through the due process clause of the
14th amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Is it possible for
the right to counsel to be "fully meaningful" if instructions are given to the jury out
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least as late as March 1967 (Griffin v. California was decided on
April 28, 1965).266 (Can this be law-in-books transmuted into
law-in-action?) Someone, however, did decide that the situation
was improper and attempted to correct the error by drawing a line
through the offensive language. Unfortunately, this action only
served to draw attention to the quoted language, and thus to the
failure of the defendant to take the stand - the error Griffin
sought to eliminate. 67 Assuming that the language in the booklet
constitutes improper comment,"' it is incredible to believe that the
State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not conof the presence of counsel under circumstances that result in counsel's complete lack
of knowledge of the giving of jury instructions or the substance thereof? This appears to be a more flagrant deprivation of the right to a fair trial than that involved
in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966), in which a bailiff assigned to shepherd a sequestered jury had stated to one juror, "Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty,"
and to another juror, "If there is anything wrong [in finding him guilty] the Supreme
Court will correct it." In reversing the defendant's conviction for second-degree murder, the Court stated:
We believe that the statements of the bailiff to the jurors are controlled
by the command of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial
jury... [and the right to] be confronted with the witnesses against him .. "
As we said in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473 (1965), "the
'evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand
in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel."
385
U.S. at 364.
In the situation presented by the use of the jury pamphlet, just as in Parker, counsel
was afforded no opportunity to pass upon the validity of statements prior to their publication to the jury. The improper comment was never brought to his attention, so
he could never have the opportunity to object to the statements. How evanescent is
the right to counsel if the State may improperly instruct a jury with impunity so long
as it does so in a way that will escape the scrutiny of counsel?
266 After April 28, 1965, the day Griffin was decided, it is difficult to conceive
of a counsel so obtuse as not to automatically object to an instruction telling the jury
that "the failure of the defendant to testify may be considered by the Court and jury
and may be made the subject of comment by counsel." If such an instruction was
given, in addition to moving for a mistrial counsel might request that the trial court
charge the jury that they could not take into account the failure of the defendant to
take the stand and testify in his behalf. The rationale of Bruno v.United States, 308
U.S. 287 (1939), combined with Griffin, would grant the defendant the right to such
a charge, although the Court in Griffin expressly reserved decision on that point.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 n.6 (1965).
26 7
See id. at 614-15.
268 Griffin does not spell out what constitutes "comment." See Note, Griffin v.
California: Comment on Accused's Failure to Testify Prohibited by the Fifth Amenduent, 70 DICK. L. REv. 98 (1965); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967). It is arguable
that an unconstitutional comment would appear only if the booklet had stated that the
jury could draw an inference of guilt from the failure of the defendant to take the
stand. Although not explicit, that implication is apparent in the language actually
used.
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tribute to the conviction of a defendant in a case in which the booklet was used.26"
Another aspect of the Chapman rule presents a masochistic inversion of the Danaides theme. The Court has probably imposed
an impossible incubus on its collective nine shoulders, since the
adoption of the rule commits it "to a case-by-case examination to
determine the extent to which [it] . . think[sl unconstitutional
comment on a defendant's failure to testify influenced the outcome
of a particular trial. This burdensome obligation is one that [it
is] ... hardly qualified to discharge."27

This is not the first time

the Court has foisted on itself an impossible task. The rule for
determining whether material is obscene and not within the purview of the first amendment embodies standards271 that require a
case-by-case Supreme Court evaluation for meaningful protection. 2

Thus, the Court is saddled with "the irksome and inevitably unpopular and unwholesome task of finally deciding by a case-bycase, sight-by-sight personal judgment of the members of this Court
what pornography (whatever that means) is too hard core for
'
One may agree that the Court has a duty
people to see or read."273
to decide obscenity cases, while also urging that it fashion a rule
2 69
In the Ohio case illustrated, a determination on the merits has not yet been
made. The federal habeas corpus action was dismissed on the ground that an unexhausted State remedy was available, which was true after newspaper publicity concerning the federal action brought the situation to the attention of interested defendants and their counsel. See note 263 supra.
270 386 U.S. at 45 (Stewart, J., concurring).
271 There are three independent elements, each of which must exist before matter
is considered "obscene" and not protected by the first amendment:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value. A Book Named Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413,
418 (1966).
272 This is necessitated because the standards are so vague that they provide insufficient guidance for lower courts. See notes 443-90 infra & accompanying text
273
AMishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
We are told that the only way we can decide whether a State or municipality can constitutionally bar movies is for this Court to view and appraise
each movie on a case-by-case basis. Under these circumstances, every member of the Court must exercise his own judgment as to how bad a picture is,
a judgment which is ultimately based at least in part on his own standard
of what is immoral. The end result [is] . . . a purely personal determination by individual justices as to whether a particular picture viewed is too
bad to allow it to be seen by the public. Such an individualized determination cannot be guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards. Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690-91
(1959) (Black, J., concurring).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19: 528

that is operational without a full-time commitment by the Court.
The problem is compounded when the Court propounds other
rules that involve standards requiring case-by-case analysis. For
example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,274 the Court held:
The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge that it 27
was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
5
false or not.
In subsequent cases, the determination of whether the Sullivan
standard was met has resulted in opinions discussing at length the
evidence presented at the trial and the relative significance of the
circumstances 276 - opinions reminiscent of the search for the "special circumstances" of the Betts v.Brady 77 doctrine.
[W]e are rapidly but surely getting ourselves in the dilemma we
found ourselves in when we were compelled to overrule the illstarred case of Betts v. Brady ... in order that the state courts of

the country might be able to determine with some degree of certainty when an indigent person was entitled to the benefit of a
lawyer and avoid the spawning of hundreds of habeas corpus cases
that finally raised
questions that a lawyer could and would have
278
raised at trial.
274

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

27

SId. at 279-80.
276See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v.

Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The same is
true in the extension of Sullivan to right of privacy actions.

See Time, Inc. v. Hill,

385 U.S. 374 (1967).
277 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
No discernible consistency appears in the Court's decisions spelling out what special circumstances dictated that counsel was necessary to
afford the defendant a fair trial. Suppose the Supreme Court had been aware of the
behavioral analysis by Kort and Lawlor of the right to counsel cases that revealed a
consistency in the applicable doctrine. See Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions
Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the "Right to Counsel" Cases, 51 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 1 (1957). The assumptions and methodology of this first attempt
were subsequently questioned in an article by Fisher, which concluded that the "circumstances which permit the legitimate construction of a perfectly predicting weighting scheme are precisely those under which all cases that arise present no new features
and are covered by clear precedents [Cardozo's easy cases]." Fisher, The Mathematical
Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions: Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods, 52
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 321 (1958). See also Kort, Reply to Fisher's Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions, 52 AM. PoL. ScI. REV. 339 (1958); G. SCHUBERT,
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAvioR (1959). Hans Baade suggests that
instead of overruling Betts in Gideon, the Court might have adopted the behaviorally
consistent interpretation of existing doctrine. Baade, Foreward, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 1, 3 (1963). But would mathematical or statistical consistency satisfy the need
for apparent rationality and guidance?
278 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 172 (1967)
(Black, J.,concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
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The main reason for this quite contradictory action [reversal of
Associated Press v. Walker (the companion case to Butts) and
affirmance of Curtis Publishipg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967).] ... is that the Court looks at the facts in both cases as
though it were a jury.... That seems a strange way to erect a constitutional standard for libel cases.... In the final analysis, what
we do in these circumstances is to review the factual questions in
cases decided by juries279- a review which is in flat violation of the
Seventh Amendment.

All such burdens are not totally self-imposed.280 Congress in
the Employers Liability Act of April 22, 1908,281 extended workmen's compensation to railroad employees who were injured while
2791d. at 171.
That the evidence might support a verdict under New York Times cannot
justify our taking from the jury the function of determining, under proper
instructions, whether the New York Times standard has been met The
extent of this Court's role in reviewing the facts, in a case such as this, is to
ascertain whether there is evidence by which a jury could reasonably find
liability under the constitutionally required instructions.. . . When, as in
this case, such evidence appears, the proper disposition in this federal case is
to reverse and remand with direction for a new trial. Id. at 174 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Mr. Chief Justice Warren has suggested a similar approach to obscenity:
I would commit the enforcement of this rule [the "prurient interest" test
of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)] to the appropriate state and
federal courts, and I would accept their judgments made pursuant to the
Roth rule, limiting myself to a consideration only of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record upon which a finding of obscenity could be
made.... This is the only reasonable way I can see to obviate the necessity
of this Court's sitting as the Super Censor of all the obscenity purveyed
throughout the Nation. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202-03 (1964).
Mr. Justice Brennan, found this suggestion
appealing, since it would lift from our shoulders a difficult, recurring, and
unpleasant task. But we cannot accept it. [Except in Sullivan-type situations. See his language in Curtis, set forth supra.] Such an abnegation of
judicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent with our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees. Since it is only "obscenity" that is exduded from the constitutional protection, the question whether a particular
work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional law ...
Such an issue, we think, must ultimately be decided by this Court. Oar duty
admits of no "substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems of
constitutional judgment involved in every obscenity case." [354 U.S. at 498]
378 U.S. at 187-88.
280 When Congress imposed a similar burden on the Court to determine on the basis
of the facts whether an injured railroad employee was involved in interstate commerce,
it became "a source of jurisdiction both prodigal of the Court's time and indifferent
to the Court's significance." F. FRANKKMTBR & J. LANDIs, TH BusINEss OF THE
SuPRmdE COURT 209 (1928).
The Court must share some of the blame, even in this instance. In Howard v.
Illinois C.R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1908), the Employers Liability Act of June 11, 1906,
34 Stat. 232, was held unconstitutional on the ground that it redressed injuries occurring in intrastate commerce. The Act of 1908 (see note 281 infra) was passed as
a result of this holding, and it was the one which caused the problems discussed in
the text
281 Ch. 149, 35 Stat 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1964).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:

528

engaged in work in interstate commerce. The attempt to draw a
line between interstate and intrastate commerce produced a plethora of cases, characterized by Professors Frankfurter and Landis as
"the most copious and futile waste of the Supreme Court's efforts."28' 2 Measures were introduced in Congress to eliminate the
duty to hear such cases,283 and ultimately legislation was enacted
"to save the Supreme Court from the voluminous futilities of employers liability litigation." 84 The obvious difference is that where
the duty is self-imposed it is the Court that must revise its rules,
just as in Gideon it overturned the Betts standard.
With the prior situations in mind, the next topic for consideration concerns whether "change" is desirable and instances in
which "change" is too frequent.
C. The Tantalus Ploy
'V0 Oysters, come and walk with as!"
The Walrus did beseech.
"A pleasant walk, a pleasant talk,
Along the briny beach."
LEwis CARROLL

THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASs

Several years ago, Professor Israel, in a persuasive and welldocumented article, demonstrated that the Court frequently writes
opinions in which prior cases are treated as "anachronism[sl when
handed down"28 and abruptly overruled when other techniques of
overruling are available that would enhance the image of the Court
as a "disinterested decision-maker applying those fundamental
values reflected in the constitution. 28 6
282 F. FRANKFURTER & J.LANDIS, supra note 279, at 208.
283 [I) t was . .. the decision of questions like these [interstate vs. intrastate]

from which Congress sought to relieve this court by the Act of September
6, 1916. . . .Of the cases on the docket for the preceding term of this court
37 presented the question whether the employee was engaged in interstate or
intrastate commerce. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 299
n.1 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
284 F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIs, supra note 279, at 213. The legislation, 39
Star. 726 (1916), 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964), also substituted discretionary for mandatory appellate review in a number of instances. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
supra note 279, at 211-14. The legislation was effective, although FELA cases "still
evoke [d] needless certiorari." Id. at 214; see note 129 supra.
28
5 Mr. Justice Black accepted this characterization of Betts v. Brady in Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
286 Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963

SUPRME
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A general willingness to adhere to precedent has always been an
important aspect of this framework [that maintains the Court's
image). Certainly, the Court could not have maintained its role
as the interpreter of a document that symbolizes continuity if its
decisions had, as Justice Jackson once claimed, "a mortality rate
almost as high as their authors." ... So too, the view of the Court
as an impersonal adjudicator has depended to some degree on the
assumption that the judge, unlike the legislator, is sharply restricted in relying upon his personal predilections by the necessity

of following the decisions of his predecessors.... [Slome danger
is inherent in almost every overruling decision, and each case that

does emphasize the personal and temporary quality of a judicial
rule further tarnishes the image that is necessary to maintain judi287
cial review in a democracy.

One example, not discussed by Professor Israel in his article,2 ss
exemplifies the most egregious application of the Tantalus ploy. In
8 9 the
Tnupiano v. United States,"
Court held that unless the circumCOURT REV. 211, 217. For a comprehensive discussion of precedent techniques, see
COMMON LAW TRADITION 77-91.
287 Israel, supra note 286, at 217-19.
Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the practicing profession
that this Court no longer respects impersonal rules of law but is guided in
these matters by personal impressions which from time to time may be
shared by a majority of Justices. Whatever has been intended, this Court
also has generated an impression in much of the judiciary that regard for
precedents and authorities is obsolete, that words no longer mean what they
have always meant to the profession, that the law knows no fixed principles.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 535 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Contrast Mr. Justice Jackson's view with that of Professor Llewellyn who finds that
[tjoday no person feels The Law to wobble when a case that is obsolete is
laid to rest, or when one which was a blob is corrected, nor does face require
a court to pose as the Voice of Infallibility, nor yet does open overruling for
sufficient cause either shock or dismay... One can almost urge that a frank
overruling, when it does crop up brings with it something of relief: that
point, at least, can for a while be counted on as clear. COMMON LAw TRADITION 256-57.
Mr. Justice Black apparently is quite proud of his frank overruling of Betts in Gideon.
In Garrison he writes: "I would hold now and not wait to hold later, compare Betts
v. Brady . . . overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright . . . that under our constitution
there is absolutely no place in this country for the old, discredited Star Chamber law
of seditious libel." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1964) (Black, J.,concurting).
288Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Gideon naturally provides one of Israel's best
examples, for
the Court in Gideon could easily have relied upon at least two of those rationales that have traditionally been employed in overruling opinions. Not
only were arguments based upon the "lessons of experience" and the requirements of later precedent relevant and persuasive, but they had been urged
upon the Court both by the petitioner's brief and by the separate opinions
of Justices Douglas and Black in two recent cases [-McNeal v. Calver, 365
U.S. 109, 117-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 517-20 (1962) (Black, J.,concurring)]. Israel, supra note 286,
at 269.
289 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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stances were such as to "make it unreasonable or impracticable to
require the arresting officer to equip himself with a search warrant,' 29° a search without a warrant was invalid. Trapiano was
overruled within a year in United States v. Rabinowitz, 9 1 in which
the Court held:
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States,...

requires a search

warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it
rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful
arrest, that case is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it
is reasonable to292procure a search warrant, but whether the search
was reasonable.
The tantalizing judicial sleight of hand - now you see it, now you
29
don't - begins in Schmerber v. California.
Is it Trupiano or is it
Rabinowitz which is "left as a derelict bound to occasion collisions
on the waters of the law"? 294 Schmerber raised the same issues, concerning blood tests made without the consent of a driver suspected
of operating his vehicle while intoxicated, that had been resolved
earlier in Breithaupt v. Abram.2" 5 In Schmerber, the Court again
upheld the validity of the blood test, even though in the interim
period the peripheral rights approach that had been developed in a
series of cases"' seemed to read into the Bill of Rights whatever
ancillary rules were necessary to make the explicit guarantees fully
meaningful. 2 7 The following language of the Schmerber opinion
is of special interest: "Search warrants are ordinarily required for
searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. ' 2 8 Is
29
01d. at 708. Earlier the Court had stated: "There are exceptional circumstances
in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of
privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed
with." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1947).
291 339 U.S. 56 (1949).
292 d. at 66.
298 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
294 Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see note 406 infra.

295 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
296 See cases cited note 10 supra.

297 Justice Douglas, in dissent, remarks:
We are dealing with the right of privacy which, since the Breithaupt case,
we have held to be within the penumbra of some specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights ....
Thus, the Fifth Amendment marks "a zone of privacy"
which the Government may not force a person to surrender ....
Likewise

the Fourth Amendment recognizes that right when it guarantees the right
of the persons to be secure "in their persons." . . . No clearer invasion of
this right of privacy can be imagined than forcible blood-letting of the kind
involved here. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 778-79 (1966).
298Id. at 770.
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it startling to discover that this language was interpreted as indicating a return to the Trupiano doctrine 29 and that "it may be that
shortly the Court will require that search without warrant be done
only when the delay incident to obtaining and serving a warrant
will result in the disappearance of the material which is to be
seized"?3 0 Obviously, a communication and promulgation problem was involved,3 0 ' for within the year, the Court, in Cooper v.
0 2 flatly stated that:
California,"
It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search
warrant, for "[tjhe relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable."
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66.803

Was the Trupiano doctrine finally put to rest in Cooper? Consider the following recent statements of the Court:
But even if we assume, although we do not decide, that the exigent
circumstances in this case made lawful a search without a warrant

only for the suspect or his weapons, it cannot be said on this record that the officer who found the clothes in the washing machine
was not searching for weapons. 304
But if its rejection [the "mere evidence" rule of Gouled v. United
States, 255 US. 298, 309 (1921)] does enlarge the area of permissible searches, the intrusions are nevertheless made after fulfilling the probable cause and particularity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment and after the intervention of '"a neutral and
detached magistrate .... Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14.,,305

[Ojne governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant.... As the Court explained in Johnson v.United

States, 333 US. 10, 14: "the right of officers to thrust themselves
into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but
to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and free299 Especially since the Court continued by stating that the "requirement that a
warrant be obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search 'be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 ....
" 384 U.S. at 770. The Johnson case anticipated and
enunciated the Trupiano doctrine. See note 290 supra.
300 B. GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL IMIvTATIONS ON EVIDENcE IN CRIMINAL

CAsES
15 (1966).
301

See notes 443-540 infra & accompanying text.
302 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
303 Id. at 62.
304 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,299 (1967) (emphasis added).
3051d. at 309-10 (emphasis added). On the significance of the use of Johnson

as authority, see note 299 supra.
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When the right of privacy must reason-

ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a

judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent."306

How is one to know the relevant rule so that he can act accordingly? Do laymen, police officers, lawyers, State or federal judges,
or the Supreme Court Justices themselves, know whether it is Trupiano or Rabinowitz that is in vogue today? Justice Traynor's
comments are apropos and hard to improve upon:
The sympathetic who hope that those on the front lines will get
well from their bouts with the books and that the supreme wordspinners will get better, often overlook the third market for sympathy where huddle the middlemen who must establish a working
pax in bello between the pacific skywriters and the bellowing front
lines. It falls regularly to the state judges and recurringly to federal judges to expound with common as well as constitutional sense
the skywriting that at times dots just enough t's to cross the eyes,
but trails off on the if's, and's, and but's. The loftier the message and the more removed from the local scene, the more difficult it is for the judges on the ground to work out the ground
rules. If they fail to transpose the message into earthy language,
either because of their own ineptitude or because the message itself defies transposition, it continues to plane in the stratosphere
with ill effect to itself as well as to those who are grounded. A
rugged constitution, by definition the law of the land, suffers a loss
of vitality when it must circle in thin air indefinitely07
Charges of too frequent change in the law could be leveled
at the Supreme Court in other periods of the Court's history,0 8 but
806 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (emphasis added).

307 Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 21 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 357, 359 (1966). Professor Kurland, in similar
fashion, comments on the failure of the Court to provide guidance for later litigation
and adds that "this is due to the substitution of 'hallowed catchword and formula' in
place of reasons." Kurland, Foreward: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 169
(1964).
308 In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter Association [322 U.S. 533
(1944)] the Stone Court negated a 75-year precedent when it held that
insurance was commerce within the purview of congressional regulation.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, [333 U.S. 203 (1948)]
the Vinson Court, then scorned as "eager crusaders" [Corwin, The Supreme
Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 3, 14 (1949)1
for the first time, 80 years after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
held that the first amendment's "establishment clause" invalidated a statesponsored program, in this case, released time for religious instruction,
prompting Mr. Justice Jackson to charge that the Court had become "a super
board of education for every school district in the nation." [333 U.S. at
237.] In Smith v. Allwright, [321 U.S. 649 (1944)] the Stone Court ruled
that a primary election, held not by the state but by a political party, was
subject to the prohibitions of the fifteenth amendment, overruling a decision

->
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it is clear that since Mr. Chief Justice Warren ° was appointed
to the Court in 1953, "the Justices have wrought more fundamental changes in the political and legal structure of the United
States than during any similar span of time since the Marshall
Court." 1 ' These frequent and fundamental changes have occurred
with an "extravagant disregard for [the Court's] own precedents, no
matter how ancient, or recent they may be."31' UMW v. Gibbs31
is especially instructive in shedding light on the Court's regard for
and manipulation of precedent. Paul Gibbs sought and recovered
damages from the United Mine Workers of America in a federal
district court in an action based upon a violation of section 303 of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947... and the common
law of Tennessee. Jurisdiction in a federal court over the Tennessee cause of action was based on exercise of "tpendent jurisdiction," a
doctrine the inception of which can be traced to Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall's statement, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,"1 4
that "when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original
cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law
may be involved in it." '15 Thus, a federal court exercising original
jurisdiction over a case involving both federal and State issues may
dispose of both, or only the State issue. In Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co.,316 a State rate regulation was attacked as
[Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)) not yet ten years old, and provoing Mr. Justice Roberts to charge that the Court, having overruled three
cases that term, had become "the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in
the public mind as to the stability of our institutions." [321 U.S. at 670.]
And the examples could be multiplied. Choper, On the Warren Court and
JudicialReview, 27 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 20,23 (1967).
30 9
On the impact of a Chief Justice, see Danelski, The Influence of the Chief
Justice in the Decisional Process, in COURTS, JUDGES, AND PoLiTics 497 (W. Murphy & C. Pritchett eds. 1961); Ulmer, Homeostatic Tendencies in the United States
Supreme Court, in INTRODUCTORY R.ADINGS IN POLITICAL BEiAVIOR 168 (S. UImer ed. 1961).
3 10
Kurland, supra note 307, at 143.
311
Kurland, The Supreme Court Today, TRIAL, April-May, 1967, at 12, 13. Kurland believes that "the most serious contribution to confusion is the disdain with which
the Court treats its own precedents." Kurland, supra note 307, at 170. He also notes
that there is an "increase in the rate of acceleration" regarding the Court's overruling
its own precedent Id.
312 383 U.S. 715 (1966), noted in 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968); see Shakman,
The New Pendent Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968).
31329 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
314 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
315 Id. at 823.
310213 U.S. 175 (1909).
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violating the Federal Constitution and as unauthorized by State
law. The Court observed:
The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the state statute because, as alleged, it was in violation of the Federal Constitution,
gave the Circuit Court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained
it, the court had the right to decide all the questions in the case,
even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party
raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them
at all, but de317
cided the case on local or state questions only.
Disposition of Siler rested solely on the State grounds, avoiding both the constitutional issue as well as unnecessary friction between federal and State governments, 318 a policy that also supports
the application of the abstention doctrine.819 In both Osborn and
Siler, the State issue was either an essential ingredient of the original
cause of action or dispositive of the entire case. The doctrine was
extended "to situations where decision of state issues must be justified solely on the ground of procedural convenience' 32o in Hum
v. Oursler. "' In Hum, the federal claim involved copyright infringement of a play, the State claims being based on unfair competition regarding both the copyrighted play and an uncopyrighted
version of the play. Holding that the unfair competition claim
regarding the copyrighted version of the play could be heard, but
not the claim regarding the uncopyrighted version, the Court applied the Siler test, stating:
at 191.
Mr. Justice Brandeis read Siler as standing for the proposition that "if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
319 If State law is not clear, and its resolution may obviate the necessity of reaching
the constitutional issue in a case brought in a federal court, and if the court is acting
in equity, a situation is presented in which:
a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative
answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication ....
The
resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a
tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
In Pullman, the Court ordered abstention until the State courts had an opportunity to
pass on the State issues. Jurisdiction was retained so that if the State issue was resolved in such a way as not to obviate the necessity of reaching the constitutional issue, no need for filing a new action in the federal district court would result. In
certain types of abstention cases, dismissal is appropriate. See Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). On abstention generally, see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
52, at 169-77 (1963).
320 C. WRIGHT, supra note 319, § 19, at 56.
321 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
3171d.
3 18
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But the [Siler] rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court
to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause
of action because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal
cause of action. The distinction to be observed is between a case
where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action
are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a
case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged,
one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where
the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance,
the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the
non-federal ground; in3 the
latter it may not do so upon the nonM
federal cause of action.

In addition, the Court recognized that a cause of action means
' 2
one thing for one purpose and something different for another,
but that for "the purpose of determining the bounds between state
and federal jurisdiction, the meaning should be kept within the
limits indicated, '24 i.e., two different grounds in support of the
same cause of action. Some lower federal courts have very narrowly construed the "limits," imposing a requirement of virtual
identity 'between the federal and State claims."2 5 Since such "questions of jurisdiction .. . [are] questions of power as between the
United States and the several states, '3 2 6 a narrow construction of
pendent jurisdiction seems in order. Yet, in Gibbs the Court extends the power of a federal court to hear a State claim for which
no basis for jurisdiction exists other than the presence of "state
and federal claims [which] ...derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole."3 ' The modern trend "toward unlimited joinder of actions '' s32 may mean that a plaintiff will soon
be expected to join all the claims he has against a defendant in
2

3 2id.

at 245-46.

Id. at 247.
324 Id.
23

325
See Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 738 (1944). For similar and contrary cases, see C. WIUGHT, supra note 319, §
19, 3at
56 n.8.
2
6B. Curtis, Notice of the Death of Chief Justice Taney, Proceedings in the Circuit Court of the United States for the First Circuit, 1864, at 9, quoted inC. WRIGHT,
supra note 319, § 1, at 1-2.
327
UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
32sp. JAMES, JI., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.6, at 454 (1965); see, e.g., FED. R.
CIv. P. 18.
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one judicial proceeding. Apparently, a plaintiff can confer subject
matter jurisdiction on a federal district court over a State cause of
action if a federal cause of action also arises from the same nucleus
of operative facts, even absent diversity of citizenship. If the federal court hears the case, the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v.Tompkins 29 must be applied to the State claim. Perhaps, then, different procedural rules, such as that regarding the standard for a directed verdict, may be applicable to the federal and the State
claims. 30
The preceding extension of federal jurisdiction was justified
by the Court's characterization that the "unnecessarily grudging""'
Hum approach was articulated in 1933, prior to enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Under the Rules, the impulse
is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and reme'
dies is strongly encouraged."332
It takes considerable imagination
to see how the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
can justify an extension of federal jurisdiction, since the enabling
act for rulemaking power 3 3 contained the "implicit limitation ...
that jurisdiction of the district courts or venue of actions therein
were not to be extended or restricted by the Rules," ' 4 and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 82 expressly provides that "[Tlhese rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts .... ." In Gibbs, the Court quoted
from Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips:3 5 "'the whole tendency
of our decisions is to require a plaintiff to try his whole cause of
action and his whole case at one time,' "
and added that the citation of Phillips in the Hum opinion "shows that the Court found
329

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

330 Such would occur if the difference between the pertinent federal and State

rules would be relevant to the choice of either a federal or a State forum. See Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965). It is interesting to note that in Hanna, the
Court observed:
neither Congress nor the federal court can, under the guise of formulating
rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported
by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section
of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because there can
be no other law. Id. at 471-72.
331 383 U.S. at 725.
332 Id. at 724.
333 28 U.S.C. 5 2072 (1964).
33
4 J. MooRE, A. VESTAL & P. KURLAND, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
111 (rev. ed. 1967).
335 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
336 Id. at 320, quoted in 383 U.S. at 723.
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that the weighty policies of judicial economy and fairness to parties
reflected in res judicata doctrine were in themselves strong counsel
for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts to
dispose of the state as well as the federal claims." '
Actually, the
Hum opinion cited Phillips only to demonstrate that the two claims
involved constituted two grounds for one cause of action, and
for purposes of jurisdiction, the meaning was to be limited to that
narrow compass. 3 ' The enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the citation of Phillips in Hum are the only authorities cited by Gibbs to justify overruling Hum. If this is not an
example of a disregard for precedent, what is?
The ready answer might be discovered in Linkletter v.
Walker,3 ' in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule of
Mapp v. Ohio.4 was applicable only to cases not yet final at the
date of the Mapp decision.8 4' Obviously, the Court did not adopt
a rule of pure prospective overruling, 4 ' although it apparently believed that it had the power to propound whatever form of prospective rule that policy dictates:
383 U.S. at 724.
The reader may judge for himself the weight that ought to be accorded the
citation of Phillips from the following excerpt in Hrn:
The primary relief sought is an injunction to put an end to an essentially
simple wrong, however differently characterized, not to enjoin distinct
wrongs constituting the basis for independent causes of action. The applicable rule is stated, and authorities cited, in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,
337
338

274 U.S. 316.

"A cause of action does not consist of facts," this court

there said (p. 321), "but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts
show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more
than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered
severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single
legal wrong ....'The facts are merely the means, and not the end. They
do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its existence by making
the wrong appear.'" Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238,246 (1933).
330 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
340 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
341
"Final" for purposes of the Linkletter and Tehan [discussed notes 380-84 infra
& accompanying text) prospective rules, means that "the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari
had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 622 n.5 (1965). The Tehan case, which applied the same "finality" test to Griffin, added to the above definition the phrase "or a petition for certiorari finally denied .... Tehan v. United States ex rel. Short, 382 U.S. 406, 409 n.3 (1966).
342 There are at least four forms of prospective overruling:
(1) denying the use of the new rule in the case changing the rule, the
"pure" form; (2) using the new rule for the case that changed the rule, or
giving the victor his fruits; (3) denying the use of the new rule in the overruling case and announcing that it will take effect on a future date, that is,
acting like a legislature in the most obvious way possible; and (4) using the
new rule in the overruling case and announcing that it will take effect at a
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It has been suggested that this Court is prevented by Article III
from adopting the technique of purely prospective overruling.
Note, 71 Yale L.J. 907, 933 (1962). But see 1A Moore, Federal
Practice 4082-4084 (2d ed.1961); Currier, [Time and Change in
Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201
(1965)], at 216-220. However, no doubt was expressed of our
power under Article III in England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See also Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.) .343

Examination of the authorities cited in the above footnote in
Linkletter proves most enlightening. First, the pagination of volume 1A of James Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1961), does not
now extend to page 4082. Second, in England v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners, the Court applied a clarification of an
aspect of the abstention doctrine 4 . in a purely prospective manner,
future date. Bartlett, Prospective Overruling and Property Law, 18 W. RES.
L. REv. 1205, 1208-09 (1967).
The Court, in the four prospective overruling cases decided thus far, Linkletter, Tehan,
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967), has adopted some form of the second version.
343 381 U.S. at 622 n.3. Critics of pure prospective overruling point out that it is
dictum; i.e., the judicial enunciation of a principle not dispositive of the case or controversy before the Court and thus without the power of binding precedent. On the
other hand, some contend that this is "name-calling" whereby judicial language is
nearly labeled as holding or dictum without responsible critical analysis. See Bartlett,
supra note 342, at 1228-29; P. MIsruKI & C. MoRis, ON LAw IN CouRTs 307-10
(1965). Some point out that even if it is dicta, the language constitutes useful warnings for the future, validly issued by the Court, since they reasonably could have been
dispositive of the case or controversy before the Court. See Currier, Time and Change
in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 216-20 (1965);
Keeton, Judicial Law Reform - A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts,
44 TExAs L. REv. 1254, 1265-66 (1966); Levy, Realistic Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21 (1960). Pure prospective overruling also
appears to violate the rule of judicial self-restraint that "[t]he Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.'" Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See note 318 supra. This rule is, however, discretionary and developed by
the Court only "for its own governance." 297 U.S. at 345.
34 4
The England case held that in a Pullman-type abstention situation [see note
319 supra) a plaintiff whose case is returned to the State courts for determination of
the State issues involved, may return to the federal court for resolution of the federal
issues, even though he litigates the federal issues in the State courts, as long as the
plaintiff
informs the state courts that he is exposing his federal claims there only
for the purpose of complying with [Government Employees v. Windsor,
353 U.S. 364 (1957), see note 345 infra], and that he intends, should the
state courts hold against him on the question of state law, to return to the
District Court for disposition of his federal contentions. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964).
Actually, "an explicit reservation is not indispensable; the litigant is in no event to be
denied his right to return to the District Court unless it dearly appears that he voluntarily did more than Windsor required and fully litigated his federal claims in the
state courts." Id. at 421.
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because the appellants relied on an earlier distinguishable Supreme
Court decision,3 45 which had been misinterpreted by lower courts
and legal writers generally. 4 6 Therefore, the basis for England
was the desire not to frustrate reasonable expectations generated
by an earlier decision, a policy barring retroactive application which
also dictated the result in James v. United States,4 ' discussed below. Third, the discussion of the constitutional validity of a
purely prospective rule is dictum, unnecessary for disposition of
the Linkletter case, and another violation of the rule of judicial
self-restraint that the Court "will not anticipate a question of con'
stitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."348
Fourth, although law review articles may provide the basis for
development of new law, 4" and surely influence the judiciary, 5 '
they do not constitute the strongest authority for extension of Article III jurisdiction.3 51
345 Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957), held:
[A) bare adjudication by the Alabama Supreme Court that the union [appellant] is subject to this Act ["(Ala. Laws 1953, No. 720) which provides
that any public employee who joins or participates in a 'labor union or labor
organization' forfeits the 'rights, benefits, or privileges which he enjoys as
a result of his public employment'
Id.] does not suffice, since that court
was not asked to interpret the statute in light of the constitutional objections
presented to the District Court. Id. at 366.
346
See 375 U.S. at 419-23.
847366 U.S. 213 (1961).
348

See note 343 supra.
349The classic example is recognition of a cause of action for an invasion of the
right of privacy. A cause of action was first accepted as based on an invasion of a
right of privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
It had been considered and rejected in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y.
538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), a case decided shortly after publication by Samuel D. Warren and his partner, Louis D. Brandeis, of the now-famous article, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
The student note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE3 LJ. 907 (1962), referred to at least five times in Linkletter, seems
to have provided almost all of the material appearing in the opinion. Numerous similar examples could be provided. Compare,e.g., the opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), with Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449 (1964), and Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect:
Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964).
350
See Newland, Legal Periodicalsand the United States Supreme Court, 3 MmWEST J. POL. SC. 58 (1959); note 349 supra.
351 The same can be said for the use of concurring and dissenting opinions as authority. For dissenting and concurring opinions suggesting prospective overruling, see Mishkin, Foreward:The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process Clause of Time
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 n.5 (1965). Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956), reflects general agreement with
Mr. Justice Cardozo's view concerning prospective overruling, that "when the hardship
[to those justifiably relying on the old rule] is felt to be too great or to be unnecessary
retrospective operation is withheld."
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The inappropriate and unnecessary discussion of pure prospective overruling in a single brief footnote in Linkletter is a prime
example of sloppy and irresponsible opinion writing.352 The craftsmanship used in fashioning the holding is equally an exercise in
"jejune logomachy. '
The serious, yet almost ludicrous, distinctions created by Linkletter were anticipated by Professor Thomas
Currier when he described the following melodrama:
See in your mind's eye two men, cellmates. It is the late afternoon of yet another unamusing day in prison, and both men are
suitably downcast. Each faces a possible seven years of servitude.
Enter the first prisoner's lawyer. "Good news, Arnold, my boy!
Your conviction has been reversed, because of illegally seized evi-

dence the state used at your trial."
The other prisoner, who has become something of a law buff during the pendency of his appeals, breaks in: "You mean they decided to give Mapp v. Ohio retroactive effect?"

The lawyer says a litde nervously, "No, Aaron, but Arnold's trial
was held after yours, and his appeal had not become final by the
time Mapp was decided. With that exception, the Supreme Court
has just decided to make Mapp prospective only. It's terrible luck
for you - I can't tell you how sorry I am."
Aaron, who has not been studying the law long enough for the
intricacy and importance of balancing and line-drawing to have
been borne in upon him fully, makes a series of rude remarks.
Then: "We were alleged to have been in on the same robbery.
We were together when the evidence was seized. We both protested the seizure, and that we were innocent. What's the deal?"
The lawyer explains that the deal is that Aaron's separate trial
happened to be held before Arnold's, and his appeal was heard
sooner. He had not petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
so his conviction became final. Arnold is to go free, he explains,
because as a matter of simple luck his conviction had not become
PRoCESS 146 (1921). Mr. Justice Cardozo also wrote the opinion in Great Northern
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), the first case in which the Court
dealt with the validity, under the 14th amendment, of a State employing pure prospective overruling. In upholding the Montana Supreme Court's ruling, Mr. Justice Cardozo, for the Court, wrote that a "State in defining the limits of adherence to precedent
may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of
relation backward." Id. at 364.
352 The Court, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), rejects the dictum of the
Linkletter footnote without even a passing reference.
Sound policies of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of
the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies
[citing Note, supra note 349), and in the possible effect upon the incentive
of counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against
...[pure prospective overruling). 388 U.S. at 301.
At least Mr. Chief Justice Marshall confessed to the relevance of his dicta in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), to the issues in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
353 Kurland, supra note 311, at 13.

1968]

THE HIGH COURT

final as of the date of the Mapp decision. Arnold and his lawyer
walk off, leaving Aaron rattling his cup against the bars and expressing his views about the majesty of a system of law that takes
two people in literally identical circumstances, puts
354 one of them
in jail for seven years, and lets the other go free.
Ludicrous, pathetic, unreal, prophetic then, and now, true!...
How does the Court justify the Linkletter rule? First, precedents

are trotted out that allegedly adumbrate the decision. The Court
cites a series of cases, including Norton v. Shelby County,8 56 Great
Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co.,357 England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners," 8' Chicot
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,.59 and James v.
United States, 6 ' none of which are on point. In each case, the
new rule was applied prospectively so as not to create a hardship

on individuals who had justifiably relied on the old rule. 6' Consider James, the case that expressly overruled Commissioner v. IWilcox3 0" -by holding that embezzled funds are included in the gross
income of the embezzler for federal income tax purposes. At the
same time, the Court in James reversed the petitioner's conviction
for wilfully attempting to evade federal income taxes by failing to
report income obtained through embezzlement. No reference to
prospective overruling, however, appears in the prevailing opinion
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren. Three Justices voted to overrule
Wilcox, but reversed James' conviction because "the element of
willfulness could not be proven in a criminal prosecution for failing to include embezzled funds in gross income in the year of the
misappropriation so long as the statute contained the gloss placed
354 Currier, supra note 343, at 201-02.
255 Linkletter, convicted in the state court by use of "unconstitutional evidence,"
is today denied relief by the judgment of this Court because his conviction became "final" before Mapp was decided. Linkletter must stay in jail; Miss
Mapp, whose offense was committed before Linkletter's, is free. This different treatment of Miss Mapp and Linkletter points up at once the arbitrary and
discriminatory nature of the judicial contrivance utilized here to break the
promise of Mapp by keeping all people in jail who are unfortunate enough
to have had their unconstitutional convictions affirmed before June 19, 1961.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 641 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
356 118 U.S. 425 (1886). For a discussion, see note 50 supra.
357287 U.S. 358 (1932). For a discussion, see note 351 sapra.
358375 U.S. 411 (1964).
For a discussion, see notes 344-47 supra.
359 308 U.S. 371 (1940). For a discussion, see note 50 supra.
360 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
301 This is only a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Cardozo's language. See note 351 supra.
302 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
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upon it by Wilcox at the time the alleged crime was committed." '63
Thus, the prevailing opinion in James was concerned with avoiding
the frustration of reasonable expectations of those persons who
had justifiably relied on the overruled Wilcox case - especially
since such reliance nullified the wilful intent constituting a basic
element of the offense charged, although it was debatable whether
James' reason for nondisclosure was his reliance upon Wilcox.
Two Justices would have remanded the case for a jury decision
on this issue.364
The sole relevance of James, or any of the other cited cases,
is that an individual's justifiable reliance on prior, ostensibly valid,
law may require prospective rather than retroactive application of
new law. 65 A prospective ruling in James kept the accused out
363James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1961). For a more elaborate
analysis of James, see Note, supra note 349, at 923-27.
364 A great deal of controversy has arisen concerning the extent to which the prevailing opinion in James actually represents the opinion of the Court. This is generally
true where the Justices cannot agree on an opinion for the Court and propound multiple
concurring opinions - a too frequent occurrence in recent years. In James, Justices
Black, Whittaker, and Douglas concurred on the ground that Wilcox was correct. Mr.
Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, expressed disapproval of the prevailing
opinion, stating that the Court's "judgements [can] not be limited to prospective application [since] ... prospective lawmaking is the function of Congress rather than the
Courts." 366 U.S. at 225. Thus, in James six Justices favored reversal of James' conviction, a different group of six favored overruling Wilcox, and only three of them
favored prospective application of the overruling. This is not quite as egregious as the
situation in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949),
wherein "conflicting minorities in combination [brought] to pass a result - paradoxical as it may appear - which differing majorities of the Court [found] insupportable." Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
365 The determination of when reliance is justifiable raises the perplexing problem
of when one ought to resist the law rather than rely on it. Recently, a Nazi judge was
convicted and sentenced to 5 years at hard labor for sending a Roman Catholic priest
to the gallows for relating a political joke during the Nazi regime. The judge's defense
was that he was merely executing the law. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1967, at 6, col. 1.
On theories of resistance, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); J. STONE,
HUMAN LAw AND HUMAN JUSTICE § 11, at 251-58 (1965); and the articles involved
in the Hart-Fuller-Nagel debate cited note 154 supra. Aquinas' classic theory of resistance postulated that if the law is contrary to the common good, it must be resisted, unless
the disorder occasioned by disobedience is more onerous than the evil created by obedience to an unjust law. When the positive law is contrary to the divine, then, according
to Aquinas, regardless of resulting disorder, one must resist the unjust law. See T.
AcQUINAS, SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 74 (d'Entreves ed. 1948). Fuller's theory
of resistance is based in large part on the existence of the minimal standards necessary
to maintain a legal system. See text accompanying notes 155-56 supra. "A total failure
[in the existence of these standards] . . . does not simply result in a bad system of law;
it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all .... " L. FULLER,
supra at 39. The resulting absence of a legal system, as perhaps was true in Nazi Germany, would mean that a Nazi judge, such as the one mentioned above, could not justifiably rely on the law in Nazi Germany, since later it would be determined that there
was no legal system in Germany. This requires the type of superhuman prescience inherent in Churchman's definition that X ought to do A on ethical grounds as "A is what
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of jail; in Linkletter it keeps him in jail. Nor was the Bill of
Rights involved -in any of the cases cited in Linkletter. Indeed, the
Court admits that "heretofore . . .we have applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule."" 6
Shortly before, in Fay v. Noia, T the Court spoke of this issue:
Surely no fair-minded person will contend that those who have
been deprived of their liberty without due process of law ought
nevertheless to languish in prison. Noia, no less than his codefendants Caminito and Bonino, is conceded to have been the victim of unconstitutional state action. Noia's case stands on its own;
but surely no just and humane legal system can tolerate a result
whereby a Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their confessions were found to have been coerced yet a Noia, whose confession was also coerced, remains in jail for life. For such anomalies, such affronts to the conscience of a civilized society, habeas
corpus is predestined by its historical role
368 in the struggle for personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy.
Because Linkletter probably will have a significant impact on
the Court's image, it is profitable to trace 'briefly the general reasoning, aside from the citation of general precedent, that was used
to justify this sharp departure from the usual practice - a departure that makes the Court's legislating rather than adjudicating
function all too visible. 6 The Court adduces three reasons for
the prospective rule: (1) the Mapp rule is designed to deter offensive police practices, and has no relevance to the reliability of the
X would do if he knew the consequences of his acts, and if he knew what future men
will want." C. WEST CHURCHMAN, PREDICTION AND OPTIMAL DEcIsION 22 (1961).
366 381 U.S. at 628. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) and Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961), both assumed that decisions expanding constitutional due process requiredissenting).
ments would operate retroactively. See 381 U.S. at 651-53 (Black, J.,
367372 U.S. 391 (1963).
08 Id. at 441.
369 "[The pronouncement of a general power of prospective limitation) .

.

.will

tend to generate more frequent arguments for the exercise of such power and the necessity to respond thereto, with concomitant spotlighting of the fact of change and strong
overtones of legislative rather than judicial process." Mishkin, supra note 351, at 69.
'The public image which sustains the unique powers of a federal court is thus not strikingly different from the image which possessed Blackstone; both images bespeak an uneasiness about a court making law." Note, supra note 349, at 931. The loss of the
inhibitory impact of the retroactive operation of constitutional adjudications has frequently been noted. Mr. Justice Black, in James, observed: "In our judgment one of
the great inherent restraints upon this Court's departure from the field of interpretation
to enter that of lawmaking has been the fact that its judgments could not be'limited to
prospective application." 366 U.S. at 225. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROcEsS: BAsIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 627 (tent
ed. 1958); Bartlett, supra note 342, at 1231; Currier, supra note 343, at 226; Mishkin,
supra note 351, at 70-72. On the other hand, "In situations of this kind, then, if courts
had no alternative but to operate with retroactive effect, judicial change of some existing
rules of law - no matter how bad they might now appear to be - would be totally
unavailable." P. MIsHriN & C. MomUs, supra note 343, at 306.
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guilt-determining process,"' ° (2) the States had justifiably relied
on the doctrine of Wolf v. Colorado,3 ' and (3) "to make the rule
of Mapp retrospective would tax the administration of justice to
the utmost."3'72 It is clear that (2) and (3) are simply makeweights,
since in all prior cases reversing earlier more restrictive cases, the
same arguments could be made." ' Indeed, the Court recognizes
that (1) is the reason for Linkletter in that it emphasizes that the
consideration of both (2) and (3) is in the context of dealing with
an "extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on
e 3 74
guilt.
Thus, Linkletter establishes that the Mapp doctrine is designed
to deter offensive police practices that do not affect reliability in
the guilt-determining process. This is patently inconsistent with
the penumbral right theory, 7 ' which is bottomed on the rights of
the accused, not the duties of police officers37 6 In fact, Linkletter
370 "Here, . . . the fairness of the trial is not under attack. All that petitioner attacks is the admissibility of evidence, the reliability and relevance of which is not questioned, and which may well have had no effect on the outcome." 381 U.S. at 639.
371 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Again and again this Court refused to reconsider Wolf and gave its implicit
approval to hundreds of cases in their application of its rule. In rejecting the
Wolf doctrine as to the exclusionary rule the purpose was to deter the lawless
action of the police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment. That
purpose will not at this late date be served by the wholesale release of the guilty
victims. 381 U.S. at 637.
How justifiable was the States' reliance on Wolf?
It was for the Warren Court to assure the rights of citizens to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures in Mapp v. Ohio, for it was plain that the
political process was inadequate; twelve years had passed since the states had
been told that such action violated the Constitution, yet more than half of them
continued to admit into evidence the fruit of the violation. Choper, On the
Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 41 (1967); see
Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 357, 362 (1966).
372 381 U.S. at 637. "Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of eviTo thus legitimate such an
dence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated ....
extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt
the administration of justice." Id. at 637-38.
373 Consider, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
374 381 U.S. at 638; see notes 371, 372 supra. The Court states: "[I]n each of the
three areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the principle that we applied went to the fairness of the trial - the very integrity of the fact-finding process."
Id. at 639.
375 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
376 If the exclusionary rule has the high place in our constitutional plan of "ordered liberty," which this Court in Mapp and other cases has so frequently said
that it does have, what possible valid reason can justify keeping people in jail
under convictions obtained by wanton disregard of a constitutional protection
which the Court itself in Mapp treated as being one of the "constitutional
rights of the accused?" 381 U.S. at 650 (Black, J., dissenting).
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very much lends to Mapp the appearance of an exercise of supervisory powers by the Court, 7 although the Court has repeatedly
denied that its supervisory powers extend to State officials." 8
For, while the power of this Court to undo convictions in state
courts is limited to the enforcement of those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice,"... the scope of our reviewing power
over . . . federal courts is not confined to the ascertainment of
Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision . . . in the federal

courts implies the duty of establishing
8 79 and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence

Subsequent cases, however, indicate that factors (2) and (3)
really are, for the Court, the most important for ascertaining
whether a rule is given prospective operation. This phenomenon is
incredible only if one forgets the fast and loose - the extravagant
use of precedent by the Court. The no-comment rule of Griffin
v. California3 was held prospective in Tehan v. United States ex
rel Shott,3 8' ostensibly for the same reasons given in Linkletter.
But, the statement that "the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent,"38 does not jibe with the observation in Griffin:
[IThe inference of guilt is not always so natural... [as] brought
out in the Modesto opinion itself: "Defendant contends that the
reason a defendant refuses to testify is that his prior convictions
377

1n Chapman, [see discussion notes 256-60 supra & accompanying text] Mr.
Justice Harlan, in dissent, contended that the Court was exercising its supervisory power:
The harmless-error rule... flows from what is seemingly regarded as a power
inherent in the Court's constitutional responsibilities rather than from the
Constitution itself.... I regard the Court's assumption of what amounts to
a general supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in
state courts as a startling constitutional development that is wholly out of
keeping with our federal system and completely unsupported by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the source of such a power may be found. 386 U.S. at
46-47.
See also Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
R V. 929, 938 (1965).
378 Compare, e.g., Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), with Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), and Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); see
Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963).
370
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). The Court recently made
very clear that it was operating under its supervisory power in requiring trial by jury for
all federal contempt cases if a sentence of 6 months or longer may be imposed. Cheff
v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966). Mr. Justice Black objects strenuously
to the limitation of Mapp to doing "nothing in the world except to deter officers of the
law," 381 U.S. at 649, since that makes Mapp "more like law-making than construing
the Constitution." Id.
380 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See discussion notes 259-68 supra & accompanying text.
381 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
382 Id. at 415.
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will be introduced in evidence to impeach him... and not that he
is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that the defendant
might fear that his prior convictions will prejudice the jury, and
therefore another 38possible
inference can be drawn from his refusal
3
to take the stand.
Why the reinforcement of an invalid inference of guilt based on

failure to take the stand is not related to reliability in determining
the innocence or guilt of the accused is not explained in Griffin.3
In Johnson v. New Jersey,"8 5 the Court held that the doctrines
of Escobedo v. Illinois.. 6 and Miranda v. Arizona s7 were also prospective in operation, each applicable only to trials commenced
subsequent to the date of the relevant decision. This prospective
rule, less liberal than the final judgment test of Linkletter and Tehan, ss was imposed since the Court believed that questions relating
to the reliability of the guilt-determining process in Miranda- and
Escobedo-type cases could be tested by habeus corpus proceedings.
"Thus while Escobedo and Miranda provide important new safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial, the nonretroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose trials have
already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as part
of an involuntariness claim." '89 The suggestion that the involun380 U.S. at 614-15 (footnote omitted).
The relation of Griffin to reliability in the guilt-determining process is even
more apparent when one considers that the defendant has the right to a "Bruno charge,"
see note 266 supra, and Mr. Justice Douglas' quotation from Wilson v. United States,
149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893), in Griffin:
"It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely
innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character,
and offenses charged against him, will often confuse and embarass him to such
a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him .... The
statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned
might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have been in
some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the
failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall
not create any presumption against him." 380 U.S. at 613.
All this led Professor Mishkin to conclude that Griffin is related to reliability in the
guilt-determining process and should be retroactive. See Mishkin, supra note 351, at
92-93. The Court did not agree in Tehan, although later, in Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court stated that "we denied retroactive application of Griffin
v.California . . . despite the fact that comment on the failure to testify may sometimes
mislead the jury concerning the reasons why the defendant has refused to take the witness stand." Id. at 729.
385 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
386 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
387 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
388 See note 341 supra.
389 384 U.S. at 730.
383
384
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tary confession route was adequate 90 and that Miranda and Escobedo did not relate to reliability in guilt-determining is absurd. 91
The purpose of Miranda is to provide safeguards "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," '92 sometimes including the presence of counsel when statements are taken, a presence
which "enhances the integrity of the fact-finding processes in
court. 3493 Clearly, the "availability [of counsel] as a witness to
the events of the period [of interrogation] might serve to improve the determination of the facts on which a decision as to 'coerIf one of the difficulties confronting the
don' must be made."3
accused is demonstrating the circumstances at the time of the interrogation, before he can argue that those circumstances resulted
in an involuntary and unreliable confession, how can one say that
the Miranda rule relating directly to that demonstration is not
related to guilt-determination?9 5 In Johnson, the Court finally
was compelled to admit that Miranda and Escobedo might relate
to the guilt-determining process, the prospective ruling being
justified by noting that collateral attack was available to protect
the innocent. 9 ' The interesting bootstrap manipulation of precedent is presented by the Court's interpretation of Griffin in Johnson: "[We denied retroactive application to Griffin v. California
. . . despite the fact that comment on the failure to testify may
sometimes mislead the jury concerning the reasons why the defendant has refused to take the witness stand" 9 7
0
S Mr. Justice Clark felt that the weight given to the same safeguards in an involuntary confession case decided the same day as Johnson virtually rendered Miranda retrospective. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 753-54 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).
391 "If, as seems plain, Escobedo and Miranda indicate dissatisfaction with - and
lack of confidence in - the actual operation of the old 'voluntariness' and 'totality of
circumstances' tests... how can it be sufficient that 'our law on coerced confessions is
available for persons whose trials have already been completed'? 384 U.S. at 730."
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 Mxct. L. REV. 59, 100 n.163 (1966).
392 384 U.S. at 458.

393 Id. at 466.
39 4 Mishkin, supra note 351, at 96.
9
05 See the discussion of Davis in Kamisar, supra note 391, at 99-104.
0
S Thus while Escobedo and Mirandaguard against the possibility of unreliable

statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation, they encompass situations in which the danger is not necessarily as great as when the accused is
subjected to overt and obvious coercion. At the same time, our case law on
coerced confessions is available for persons whose trials have already been
completed. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966).

See discussion notes 385-97 supra & accompanying text
397 384 U.S. at 729.
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The bizarre denouement of the entire episode was delivered in
Stovall v. Denno, 98 in which the Court was confronted with the
issue of whether the rules of United States v. Wade,"' and Gilbert
v. California,.° that identification evidence is tainted and must be
excluded if the accused was exhibited to the identifying witness before trial in the absence of counsel, were to be prospective or retrospective in operation." 1 In holding these rules prospective only,
the Court comes full circle, with factors (2) and (3), the "makeweights" of Linkletter, becoming the most important, while (1), the
only remotely valid reason, is reduced to mere baggage:
Although the Wade and Gilbert rules ... are aimed at avoiding
unfairness at the trial by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of identification evidence, "the question
whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does
not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is
necessarily a matter of degree." Johnson v. New Jersey.... The
extent to which a condemned practice infects the integrity of the
truth-determining process at trial is a "question of probabilities."
[Johnson v. New Jerseyl ... Such probabilities must in turn be
weighed against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard
and the
impact of retroactivity upon the administration of
justice.402
398388 U.S. 293 (1967).
399388 U.S. 218 (1967).
400 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
40
The Court did note in Wade: "Legislative or other regulations, such as those of
local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial
may also remove the basis for regarding the stage as 'critical."' 388 U.S. at 239.
402 388 U.S. at 298. In Stovall, factors (2) and (3) preponderated even though
[a] conviction which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage
of justice. The Wade and Gilbert rules are aimed at minimizing that possibility by preventing the unfairness at the pretrial confrontation that experience
has proved can occur and assuring meaningful examination of the identification witness' testimony at trial. Id. at 297.
Justice Black, dissenting, stated: "I do not believe . .. [the Court] has the power, by
weighing 'countervailing interests,' to legislate a timetable by which the Constitution's
provisions shall become effective." Id. at 304.

D.

The Janus Ploy
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty
said in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less."
'The question is," said Alice,
"whether you can make words mean different
things."
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'The question is," said Humpty

Dumpty, "which is to be masterthat's all."
LEWIS CARROLL

THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

The Court, itself, has recognized that statutes proliferating
"conflicting commands" do not provide "fair warning" and are
thereby void for vagueness." 3 Thus, in James,"4 even an embezzler is protected from compulsion to obey conflicting commands an obedience that would require something of the impossible.40 5
The Trupiano-Rabinowitz-Schmerber-Cooper-Warden-Camara sequence embodies within it a cycle of contradictions as well as a
promulgation problem. If it is unclear whether a precedent is overruled, then contradictory commands are often present. 0'
403 E.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952), wherein the Court stated:
The alternative construction pressed on us is equally treacherous because it
gives conflicting commands. It makes inspection dependent on consent and
makes refusal to allow inspection a crime. However we read § 301 (f) we
think it is not fair warning. .. to the factory manager that if he fails to give
consent, he is a criminal. Id. at 176.
The Court recently incorrectly cited Cardiff as "[holding] that the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act did not compel that consent be given to warrantless inspections of
establishments covered by the Act." See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 n.4 (1967).
(See involved issues similar to those in Cararaand was handed down the same day. See
text accompanying note 306 supra.) Cardiff reached no holding on the issue of whether
the Act compelled inspection; rather the vagueness relating to that issue was the reason
for vitiating the relevant provision.
4 04
See discussion in notes 360-66 supra & accompanying text.
405 See discussion in note 363 supra & accompanying text.
406 Unanimous verdicts in Employer Liability Act cases brought in State courts are
'The
not required. Minneapolis & St. LR.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
right to trial by jury is 'a basic and fundamental feature of our iystem of federal jurisprudence,"' Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943), and must be
afforded to the litigants in such a case brought in a State court. Dice v. Akron, C. &
Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). Since the federal trial by jury is based on the seventh
amendment that demands a jury of 12 returning a verdict by unanimous decision, Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), is Bombolis still valid? Would it not have
been preferable for the Court to overrule Bombolis "explicitly instead of [leaving it)
...as a derelict bound to occasion collisions on the waters of the law." 342 U.S. at
368-69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Since Congress cannot act "abroad . . . free of
the Bill of Rights," Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957), a fortiori, it would follow
that Congress cannot avoid the limitations of the Bill of Rights by placing federal actions
in State courts; thus Bombolis is indeed overruled, if the Court is to be consistent. The
Reid case is of special interest since the opinion arrives at a conclusion antipodal to that
of an opinion published the term before in Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
Professor Paul Kauper explains how this anomalous situation came about:
The majority opinion [in 351 U.S. 470], written by Mr. Justice Clark, justified the use of military courts in this situation on the ground that the underlying legislation was a valid exercise of the Congressional power under Article
I of the Constitution to establish legislative courts outside the territorial limits
of the United States ....
Mr. Justice Frankfurter reserved opinion in the
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Logical consistency of legal doctrine is, at the least, a necessary condition for effective implementation of the law-in-books.
The role of logic and consistency in the law requires little elabora4

tion.

07

Law without concepts or rational ideas, law that is not logical, is
like pre-scientific medicine - a hodge-podge of sense and superstition ....

To urge that judges ... should rely on their experience or intuition in disregard of logically formulated principles is to urge sentimental anarchy. Men will generalize in spite of themselves. If
they do it consciously in accordance with logical principles, they
will do it more carefully and will be liberally tolerant to other
possible generalizations.-"'
case since he felt that there had not been sufficient time for adequate reflection upon the issues presented by the case.... Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas dissented, but reserved the writing of their dissenting opinions until the next Term of Court. Then on November 5, 1956, after
the opening of the new Term of Court, the Court granted a motion for a rehearing of these two cases [Reid and Kinsella].... Justices Reed, Burton
and Clark dissented from the order granting a rehearing. Mr. Justice Brennan, who had replaced Mr. Justice Minton on the bench, took no part in the
consideration or decision of the order granting a rehearing.
Following the rehearing the Court handed down... [the decision reported
in 354 U.S. 1]. P. KAUPER, CONSTITTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATE-

RIALS 505 (3d ed. 1966).
407The logical form of a decision serves the function of justification:
[B]efore any particular decision is deemed to have been truly justified it must
be shown to be formally deducible from some legal rule ....
To require that
judicial decisions be deducible from legal rules is to do more than insist that
an argument not be formally fallacious. For it is to ensure as well that further
criticism and evaluation of the premises of that argument will be possible;
it is to require that their content will be understandable and their correctness
verifiable. R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DEcISIoN 172-73 (1961).
Logic also serves to clarify legal principles while aiding rational decisionmaking.
The lawyer and the judge can, and ordinarily do, reason in a way consistent
with the rules of formal logic, without knowing those rules. They can, indeed, reach reasonable decisions (sometimes) without reasoning at all. Yet
in the long run and for decisions which justify the expenditure of time and
effort, they will get better results if they utilize the resources of logic, both
formal and instrumental. Patterson, Logic in the Law, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 875,
909 (1942).
For a bibliography on law and logic, see Cowan, Decision Theory in Law, Science and
Technology, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 499, 522 (1963).
40s Cohen, Law and Scientific Method, in JURISPRUDENCE IN ACrION 115, 127
(1953). Cohen observes that a "deductive system that enables us to derive many legal
rules from a few principles makes the law more certain, so that people can better know
their rights." Id. at 125. Cohen was critical of the realists for discounting legal rules.
In answer, Jerome Frank wrote: "The skeptics [realists] insist that legal rules ... must
be studied. But they say that knowledge of the rules is but a small part of what lawyers
and judges use in their work ....
Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17,
44-45 (1931).
"[The value of logic to philosophy is not that it supports a particular system, but
that the process of logical organization of any system ... serves to test its internal consistency, to verify its logical adequacy to its declared purpose, and to isolate and clarify
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To require logical consistency is not, however, to dictate that
judges reason "according to strict rules of logic." ' 9 Rather, judges
should act in accordance with what Ernest Nagel terms the
the assumptions on which it rests." A. CHURCH, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
LOGIC 55 (1956). Modern logic, it is contended, is a more versatile and powerful organon. Layman Allen has proselytized vigorously for lawyers to adopt his brand of
symbolic logic, which he describes as a "razoredged" tool for analysis of legal doctrine.
Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Draftingand Interpreting Legal Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833 (1957). The function of the razoredged tool is to ferret
"out various possible interpretations from syntactically ambiguous legal language." Allen & Caldwell, Modern Logic and JudicialDecision Making: A Sketch of One View,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 213, 229 (1963).

This is not especially startling since

modern logic or Boolean algebra was developed primarily to assist the design of logic
circuits for computers and switching circuits for control systems and telephonic networks.
See F. HOHN, APPLIED BOOLEAN ALGEBRA, INTRODUCnTON (1960).
In switching
networks the material carried is not important, rather it is the route which is important.
See J. KEMN Y,

J. SNELL

&

G. THOMPSON,

INTRODUCTION TO FINITE MA.THEMATICS

49 (1957); Hohn, Some Mathematical Aspects of Switching, 62 AM. MATHEMATICAL
MONTHLY 75 (1955). Modern logic, as now constituted, cannot ferret out the referent
if conceptual ambiguity is involved, although other means of eliminating conceptual
ambiguities exist, such as precisely delineating the extensional or denotative meaning
of a word. See Allen, Symbolic Logic and Law: A Reply, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 47, 50 (1962).
Anderson, by the use of deontic logic, has illustrated logical weaknesses and inconsistencies in Hohfeld's approach. See Anderson, Logic, Norms and Rules, in MATI-EMATICAL METHODS IN SMALL GROUP PROCESSES 11, 14-21 (J.Criswell, H. Solomon & P.
Suppes eds. 1962). See also Anderson & Moore, The Formal Analysis of Normative
Concepts, 22 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 9, 13 (1957). Other studies have also focused
on the problem of ambiguities in the law. E.g., Curtis, A Better Theory of Lagal Interpretation, 4 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.. 321 (1949); Williams, Language and the Law, 61
L.Q. REV. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945). See also D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW (1963); Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 381
(1941); Hager, Lot's Simplify Lagal Language, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 74 (1960);
Lavery, The Language of the Law, 8 A.B.A.J. 269 (1922); Lavery, The Language of
the Law, 7 A.B.A.J. 277 (1921); Mehler, LanguageMastery and Legal Training, 6 VILL,
L. REV. 201 (1961); The Language of Law - A Symposium, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 115
(1958). Since conceptual ambiguity is generally the type of interpretation problem
confronting lawyers, modern logic is not too helpful for them. This was one of the
primary criticisms of Allen's razoredged tool in Summers, A Note on Symbolic Logic
and the Law, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 486 (1961). Allen's reply to Professor Summers appears
in Allen, Symbolic Logic and Law: A Reply, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 47 (1962). Professor
Tammelo comments on the Summers-Allen articles in Tammelo, Syntactic Ambiguity,
Conceptual Vagueness, and the Lawyer's Hard Thinking, 15 J. LEGAL ED.56 (1962).
Professor Summers has the last word in Summers, Symbolic Logic and Law: A Reply
to Professors Allen and Tammelo, 15 J.LEGAL. ED. 60 (1962). At this stage, modem
logic probably will not produce more rational methods for analysis and evaluation of
legal problems.
[M't is doubtful whether they [modem logic formulae] even simplify the formulation of the problem. Perhaps we have here yet another intellectual fad,
the desire of the jurist to be in the august company of the mathematical phys-

icist, to speak with the mathematician's language in the field of legal science.
Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 CoLtuM. L. REv.
821, 825 (1961).
Professor Alonzo Church, a noted authority on modern logic, after listening to a presentation by Layman Allen on his logical method, stated that the logic applicable to the
statutory problems presented by Allen would be implicitly, not explicitly, used, and that
he, himself, had considered the statutory problems on a case-by-case approach rather than
formulating and analyzing the problems by use of modern logic. See Chasalow, The
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more inclusive sense of logic . . . [that] studies the methods employed by men aiming at stable knowledge, assays their efficacy
in achieving this aim, examines the role of critical thought in every
department of human activity, and institutes a rigorous inquiry into the conditions upon which the significance and effective operation of discourse rest. It is a genuine organon for achieving a rational life and society. It will discover the limitations of procedures sometimes adopted on impulse, and by acting as the searchmay free him
ing critic of man's aspirations and customary beliefs
410
from the shackles of blind routine and force.

The examples selected to illustrate the Janus ploy suggest that
if the Court is using logic to arrive at such incompatible positions,
then perhaps its logic is correctly defined as "arriving at the wrong
result with confidence."
The first incongruous trinity of cases to be considered is Miranda
v. Arizona,41 ' Hoffa v. United States,12 and Escobedo v. Illinois.4 1
In Miranda, the Court held:
When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination

is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect
the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted
to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the
exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following
measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questionUCLA National Law on Electronics Conference, 1960 M.U.L.L. 102, 107. Analogously, it does not follow that an individual familiar with game theory will behave
as prescribed by the theory. "[Slubjects who are sophisticated about probabilities and
expected values are not more likely to maximize expected dollar value than others."
Scodel, Ratoosh & Minas, Some Personality Correlates of Decision Making Under Conditions of Risk, in 1 DECISIONS, VALUES AND GROUPS 48 (1960). However, where
extremely complex contracts are involved symbolic logic may provide a helpful tool for
determining the rights and duties under the contract. See Pffeiffer, Symbolic Logic,
SCIENTIFIc AM., Dec. 1950, at 22; Tammelo, Sketch for a Symbolic Juristic Logic, 8
J. LEGAL ED. 277, 306 n.109 (1955). Although beyond the scope of this article, the
work of Sidney Siegel may provide the basis for transforming game theory from prescription into description. See, e.g., S. SIEGEL, CHOICE, STRATEGY, AND UTILITY
(1964).
409
To think in symbols according to strict rules of formal logic is hardly practicable in all steps of juristic reasoning. This reasoning, since it works on
extremely complex and intricate material, must organize that faculty of the
human mind which enables it to see the wholes before their parts are distinctly
apprehended - that means, juristic reasoning has to remain intuitive to a
considerable degree. Tammelo, Sketch for a Symbolic Juristic Logic, 8 J.
LEGAL ED. 277, 302-03 (1955).
See generally S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (1942).
LOGIC WITHOUT METAPHYSICS 353-60 (1956).
410 E. NAGEL, supra note 409, at 52-53.
411
412
413

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).

But see E. NAGEL,
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ing that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded
to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have
been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
hin.414

Later, in Hoffa, the Court held that "[Tlhere is no constitu-

tional right to be arrested," ' 5 even though the Government has
sufficient evidence to take the accused into custody and charge him
with the alleged crime.418 This is akin to throwing a drowning man
both ends of the rope! It is not only inconsistent with the promise of Escobedo v. Illinois,17 that where "the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect," 18 and that "when the process shifts
from investigatory to accusatory - when its focus is on the accused
and its purpose is to elicit a confession - our adversary system
begins to operate, and, under the circumstances . . . the accused

must be permitted to consult with his lawyer," 1" but it is also inconsistent with the "fully meaningful" approach supposedly in favor with the current Court ° As long as police move within certain prescribed limits, they may gather enough evidence to literally
hang a person (a critical stage of the process?) without arresting
him, ie., subjecting him to custodial interrogation,421 thereby not
affording him the "protection" of the Miranda doctrine.4"

Such is

414 384 U.S. at 478-79.
415 385 U.S. at 310.
416 See id. at 309.
417 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
48
1 1d. at 490.
419 Id. at 492.
420
42

See note 10 supra.
"MBy
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. The Court hides in a footnote the

amazing revelation, "this is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an invdstigation which had focused on an accused." Id. at 444 n.4. That tops Lewis Carroll's cat
that vanished before his grin.
422 This situation occurred in Hoffa. See also, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385

U.S. 323 (1966). It is doubtful whether Miranda will ever provide meaningful protection if State police superintendents continue ordering their men to "forget Miranda
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the manner in which the Court renders constitutional guarantees
meaningful.
Another mismatched pair is Jackson v. Denno2 3 and New
York Times v. Sullivan.424 In Jackson, the Court adopted what
is known as the Massachusetts doctrine regarding the instructions
given to a jury concerning alleged involuntary confessions,425 holding that the approach adopted in Stein v. New York. 6 was invalid
"by going behind the historic assumptions of the law of evidence
and considering the psychological reality of the jury's functioning
in [Jackson] . .. as it related to its consideration of the voluntari'
ness of confessions."427
The Court in Jackson apparently recognized that "cautionary instructions [even if] copiously provided by
42 8
the trial judge . . . do not give the accused adequate protection.,
Therefore, the
danger that matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will infect
the jury's findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as
its conclusion upon that issue itself, is sufficiently serious to preclude their unqualified acceptance upon review in this Court, regardless of whether there 429
is or is not sufficient other evidence to
sustain a finding of guilt.

Conversely, in Sullivan the Court ignored the psychological
realities of jury functioning,"' holding that a public official canand Escobedo and become policemen again." N.Y. Times, June 23, 1967, at 24, col. 5;
see Kamisar, supra note 391, at 67 n.4 7.
423 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
424 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although prior to Jackson, the Sullivan doctrine is accepted and applied in numerous cases after the date of the Jackson decision. See note
16(5) supra.
425 See 378 U.S. at 377-79. Although the Court did not explicitly adopt the Massachusetts doctrine, it must have done so implicitly in light of the remand to the trial
court for a hearing by the judge on the issue of whether the confession was voluntary,
and only if the judge found it involuntary was a new trial required. See id. at 394-95;
Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967).
426 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
42 7
Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
4281d. at 645-46. Mr. Justice Jackson had earlier observed that -[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion).
429378 U.S. at 383.
430 Realistically, evidence proves that juries do ignore judges' instructions and apply
their own notions of the law. In one early study the case given to the jury involved a
defense of criminal irresponsibility. Alternate charges were given, one based on the
M'Naghten rule, see text accompanying note 243 supra, the other on the Durham rule.
Logically, the jury should have arrived at different verdicts, depending on which charge
was given, but instead, they entirely disregarded the instructions. See R. JAMES, JURORS' REACTIONS TO ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF LEGAL INSANITY (Univ. of
Chicago Microfilm 1957). On the jury, see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN

19681

THE HIGH COURT

not recover "damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." ''
Freedom of
expression will only gain limited protection by this rule if jury functioning is viewed realistically, since
[ilf malice is all that is needed, inferences from facts as found by
the jury will easily oblige. How can we sit in review on a cold
record and find no evidence of malice ... when it is the common-

JURY (1966); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967); A.I.G.,

Confessions of a Juror, 29 WIs. B. BULL. 21 (1956); Arens & Susman, Judges, Jury
Charges and Insanity, 12 How. L.J. 1 (1966); Becker, The Influence of Jurors' Values
on Their Verdicts: A Courts & PoliticsExperiment, 46 Sw. SOCIAL Sci. Q. 130 (1965);
Bevan, Albert, Loiseaux, Mayfield & Wright, Jury Behavior as a Function of the Prestige of the Foremanand the Nature of His Leadership, 7 J. PUB. L. 419 (1958); Broeder, The Importance of the Scapegoat in Jury Trial Cases: Some Preliminary Reflections, 4 DUQUESNE U.L REV. 513 (1966); Broeder, The Impact of the Lawyers: An
Informal Appraisal, 1 VAL"RAiso U.L REv. 40 (1966); Broeder, Occupational
Expertise and Bias as Affecting JurorBehavior: A PreliminaryLook, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1079 (1965); Broeder, Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 504 INS.
L.J. 138 (1965); Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical
Look, 45 NEB. L REv. 99 (1966); Broeder, The Pro and Con of Interjecting Plaintiff
Insurance Companies in Jury Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case Study, 6 NAT'L
REsOURcEs J. 269 (1966); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB.
L. REV. 744 (1959); Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations:An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL.
L. RE . 503 (1965); Brown, A Juryman's View, 2 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 225 (1965);
Ferguson, Legal Research on Trial, 39 J. Am. JUDICA UE Soc'Y 78 (1955); Fishman
& Morris, Witnesses and Testimony at Trials and Hearings, 1957 J. SoCIAL IsSUEs
13; Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 273 (1955); Hawkins, Interaction Rates of Jurors Aligned in Factions, 27 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 689 (1962);'
James, Jurors' Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 58 (1959);
James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J.SOCIOLOGY 563 (1959); Kalven,
The Jury, The Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158
(1958); Kalven, Report on the Jury Project, in CONFERENCE ON AIMS & MET-ODS
OF LEGAL RESEARCH 155 (held at the University of Michigan Law School, November
4-5, 1955); Mills, A Statistical Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 AM). L. REV. 205 (1962); Redmount, Psychological Tests for Selecting
Jurors, 5 KAN. L. REv. 391 (1957); Robinson, Bias, Probability,and Trial by Jury, 15
AM. SOCIOLOGICA. REV. 73 (1950); Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, & Verdict
Trends, 45 SW. SOCIAL Scr. Q. 361 (1965); Staton, Psychological Factors Influential
in Jury Trials, 13 FEDE T ON INS. COUNSEL 91 (1963); Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations,22 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 713 (1957);
Strodtbeck & Hook, The Social Dimensions of a Twelve-Man Jury Table, 24 SOciOMETRY 397 (1961); Tans & Chaffee, PretrialPublicity and Juror Prejudice,43 JOURNALISM Q. 647 (1966); Weld & Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is
Reached by a Jury, 53 AM. J.PSYCHOLOGY 518 (1940); Weld & Roff, A Study in the
Formationof Opinion Based upon Legal Evidence, 51 Am. J.PSYCHOLOGY 609 (1938);
Wolf, Trial by Jury: A Sociological Analysis, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 820; Zeisel, Social
Research on the Law, in LAw AND SOCIOLOGY 124 (W. Evan ed. 1962); Jury Prejudices Laid to 11 Causes, N.Y. Times, August 5, 1963, at 31, col. 8. Additional studies
are listed in C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 235-38 (1962).
431376 U.S. at 279-80.
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place432
of life that heat and passion subtly turn to malice in actual
fact?

"The requirement of proving actual malice or reckless disregard
may, in the mind of the jury, add little to the requirement of proving falsity, a requirement
which the Court recognizes not to be an
'4 33
adequate safeguard. 1
Resolution of the real meaning of Jackson finally became unavoidable in Spencer v. Texas,43 in which the jury was given evidence of prior convictions of the accused for sentencing purposes,
but was charged not to take this evidence into account in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused under the current indictment. The Court avoided any contradiction by emasculating Jackson, restricting it to its facts:435
It would be extravagant in the extreme to take Jackson as evincing a general distrust on the part of this Court of the ability of
juries to approach their task responsibly and to sort out discrete
issues given to them under proper instructions by the judge in a
criminal case, or as standing for the proposition that limiting inintroduction of evidence
structions can never purge the erroneous 436
or limit evidence to its rightful purpose.

The Court admitted, however, that "the Court in Jackson supported
its holding by reasoning that a general jury verdict was not a 're-

liable' vehicle for determining the issue of voluntariness because
the issues of voluntarijurors might have difficulty in separating
43 7
ness from that of guilt or innocence.
432

concurring).
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 81 (1964) (Douglas, J,,

433

376 U.S. at 298 n.2.

434 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
435 Confining a precedent to its facts is described by Llewellyn as "Killing the Precedent." COMMON LAW TRADITION 87. He characterizes as "Avoidance Without Acceptance of Responsibility: Illegitimate Techniques:" (1) a distinction being drawn
without a difference, (2) an earlier similar case "being brushed off because of the 'facts'
. ..there, while a completely different manner of interpretation and classification is
used on the raw facts of the case in hand," and (3) the "older case being knowingly
disregarded without mention." Id. at 85. In regard to (3), the question arises as to
why none of the opinions in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), even mentions
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
436 385 U.S. at 565.
But see Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); especially
note the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, id. at 116.
437 385 U.S. at 565.
Although Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), is
never mentioned in Spencer, it is clear that the Court did hold that recidivist or habitual criminal statutes are not proscribed by the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments. See 385 U.S. at 560. This is a highly relevant inquiry. See discussion notes 536-40 infra & accompanying text.
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Finally, it is interesting to scrutinize Mapp v. Ohio438 and McCray v.Ilinois" In McCray, the Court held that a valid search
warrant may issue pursuant to a State officer's affidavit which
may be based on the hearsay testimony of an informer. Further,
the informer's identity need not be disclosed, since "[nlothing in
the Due Process Clause requires a state court judge.., to assume
the arresting officers are committing perjury."44 Is this consistent
with the Mapp policy of making the search and seizure provision
of the fourth amendment fully meaningfl? 1 Professor Younger
draws attention to the ironical demise of a doctrine based on a
recognition of the realities of law enforcement, due to the Court's
failure to remain perceptive and sensitive to those realities:
[Als every lawyer knows who practices in the criminal courts, police perjury is commonplace. To be sure, judicial recognition of
the fact is extremely rare, but can be found. (See, e.g., Veney v.
United States, [344 F. 2d 542 (D.D.C. 1965)1).
Should the Supreme Court be blind to what all else see? Far from
adopting a presumption of perjury, McCiay almost insures wholesale police perjury.
When his conduct is challenged as an unreasonable search and
seizure, all the policeman now need say is that an unnamed "reliable informant" told him that the defendant was committing a
crime. That will establish probable cause, thus making reasonable
the search and seizure and admissible the evidence thereby obtained.
Henceforth, we can be certain, most policemen will have a genielike "reliable informant" whose job it will be to legalize his master's arrests.
This affronts the integrity of the administration of justice. From
the viewpoint of realistic jurisprudence, it also marks the end of
the short life of Mapp v. Ohio.442
488 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For an informative impact study involving Mapp, see
Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
283.
430 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
4401d. at 313.
441 Unfortunately, the Mapp doctrine is losing its vitality in other ways beyond the
control of the Court. In New York:
[TJhe police made the great discovery that if the defendant drops the narcotics on the ground, after which the policeman arrests him, the search is reasonable and the evidence admissible.
Spend a few hours in the New York City Criminal Court these days, and
you will hear case after case in which a policeman testifies that the defendant
dropped the narcotics on the ground, whereupon the policeman arrested him.
Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure Dead?, TRIAL,
Aug.-Sept, 1967, at 41. See also note 422 supra.
442 Younger, supra note 441, at 41. Unhappily, there are all too many other examples of inconsistencies propounded by the Court. For instance, the reader might see if
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The Zuckerkandl Syndrome
"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the more raths outgrabe.
LEw s CARROLL
THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

Having come this far in the discussion concerning the Court's
craftsmanship, the reader may have already diagnosed that the
Court is afflicted with the dread disease, Zuckerkandlism. The pathognomonic symptom - the absence of communication - is
clearly present where contradictions abound.443 Several judicial
Zuckerkandlites, not yet discussed, readily come to mind, the most
visible projecting us into the fascinating topic of obscenity. " 4
As an initial premise, clearly obscenity is not easily defined.
It ordinarily has at least three distinct, but equally vague, meanings: (1) something that offends accepted standards of propriety;
(2) something that tends to corrupt; or (3) something that provokes erotic thoughts or desires.445 The etymology of the term
does not provide much of a clue, the Latin term being perhaps an
amalgam of "ob" (on account of) and "caenum" (filth)."' Perhaps St. John Stevas is correct when he counsels that "the attempt
he can discern the contradiction involved in the differing rationales of Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) and Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
44 An interesting hypothesis is that in communication "[a]ll that is not information, not redundancy, not form and not restraints - is noise, the only possible source
of new patterns." Bateson, Cybernetic Explanation, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, April
1967, at 29, 32. The Court surely is not short on noise, which perhaps explains its
willingness to adopt new patterns.
444 The only thing clear about obscenity is that it has become big business in the
United States. Estimates of the volume per year range from 500 million to 1 billion
dollars. See Report to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service of the U.S. Congress, Obscene Matter Sent Through the Mail, September 1959, at 8. The same report
contends that there is a direct connection between juvenile delinquency and distribution
of obscene literature, a contention that appears empirically unsound and at best speculative. See note 247 supra. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 510-11
(1957) (Douglas J., dissenting); A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 192 (1948); S.J. STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAw 189-91 (1956); Lockhart
& McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 57 (1960); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity,
and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 387 (1938); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 586, 590 (1955).
4 45
Larrabee, The Cultural Context of Sex Censorship, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
672, 763 (1955).
446 "Havelock Ellis suggested that the word is a modification of 'scena,' and means
literally what is 'off the scene,' and not normally presented on the stage of life." S.J.
STEvAS, supra note 444, at 1.

/

-p..

.

.

19681

THE HIGH COURT

to understand 'obscenity' in terms of a simple definition is fruitless
'
and best abandoned."447
Attempted definitions of obscenity by experts in other disciplines are of little help, and only serve to exemplify the amorphous, almost evanescent meaning ascribed to the
term,4 ' a meaning that varies widely from one period of history
to the next.449
The Court, since it first got into the business of defining obscenity, has succeeded only in generating more and more confusion. In Roth v. United States,45 after deciding that obscenity is

not protected by the first amendment,451 Mr. Justice Brennan, for
the Court, defined obscene material as "material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."45 At first glance,
Mr. Justice Brennan's definition coincides with that of the American Law Institute,.58 but he adds in a footnote, "[i.]e., material
447 Id. at 2. He continues, however, to note that obscenity

has always been confined to matters relating to sex or the excremental functions. Although there is an ideological element in the word and it is sometimes used to describe unconventional moral attitudes, the word is normally
related to the manner of presenting a theme or idea rather than to the theme
itself. Id.
448 From an anthropological facet, obscenity is a relative term, with nothing being
absolutely obscene, i.e., vis-a-vis various societies. La Barre, Obscenity: An Anthropological Appraisal,20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 533, 543 (1955).

From an aesthetic-philosophical view, obscenity, especially pornography, "is not itself the object of an experience, esthetic or any other, but rather a stimulus to an experience not focused on it It serves to elicit not the imaginative contemplation of an
expressive substance, but rather the release in fantasy of a compelling impulse." Kaplan,
Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 544, 548 (1955).

Both art and obscenity have a single genetic root: the infantile capacity to endow a mere sign with the affect that belongs properly to what it signifies ....
fOjbscenity is a matter, not of what the work refers to, but rather of the expressive substance of the work ....
A sexual subject (or similar reference)
is a necessary condition for obscenity but not a sufficient one. Id. at 550-51.
And from a psychiatric point of view, the dynamics of obscenity are described: "[obscenity] seems to coincide with the expression, verbally or non-verbally, of sadistic-sexual strivings associated with notions of dirt derived from preoccupation with excretory
processes and emotionally toned with defiance of established authority." Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of Definition of Obscenity, 20 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 572, 580-81 (1955).
449 Plato advocated expurgation of certain "obscene" passages in the Odyssey, such
as those describing the lust of Zeus for Hera, since they were "not conducive to selfrestraint." See SJ. STEVAS, supra note 444, at 2.
450354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4 1
5 At the time of the Roth decision, "[slubstantially all of the states had statutes
which declared the distribution of obscene material to be criminal conduct and punishable as such." MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
452 354 U.S. at 487.
45
3A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
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having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts,"4 54 a standard rejected
by the Institute."' The holding of Roth necessarily includes the
footnote extension, since the standards applied in the cases before
the Court, were: (1) obscene, lewd, and lascivious describe that
form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity and has
a tendency to excite lustful thoughts; and (2) material is obscene
if it has a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by
inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desire.
After a careful exegesis of Roth, Lockhart and McClure conclude: "[T]he Court laid down two - and only two - constitutional requirements for determining what is obscene. The two
requirements are ...that material must be judged as a whole, not
by its parts, and that it must be judged by its impact on average
persons, not the weak and susceptible."45
The holding clearly
does encompass at least these two elements: "'[The test is] whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest." '
A series of per curiam opinions4 8 handed down shortly after
representation of such matters .... Obscenity shall be judged with reference
to ordinary adults. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
454 354 U.S. at 487 n.20; see Fort v. Miami, 389 U.S. 918, 919 n.4 (1967) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
455 Obscenity is defined in terms of material which appeals predominantly to
prurient interest in sexual matters and which goes beyond customary freedom
of expression in these matters. We reject the prevailing test of tendency to
arouse lustful thoughts or desires because it is unrealistically broad for a society
that plainly tolerates a great deal of erotic interest in literature, advertising,
and art, and because regulation of thought or desire, unconnected with overt
misbehavior, raises the most acute constitutional as well as practical difficulties. We likewise reject the common definition of obscene as that which "tends
to corrupt or debase." If this means anything different from tendency to
arouse lustful thought and desire, it suggests that change of character or actual
misbehavior follows from contact with obscenity. Evidence of such consequences is lacking; if actual proof of tendency to corrupt were required, prosecutors would have a difficult task. On the other hand, "appeal to prurient
interest" refers to qualities of material itself: the capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look behind the curtain of privacy which our customs draw about sexual matters. Psychiatrists and anthropologists see the
ordinary person in our society as caught between normal sex drives and curiosity, on the one hand, and powerful social and legal prohibitions against
overt sexual behavior. The principal objective of Section 207.10 is to prevent commercial exploitation of this psychosexual tension. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.10, Comment, at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
456 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MnIN. L. REv. 5, 53 (1960).
457 354 U.S. at 489.
458 On the use of per curiam opinions, see notes 497-521 infra & accompanying text.
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Roth, indicated the Court was moving toward an acceptance of
the more liberal standard of the Model PenalCode,4 59
In the following decade numerous cases dealing with obscenity
have come before the Court. For purposes of this discussion it
is sufficient to set forth the Court's own description of the current
standard as rendered in Redrup v, New York:4 0
Two members of the Court have consistently adhered to the
view that a State is utterly without power to suppress, control, or
punish the distribution of any writings or pictures upon the
ground of their "obscenity." A third has held to the opinion that
a State's power in this area is narrowly limited to a distinct and
clearly identifiable class of material [i.e., hard-core pornography].
Others have subscribed to a not dissimilar standard, holding that
a State may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary
material as obscene unless "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly 'without redeeming social value," emphasizing that the "three elements must
coalesce," and that no such material can "be proscribed unless it is
found to be utterly without redeeming social value." Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 US. 413, 418-419. Another Justice has not
viewed the "social value" element as an independent factor in the
judgment of obscenity. Id., at 460-462 (dissetting opinion). 461
The ambiguities and vagueness inherent in these standards is
so great" 2 that if a legislature promulgated a statute with a similar
standard the Court would probably find it "void for vagueness"
- a denial of due process.4
In Baggett v. Bullitt,'" the Court
held that the phrase "aiding or abetting" was too vague since it
might include lawful exercise of constitutional rights. 6 5 Could
450

See Sunshine Book Co. v. Suinmerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957); Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 456,

at 49-60.
460 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
see note 211 supra.

For the impact of Redrup on Givzburg and Mishkin,

461 386 U.S. at 770-71.
462 For an excellent treatment

of the ambiguities, see Wilson, California'sNew Obscenity Statute: The Meaning of "Obscene" and the Problem of Scientr, 36 S. CAL. L.
REv. 513 (1963). See also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476-82 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting); Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364

(1966).
403 See, e.g., Whitehill v. Blkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
464 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
46 5

The Court pointed out that it was not dear whether a lawyer defending an in-
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one not make the same charge regarding the Court's obscenity
standard which is incorporated into existing State criminal statutes?
Three cases were disposed of in Redrup v. New York4 66 on the
ground that the material published by the defendants in each case
was not constitutionally obscene. In one of the three consolidated
cases, Gent v. Arkansas, the Court originally granted certiorari "to
consider the validity of a comprehensive Arkansas anti-obscenity
statute in light of the doctrines of 'vagueness' and 'prior restraint.' "467 It is possible that the Court avoided resolution of this
problem because of a realization that the obscenity standard it propounded could not meet the Court's standard of clarity required
for legislative language. This probability is increased when one
considers that the issue of whether the material was obscene was
not discussed anywhere in the briefs or at oral argument, attention
being directed instead at the issues of scienter, vagueness, and prior
restraint."' Mr. Justice Harlan's comment appears justified:
In my opinion these dispositions do not reflect well on the processes of the Court, and I think the issues for which the cases were
taken should be decided. Failing that, I prefer to cast my vote to
dismiss the writs in Redrup and Austin as improvidently granted
and, in the circumstances to dismiss the appeal in Gent for lack of
substantial federal question. I deem it more appropriate to defer

an expression of my own views on the questions brought here un-

til an occasion when the Court is prepared to come to grips with
such issues.469
dividual charged with a violation of the Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. 5 2385 (1964),
would be "aiding or abetting" Communism and therefore fall within the language of the
statute. See 377 U.S. at 368.
466386 U.S. 767 (1967).
467Id. at 771 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Redrup and Austin v. Kentucky, the other
two consolidated cases, were taken to clarify the scienter requirement of Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1961). The Smith test was scarcely the epitome of clarity: "The
circumstances may warrant the inference that [the bookseller] . . . was aware of what
a book contained, despite his denial." Id. at 154.
468
See 386 U.S. at 771-72 (Harlan, J.,dissenting). A similar situation existed in
Mapp v. Ohio, see note 10 supra, in which practically no mention was made of the application of the exclusionary rule to the States in either the briefs or at oral argument.
469 386 U.S. at 772 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
Making a similar point, Mr. Justice
Fortas dissented in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), stating:
I would vacate the writ in this case as improvidently granted. The trial below
occurred before this Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254. As a result, the factual record in this case was not shaped in light
of the principles announced in New York Times. Particularly in this type of
case it is important to observe the practice of relating our decisions to factual
records. They serve to guide our judgement and to help us measure theory
against the sharp outlines of reality. Especially where our decision furnishes
a necessarily Procrustean bed for state law, I think, with all respect, that we
should insist upon a relevant factual record. A subsequent trial may conceiv-
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Another instance of the confusion generated by unclear opinions47 is graphically illustrated by the state of the law subsequent
to Escobedo v. Illinois,47' in which the opinion stated the holding
as follows:
We hold ... that where, as here, the investigation is no longer

a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect [this language is treated as nonexistent in
Miranda. See note 421 svpra.], the suspect has been taken into

police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
"the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment," Gideon v. Wainwright ... and that no
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be
used against him at a criminal trial. 472
This stream of consciousness nowhere indicates whether all,
some, or one of these circumstances is sufficient to render a confession inadmissable.4 71 In Miranda, the Court confessed that Escobedo had been "the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited
ably help respondent, but it will be too late to be of assistance to us. 383 U.S.

at 100-01.

470
The very manner in which an opinion is arranged may lead to confusion. In
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), Mr. Justice Harlan announced
the judgments of the Court and wrote a lengthy opinion rejecting application of the Sullivan rule [see notes 424-33 supra & accompanying text] to cases in which the plaintiffs
were public figures rather than public officials. In these situations, he suggested that
the plaintiff could "recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." 388 U.S. at 155. The final sentence of
the opinion apprises the reader that "[the judgment of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in No. 150 is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinions that have been cited herein by the Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Brennan." Id. at 161-62. The other opinions referred to, representing the view of a majority of the Court, applied the Sullivan test to
public figures. But is it surprising that some lawyers thought Mr. Justice Harlan's new
test was the law for public-figure plaintiffs in defamation suits? The contention was
made, and rejected by the court in News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166, 170
(Del. 1967). Another State supreme court wrote an opinion based on Mr. justice Harlan's "new test" for public figures, but discovered its error prior to publication and corrected the official opinion.
47-1378 U.S. 478 (1964).
472 Id. at 490-91.
473 Justice Schaefer has remarked that: "It is the lawyer's business to master words;
the risk that the law runs is that they may master him." Schaefer, Forewordto The Language of the Law - A Symposium, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 115, 118 (1958). The risk is
greatly increased when judges fail to master words - their primary means of communication.
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legal debate"474
and that "state and federal courts, in assessing its
implications have arrived at varying conclusions."4'75 This comment
constitutes an amazing judicial hyperbole of understatement! Some
cases held Escobedo prospective in operation,"' some retrospective.477 Certain cases read Escobedo narrowly, virtually restricting it
to its facts,47 8 others took an expansive view toward making constitutional rights meaningful.47 9 This led to a dramatic confrontation
of the divergent interpretations of Escobedo by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court. Justice Weintraub, Chief Justice of the New Jersey
474

384 U.S. at 440.

475 Id. The Court footnoted this conclusion with:

Compare United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (C.C.A. 7th Cit. 1965),
with Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1965). Compare People
v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P. 2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1964) with
People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E. 2d 33 (1964). 384 U.S. at
440 n.1.
476 E.g., State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 719
(1966.) See discussion notes 385-97 supra & accompanying text.
477 E.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966). Mr. Justice Douglas was "of the opinion that...
the judgment below... [should be) vacated. He would remand the case for reconsideration in light of Mirandav,.
Arizona...." 384 U.S. at 1012.
478 We have held that the Supreme Court limited the effect of Escobedo to the
facts before it in that case and that one of those decisive facts was that the accused there had repeatedly and in terms asked to see a previously retained lawyer and had been refused. Here no request for a lawyer whatever was made
and Escobedo, in our view, does not control. Swartz v. State, 237 Md. 263,
265, 205 A.2d 803, 804 (1965).
To the same effect: People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ii1. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965); Anderson v. State, 237 Md. 45, 205 A.2d 281 (1964);
Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966);
State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67, 202 A.2d 699 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005 (1965);
State v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Linde v.
Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131
N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965). A variation appears in State
v. Fox, 257 Iowa 174,131 N.W.2d 684 (1964), wherein the court stated: "T]he holding in [Escobedo] was predicated upon those facts which disclosed a police interrogation of the accused when his attorney was being excluded and was unable to advise him."
Id. at 178-79, 131 N.W.2d at 686. To the same effect: State v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d
701 (Mo. 1964); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1965). See also State v. Kitashiro, 48 Hawaii 204, 397 P.2d 558 (1964); State
v. Hall, 85 Idaho 117, 397 P.2d 261 (1964); Carson v. State, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 938 (1965); State v. Vigliano, 43 N.J. 44, 202 A.2d 657
(1964); Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964); State v. Stinson, 263 N.C.
283, 139 S.E.2d 558 (1965); State v. Elan, 263 N.C. 273, 139 S.E.2d 601 (1965);
Ward v. State, 205 Va. 564, 138 S.E.2d 293 (1964).
479 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cit. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966); In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 398 P.2d 380, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 188 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1016 (1966); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965); State v. Neely,
239 Ore. 487, 395 P.2d 557 (1964), modified, 398 P.2d 482 (1965); State v. DuFour,
206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965); Campbell v. State, 215 Tenn. 95, 384 S.W.2d 4 (1964).
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Supreme Court, reacted to the Third Circuit's liberal interpretation
48
(an
of Escobedo in United States ex rel. Russo v. New JerseY
interpretation much broader than that of the New Jersey Supreme
Court) 481 by issuing a directive to all New Jersey State judges and

county prosecutors ordering them to ignore Russo if there was no
other way around the use of a questionable confession at the trial." 2
Suppose an individual was released by the federal court, then retried by the State, which again admitted into evidence the confession pursuant to the State's interpretation of Escobedo. Probably,
the accused would merely petition the federal court for release
under a writ of habeas corpus, and "the round-robin could go on
and on,"48 culminating in an impasse due primarily to the ambiguous nature of the Court's holding in Hscobedo.48 4
Rather than set forth other judicial Zuckerkandlites, it suffices
here merely to note that the Court's standards for due process, 485
480 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012 (1966).
48 1

See State v. Smith, 43 N.j. 67, 202 A.2d 669 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1005 (1965); State v. Vigliano, 43 N.J. 44, 202 A.2d 657 (1964).
482
See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1965, at 1, col. 1; Editorial, In the Public Interest, 88
N.J.LJ. 392 (1965). Justice Weintraub specifically rejected a delay in trial as a means
of avoiding the issue until the Supreme Court acted, apparently anticipating Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.. 213 (1967).
48
3 N.Y. Times, supra note 482, at 32, col. 5.
484 There are times where the law is necessarily vague, but the Escobedo doctrine
scarcely qualifies as such a situation. See generally Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role
of the Judge: Restraintand Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255
(1961); Pannam, Professor Hart and Analytical jurisprudence, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 379,
386-92 (1964).
485 Consider the vagueness inherent in the very concept of "due process," then mix
in the various incorporation theories, the "shocking to conscience" and "fundamental
fairness" tests, penumbral rights (see discussion notes 8-11 supra & accompanying text),
the dialectic between the equal protection clause and due process (see, e.g., Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)), the prospective operation of some due process requirements (see discussion notes 339-402 supra & accompanying text) and - voila Zuckerkandlite! For a discussion of some of the perplexing difficulties in determining
the dimensions of due process and what limitations it imposes on the government, see
Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YAiE L.J. 74
(1963); Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication - A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YA. LJ. 319 (1957). For a discussion of the difference between
the standards for economic regulation of substantive due process and other forms of substantive and procedural due process, see Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and
Substantive Due Process of Law (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 13, 226 (1958); Professors Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper comment on the historical basis for incorporation
theories: "Historical research has produced ample support - and ample skepticism for the 'incorporation' theory." After citing numerous authorities with conflicting
views, they continue, "[i)s further historical search likely to do more than 'further obscare the judicial value-choosing inherent in due process adjudication which can proceed
with greater expectation of success if pursued openly and deliberately rather than under
disguise?"' W. LOcKHART, Y. KAMNsAR & J. CHoPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES -

COMMENTS -

QUESTIONS 556 (2d ed. 1967).
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reapportionment,486 equal protection,. 7 and State action, 8 are
likely candidates. The use of imponderable, amorphous standards
detracts from the myth of objectivity and the notion of a "rule of
law," since incomprehensible rules provide no more of a guiding
constraint for the Justices than for the public.4 89 "A prudent court
will seek always to minimize doctrinal developments that cut so
close to the very fulcrum of judicial power."49
F. The Caligula Ploy
"Then you should say what you
mean," the March Hare went on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied;
"at least - at least I mean what I say
that's the same thing, you know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said
the Hatter. "Why, you might just as
well say that 'I see what I eat' is
the same as 7 eat what I see'!"
LEwis CARROLL
ALIcEs ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND

That law must be promulgated to be effective, can be con486

On the standards for apportionment, see artides cited in P. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATEIuALS 44 n.2, 1284 n.h (1966). Professor Choper
believes:
As to the constitutional standard adopted, it must be perceived that in the Reapportionment Cases the Court "recognized as constitutional rights . . . 'the
democratic ideals of equality and majority rule."' (Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Value, 1964 SUp. CT.REv. 1, 66.] The Court, cogently
fulfilling its role in a democratic society, ruled for the majority of citizens and
voters in the nation, mostly living in urban areas, whose political influence
was being seriously diluted by state legislatures dominated by minority rural
interest. On the question of the standard adopted, I believe it is adequate
here to point out, as Professor Carl A. Auerbach has thoroughly and admirably demonstrated, that "no reason consistent with the democratic ideals . ..
has been advanced for not effectuating" [id. at 67] the Court's "one man-one
vote" principle .... Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17
CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 20, 30 (1967).
Compare L. DOZELL, THE WARREN REVOLUTION 80-112 (1966).
487 See discussion notes 231-38 supra & accompanying text. But see Choper, supra
note 486, at 32-36; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
488 See Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967). It is surprising that neither Professor Black's article nor
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), mention the obvious parallel between Mulkey and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
489 "Words which are vague and fluid ...may be as much of a trap for the innocent
as the ancient laws of Caligula." United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952).
4 90
McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54, 70 (1962).
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sidered a truism. "Law as a guide to conduct is reduced to the
level of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable."4"1 Yet,
the torrent of published material, legal and nonlegal, 92 reduces,
in large measure, much law to the unknowable. Counsel frequently omit relevant cases and material because the output of
legal material is too enormous to yield to traditional indexing
systems,""3 which never have been entirely adequate.49 Judges
491
B. CARDOZO, Tim GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924). This appears especially
true where the Court is attempting to make constitutional guarantees fully meaningful.
Ehrlich was undoubtedly correct about the general body of law when he observed that
"the effect of norms for decision is usually very much over-estimated. The whole matter
hinges upon action by the parties, who very often fail to act altogether. Often the statute
remains unknown to a considerable part of the population....'" E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINcIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 368 (W. Moll transl. 1936). The
Court seems to agree. See note 489 supra.
492 On the amazing increment in publication of legal material with which courts
and lawyers must cope, see L ALLEN, R. BOOKS, & P. JAMES, AUTOMATIC RETERIvAL
OF LEGAL LITERATURE: WHY AND How 1-22 (1962). On the possibility and potential
impact of machine retrieval of legal and related materials, see COMMUNICATION Sca-

ENcEs AND LAW: REFLECTIONS FROM THE JuRIm

CS CONFERENCE 267-99 (L.

Alien & M. Caldwell eds. 1965); COMPUTERS & THE LAW 48-59 (R. Bigelow ed.

1966).
493 "Inadequate trial preparation is often inevitable due to the prohibitive time and
effort required to prepare a case with the primitive legal tools of today ...
Lewis,
ElectricalRevolution in Legal Research, 47 ILL. B.J. 680, 681 (1959).
494 From the outside the West system looks impressive ....
People who research law... tend to be less impressed. "If you're doing a products liability
book," says Bender's Framer rather mildly, "you'll find a lot of cases you'd
never locate in the West Digest." Jack Artigues, the young lawyer in charge
of the American Law Institute's Books for Continuing Legal Education says
that "some of the headnotes read like they were written by first-year law students." Craig Spangenberg of Cleveland told a meeting recently, "I spend
a lot of time in upper courts on fine points of law and I tell you most of them
are points that we can never find indexed anywhere....
We read maybe
fifty cases hoping to find some paragraph in one opinion where some judge
has decided the point, but it isn't in the headnote and it isn't in the index."
California's Felix Stumpf says, "You know the Palsgraf case? ...
Well,
West didn't put it under 'proximate cause.' The avalanche of head notes
under the present classifications system makes the digests virtually useless.
But West is sitting pretty because its Reporter system amounts to a national
monopoly." M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 432-33 (1967).
The West system is, however, quite sophisticated compared with existing indexing
schemes in the sciences. The very inaccessibility of scientific studies and reports leads
to innumerable instances of needless duplication of research efforts. See Kent, A Machine that Does Research, HARPER's MAGAzI, April 1959, at 1. Some contend that
the Russians advanced rapidly in space technology because they made effective use of
existing knowledge reported in foreign literature. The fantastic amount of time and
effort expended by the Russians on documentation, abstracting, and retrieval, is reported
in Kent & Iberall, Soviet Documentation, 10 Am. DOCUMENTATION 1 (1959). See
also Kerimov, Cybernetics and Soviet Jurisprudence, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 71
(1963); Kerimov, FutureApplicability of Cybernetics to Jurisprudencein the U.S.S.R.,
63 MODERN USES OF LOGIC IN LAW 153 (1963).
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are publishing more,49 5 and apparently reading less,49 thereby
adding to the rapidly growing and intractable mass of precedents,
statutes, and regulations, that must be examined to discover the
relevant, if any, legal doctrines for a particular case.
The Court only exacerbates this condition when it "promulgates" the law in such a way that nobody, not even the Court,
knows what it is that has been said.497 In Rosenblatt v. American
Cyanamid Co., 498 the Court's per curiam opinion merely stated:
"The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question."49' 9 Unlike a denial of certiorari, a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question may constitute a decision on the merits," 0
even though most of the dismissals are entered without hearing arguments.5
Therefore, it appears that in Rosenblatt the Court has
49

5
For a good summary of efforts to reduce publication of opinions that add nothing
but volume to the law, see Prince, Law Books Unlimited, 48 A.B.A.J. 134 (1962).
496 Unless a judge knows the judicial treatment accorded similar cases how can he
render justice? "Rendering contrary decisions in like or similar cases would not be law
and right, but arbitrariness or caprice." E. EHRLICH, supra note 491, at 132. Of course,
a compulsive adherence to this principle would result in a static rather than a "living"
law, since social changes require that factually similar cases be treated differently at different times. See Spengler, Machine-Made Justice: Some Implications, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 36 (1963).
497 See, e.g., the discussion of the Trupiano doctrine in text accompanying note 290
supra. Professor Kurland has remarked that:
Certainly there is something to be said, under the circumstances of the
Court's behavior, for Lord Mansfield's advice: "[C]onsider what you think
justice requires, and decide accordingly. But never give your reasons; - for
your judgment will probably be right, but your reasons will certainly be
wrong." [4 J. CAMPBELL, LivEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 26
(3d ed. 1874).) To this view of the judicial process might be added the observation that in the absence of reasons it may not be possible to discover
whether the judgment was right or wrong, especially if, in addition to refusing reasons, the Court does not reveal the facts of the case. The Court's
memorandum decisions demonstrate the absence of novelty in this suggestion.
Kurland, Foreward:Equal in Originand Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 175 (1964).
498382 U.S. 110 (1965).
499 Id.
500 Wright categorically states that "Summary disposition of an appeal . . . either
by affirmance or by dismissal for want of a substantial federal question, is a disposition
on the merits." C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 11, at 431 (1963). Wolfson and
Kurland are more cautious, observing that "dismissals by the Supreme Court for want
of a substantial federal question often constitute undisclosed determinations on the
merits." R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES § 58, at 104 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland eds. 1951). They also
note that the "distinction between federal questions sufficiently substantial not to be
dismissed but not so substantial as to resist summary affirmance is not clear." Id. § 58,
at 104 n.11. See also Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
50 1
See Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During The 1951
Term, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 451 (1953).
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upheld the New York "long arm" statute" 2 without hearing arguments and without discussion, although this significant issue is not
resolved in any preceding opinion of the Court.0 3 How many
attorneys and judges are aware of the Rosenblatt holding?
Unfortunately, the above is not an isolated instance. Other
important issues have been disposed of by the Court in one or two
sentence memorandum per curiam opinions:50 4
(1) The Wong Sun v. United States rule0 5 was applied to
the States in Traub v. Connecticut, °5 a memorandum opinion. 0 7
The Court has indicated that the abstention doctrine
(2)
is not to be employed if it would "force the plaintiff who has
commenced a federal action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings [and therebyl . . . itself effect the impermissible chilling
of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect."50 8 In Fenster
v. Leary,00 the Court may have held for the first time that this limitation is not available to a plaintiff unless a "delay in adjudication
on the merits could be 'costly where the vagueness of a state statute
may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.' 2)510
502N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)2 (McKinney 1963). This section provides
that "A Court may exercise jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary... as to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if
he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he: ... 2. commits
a tortious act within the state .... "
503 State courts had spoken on the issue. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 NE.2d 761 (1961); F. JAMES, JR., CivIL
PROCEDURE

644-53 (1965).

The Court must itself view these per curiam opinions as authoritative since they
justify decisions by merely citing them. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
450 (1967), citing as dispositive Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372
(1958), one of the per curiam opinions following Roth indicating that the Court had
adopted the Model Penal Code standard.
505 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which held that the exclusionary rule is applicable to
verbal evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search and seizure. The holding
of Mapp dealt only with "papers and effects," i.e., physical evidence.
5o0 374 U.S. 493 (1963) (mem.); see Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 459 (1964). The Wong Sun doctrine is itself quite vague. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith
and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483 (1963).
507 See note 319 supra.
50 8
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
r00 386 U.S. 10 (1967) (mem.), aflg 264 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
510 264 F. Supp. at 156 (emphasis added). Or is the holding that
the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Dombrowski [Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)] and Baggett [Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964)]. Plaintiff does not claim that the statute is vague or that prolonged
litigation in the State courts would be required to determine its constitutionality. Neither does he claim that first amendment rights are involved. 264
F. Supp. at 156.
504

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 19: 528

(3) The rule of Wickard v. Filburn511 was extended to situations in which the activities involved would have no substantial
effect on interstate commerce in the memorandum decision United
States v. Ohio.512
(4) It appears the standard for obscenity51 continues to become more liberal (or libertine, depending on how you view it)
with the Court's memorandum per curiam reversals of a series of
514
cases.
One variation in the use of memorandum per curiam opinions,
designated as the Sisyphus ploy for reasons that will become apparent, is illustrated by the strange case of McLeod v. Ohio.515 Mr.
Joseph T. McLeod, while voluntarily attempting to help the police
secure evidence relating to a murder, made incriminating statements. At that time he was under indictment for the crime, but
he had not yet been arraigned and had not requested nor retained
counsel. Further, the incriminating statements were not made as
the result of any stratagems or artifice of the police. Therefore,
these factors seem to differentiate McLeod's case from Massiah v.
United States," 6 in which incriminating statements were elicited
511317 U.S. 111 (1942).
512385 U.S. 9 (1966) (mem.), frevg 354 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1965). The lower
court did an excellent job of distinguishing Filburn. See 354 F.2d at 555-556.
51
3 See notes 460-61 supra & accompanying text.
514 See, e.g., Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967); Friedman v. New York,
388 U.S. 441 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Cobert v. New York,
388 U.S. 443 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Avansino v. New
York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Corinth
Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388
U.S. 449 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); A Quantity of Copies
of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967). In United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine
Entitled "Exclusive," 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1967), the Court of Appeals held that the
magazine Exclusive was obscene. The magazine was a collection of photographs of
young women. In most of
them, long stockings and garter belts are employed to frame the pubic area
and to focus attention upon it. A suggestion of masochism is sought by the
use in many of the pictures of chains binding the model's wrists and ankles.
Some of the seated models, squarely facing the camera, have their knees and
legs widespread in order to reveal the genital area in its entirety. In one of
the pictures, all of these things are combined: The model, clad only in a framing black garter belt and black stockings is chained to a chair upon which she
is seated, facing the camera, with one knee elevated and both spread wide.
The Supreme Court reversed, merely citing Redrup. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967). See 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748 (1968).
It was earlier noted that the Roth decision was clarified by a subsequent series of memorandum per curiam opinions. See note 459 supra.
515 381 U.S. 356 (1965), rev'g per curiam 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349
(1964).
516377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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from the accused by stratagem, after indictment and arraignment
for the crime, and after he had retained counsel. In Massiah, the
Court stated that "[all . ..we hold is that the defendant's own
incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by
the prosecution as evidence against him at his [federal] trial."51' 7
In McLeod, the defendant was convicted after incriminatory
statements made by him were introduced into evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Ohio courts "for consideration in light of Massiah v. United States ... ,,"' The Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed McLeod's conviction, finding that the "defendant had not yet been arraigned and . . . the 'circumstances'
under which his incriminating statements were given were wholly
different from those in Massiah."19 On appeal, the Supreme Court
again reversed, this time with the informative statement: '"rhe
judgement is reversed. Massiah v.United States....,,520
The wisdom of such cryptic reversals and remands is doubtful,
especially if several appeals to the Court are required when one
would suffice. Thus, adequate guidance should be provided in
parallel to the McLeod
the first opinion. Unfortunately, sequences
5 21
locate.
to
difficult
not
are
round-robin
The ordinary full-dress opinions provide us with plentiful ex517 Id. at 207. The statements could have been used, however, to convict him of
a crime for which he was not yet indicted. See the discussion of Miranda and Hoffa
in notes 412-22 supra & accompanying text.
518378 U.S. 582 (1964), vacating and remandingper curiam 173 Ohio St. 520,
184 NB.2d 101 (1962).
51
9State v.Mceod,I Ohio St. 2d 60, 62-63, 203 N.Y2d 349,351 (1964) (per
curiam), rev'd er curiam, 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
520 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (mem.). To the same effect: Beatty v.United States,
389 U.S. 45 (1967) (mem.).
521 See, eg., (1)Doughty v.Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963) (remanded "inlight
of Gideon v. Wainwright"). On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished Gideon and adhered to its original judgment. Doughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191
N.E.2d 727 (1963). The Court then reversed merely citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506 (1962), and Gideon v. Wainwright. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202
(1964). (2) O'Connor v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 286 (1965) (remanded "in light of Griffin v. California.") On remand, the conviction was again affirmed. State v. O'Connor,
6 Ohio St. 2d 169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966). On appeal, the Court reversed, writing
a two-page per curiam opinion. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966). The Court
did observe that the defendant's "failure to object to a practice which Ohio had long
allowed [comment on failure to take the stand] cannot strip him of his right to attack
the practice following its invalidation by this Court." Id. at 93. An addition to the
above language should be made: "unless his conviction was 'final' at the time Griffin
v. Californiawas handed down." See discussion note 341 supra & accompanying text.
See also the following sequence: Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967), on remand,
223 Ga.465, 156 SXE.2d 65 (1967), rev'd, 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
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amples of promulgation problems, some of which already have
been mentioned. 2 Occasionally it is merely a matter of carelessness, although one never knows for sure. In Parker v. Gladden," discussed earlier,524 the Court wrote:
We believe that the statements of the bailiff to the jurors are
controlled by the command of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the
right to a .. .trial, by an impartial jury ... [and] be confronted

with the witnesses against him.525

This language suggests that the sixth amendment's right to
an impartial jury trial is now applicable to the States. Yet, in
Maxwell v. Dow,52 and other cases, the Court has "steadily . . .
ruled that the commandments of the Sixth and Seventh amendments, which require jury trial in criminal and certain civil cases,
are not picked up by the due process clause of the Fourteenth so
'
as to become limitations on the states."527
Probably, the Court
intended in Parker only to hold that the fair and impartial trial
required by the due process clause of the 14th amendment had not
52
been afforded the defendant in Parker.
But, given the incorporation theory now in ascendancy, and the above quoted language in
Parker, it appears that both the confrontation clause,52 and the
right to an impartial jury clause, of the sixth amendment are now
"to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth AmendSee notes 289-307 supra & accompanying text.
U.S. 363 (1966).
524 See note 265 supra.
525 385 U.S. at 364.
526 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
527 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947).
528This explains why the Court declares: "In any event, petitioner was entitled to
be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors. See State v.Murray,
164 La. 883, 888, 114 So. 721, 723 [1927]." 385 U.S. at 366. Actually, that was
not necessarily the holding of Murray. The Louisiana court stated: "[the defendant)
was entitled to be tried by twelve - not nine or ten or eleven, but twelve - impartial
and unprejudiced jurors. Besides, we are not sure that the 'pernicious activities'
of the deputies sheriff in this case had no effect upon the deliberations of the jury." 164
La. at 888, 114 So. at 723.
529
The confrontation clause was applied to the States in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965). The Court has also held the following sixth amendment guarantees applicable to the States: the right to compulsory process to obtain the presence of witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); the right to speedy trial, Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); the right to public trial, Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965); the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 239 (1941); and the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Thus, the only guarantee in the sixth amendment not
now applicable to the States is the right to trial by jury.
522

523385
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ment according to the same standards that protect those personal
rights against federal encroachment. '53 Either a problem of promulgation and a failure to deal with relevant precedent arises or
another instance of sloppy and irresponsible craftsmanship in constructing an opinion is presented.
The frequent use of unnecessarily broad principles or dictum
by the Court has already been noted.3 ' It is appropriate, however, to add that Justices in concurring opinions frequently make
statements that give us pause as to what really is the law. Mr.
Justice Douglas' observation in his concurring opinion in Engel v.
Vitale, 32 that "[t]he Everson case seems in retrospect to be out
'
of line with the First Amendment,"533
may indicate that the hold534
ing of E'verson v. Board of Education is no longer valid.53 5 Consider the import of the following assertions by Mr. Justice Black
in his dissenting opinion in Mishkin v.New York:5 "6
I would reverse these convictions. The three-year sentence imposed on Mishkin and the five-year sentence imposed on Ginzburg
for expressing views about sex are minor in comparison with those
more lengthy sentences that are inexorably bound to follow in state
and federal courts as pressures and prejudices increase and grow
more powerful, which of course they will. Nor is it a sufficient
answer to these assuredly ever-increasing punishments to rely on
this Court's power to strike down "cruel
and unusual punish57
ments" under the Eighth Amendment.
Does this mean that the Court is now ready to extend the eighth
amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishments to cover
"all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged"?55 5 While dicta
53

5Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
See discussion notes 231-40 supra & accompanying text.
532 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962).
531

533M. at 433.
534 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
53 5

Everson was a five to four decision, with Mr. Justice Douglas joining the majority.

536 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966).
5371d. at 517.
5

sso'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892)

(Field, J., dissenting).

In

O'Neil, the majority refused to apply the eighth amendment to the States, therefore refusing to discuss its scope. Irving Brant comments:
No more biting dissent ever came from Justice Field than the one he delivered in . . . [O'Neill, with the support of Justices Harlan and Brewer in a
separate dissent... The term "cruel and unusual" punishment was usually
applied to the infliction of torture ... but the inhibition embodied in the ...
Eighth Amendment was directed also against all punishments greatly disproportioned to the offense charged. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 352

(1965).
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to this effect appears in some Court opinions,"' no Court language
can, as yet, be considered as holding for the proposition."
The cruel and unusual punishment prohibition was applied to the States in Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See discussion note 249 supra. In his concurring
opinion in Robinson, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "[a) punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban against 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" 370 U.S. at 676.
M9 In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court stated that "it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offense." Id. at 367, quoting in support of this proposition Mr. Justice Field's statement
in O'Neil, as appears in text accompanying note 538 supra. The defendant in Veems
was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United
States Government of the Philippine Islands, who falsified a public document by entering as paid out certain wages which had not been paid out. He was convicted and the
following sentence was imposed:
To the penalty of fifteen years of Cadena, together with the accessories of section 56 of the Penal Code, and to pay a fine of four thousand pesetas, but not
to serve imprisonment as a subsidiary punishment in case of his insolvency, on
account of the nature of the main penalty, and to pay the costs of this cause.
Id. at 358.
The questions assigned by the defendant as error on appeal to the Supreme Court included: "4. The punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment was a cruel and unusual
punishment, and, to the extent of the sentence, the judgment below should be reversed
on this ground." Id. at 359. In reversing the conviction on this ground, Mr. Justice
McKenna, writing for the majority, stated emphatically:
In other words, the highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause
the loss of many thousand of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the
State should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single
item of a public account. And this contrast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
But, the case involved the "cruel and unusual punishment' prohibition of the Philippine
Bill of Rights. The imposition of the punishment of "fifteen years of Cadena" raises
the issue of the type of punishment, rather than its duration. The Cadena exacts that
the prisoner "always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists ... [and] shall
be employed at hard and painful labor...." Id. at 364. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), involved imposition of the penalty of denationalization for wartime desertion
and, thus, also dealt with the type and not the duration of punishment. See also Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 330-31 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121, 124 (10th Cir. 1966); Carey v. Settle, 351
F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1965).
540 State decisions are quite different:
[Ilt is now generally recognized that imprisonment for such a length of time
as to be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense committed ... is
cruel and unusual within the meaning of the constitution. Stephens v. State,
73 Old. Cr. 349, 121 P.2d 326; State v. Ross, 55 Or. 450, 104 P. 596, 106
P. 1022, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 601; Nickle v. Henrichs, D.C. Nev. 262 F. 687;
Harper v. Wall, D.C.N.J., 85 F. Supp. 783; Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc.
792, 262 N.Y.S. 802; MacDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E.
874; State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273; Nowling v. State,
151 Fla. 584, 10 So.2d 130; State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann.
527, 19 So. 457, 35 L.R.A. Note 561, et seq; Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349,
30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793; 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 524, 525, 535.
State v. Evans, 245 P.2d 788 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1952).
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CONCLUSION

The preceding portrait of the Court has been painted with a
broad brush to accentuate those features most critical and pertinent
to its power and prestige. With finer and more sophisticated brushwork we might have created a "prettier" picture of craftsmanship
and artistry, but only a casuistical masterpiece could conceal the instances in which the Court ignored or inartistically manipulated
precedent, imposed the impossible, propounded contradictory and
incomprehensible rules, and sometimes simply failed to promulgate
any relevant rule for decision.
Intended as a realistic appraisal of the work of the Supreme
Court, the completed composition, in retrospect, certainly does not
evince even a hint of the naive optimism of a Pangloss. Indeed, it
occasionally may manifest a tone approaching the direful pessimism
of a Jeremiah. But is that inappropriate, considering the input and
output demands made on the Court, and considering its extremely
limited resources? The Court's output is not as ludicruous as some
statutes enacted by American legislatures,54 ' but it is egregiously
deficient in clarity and internal consistency. Perhaps the Court
needs not only a Council of Constitutional Advisers, but an opinion
drafting service as well.
The critical and pessimistic evaluation of the craftsmanship of
some of the Justices has been based on a prescriptive criterion: if
the Court is to attain its goal of transmuting constitutional language
into living law and making constitutional rights fully meaningful,
then good craftsmanship would not abrade the fons et origo of its
authority and power.
The analysis of legal, traditional, and charismatic power sources
revealed that "[tjhe Court's authority . . . ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.""as This public confidence is based largely on the assumption that the Justices resolve
cases and controversies by a process of reasoned elaboration quite
different from that of elected politicians. As McCloskey has
pointed out, "tilf the public should ever become convinced that the
Court is merely another legislature, that judicial review is only a
euphemism for an additional layer in the legislative process, the
54 1
For example, the Ohio Legislature provided, in 1913, that the State coat of arms
was to be engraved on each State official. The Kansas Legislature passed a law requiring that when two trains met on a single track "each train should take to a siding, and
remain there until the other should have passed." W. GRAVEs, AMEICAN STATE GovmuMENT 263 (1953).
542 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Court's future
as a constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave
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doubt.
How different is the judicial from the legislative approach? It
is apparent that the Court today legislates, not just interstitially or
in the gaps, but fully and comprehensively in its attempt to make
constitutional rights and the democratic process meaningful. For
instance, the Miranda opinion reads almost like a portion of a code
of criminal procedure, with relatively little attention given to the
facts and disposition of the particular cases involved. The activism
of the Court, the device of prospective overruling, the appearance
of propounding the desirable as well as the constitutional, the use
of sweeping generalizations, the disregard for precedent, the resolution of polycentric problems in an ad hoc fashion - all these elements combine to convey the impression that the Court is only "an
additional layer in the legislative process."
Yet, notable contrasts between the legislative and judicial approaches remain. For example, the legislative branch has many
more resources than does the Court for gathering data and investigating social antecedents, consequences, and values. Further, the
legislative branch is furnished with better facilities for implementing comprehensive legislative schemes. Courts are traditionally
limited to deciding the justiciable case or controversy before them
in light of the evidence developed at trial - the adjudicatory facts
aided sometimes by the doctrine of judicial notice, amicus curiae
briefs, and appointment of masters in appropriate cases. Thus, access to the facts necessary for legislating rationally is extremely
limited. In addition, the legislature is generally responsive to the
will of the majority. The Court, invested with the security of tenure and salary, is often characterized as an antimajoritarian institution and an anomaly in a democracy. But, as noted, there is
abundant evidence of antimajoritarian sentiment expressed in the
Constitution. The constituency of the Court includes the Ishmaels
and Paraiyans of our society, as well as the majority. Minority
groups with no effective legislative representation look to the Court
for protection and elaboration of their rights. That minority
groups, relying on the activism of the Court, increasingly look to
the Court for vindication, exacerbates the Court's dilemma since a
refusal to act will frustrate the justifiable, albeit esurient, appetite
of these groups for favorable judicial decrees. A salient distinction
543
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between Court and congressional recognition of these rights is that
Court decrees are subject to reversal only by the cumbersome process of constitutional amendment, whereas statutes are abrogated or
amended at the pleasure of the legislature.
The fact is, of course, that the Court is responsive and sensitive
to public and community demands. It may temporarily substitute
"cool and sedate" reflection for legislative readiness to effectuate
popular demands, but in the long run the Court does not resist most
dominant and persistent societal values and programs. After all,
the Court has neither the power of the sword nor the purse, is comprised of individuals appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, is bombarded continually by critiques in the
law reviews, popular magazines, and the press, and is dissected
daily by political scientists and behavioralists. Still, the Court will
oppose the will of the majority -ifit believes constitutional policy so
dictates; such unpopular decrees are effective because the public
venerates the Constitution and its guardian, the Court. In some
cases, the opinion-creating force of the Court will so affect the public sentiment that the decrees will ultimately reflect public opinion
generally.
As previously mentioned, the public confidence in the Court has
rested not only on notions of judicial detachment and objectivity,
but also on the "declaratory myth." The cynical acid of the realists
and behavioralists, with the Court acting as a catalyst, has almost
completely dissolved the latter, and considerably corroded the former. Of course, the apparent absence of rules in significant areas
of constitutional adjudication does little to enhance public or professional confidence in the competence and appropriateness of the
Court continuing in the role of final arbiter of constitutional meaning. Reasoned elaboration of the Great Charter requires at the
least conscientious and unbiased application of discernible, consistent rules and principles in resolving the conflicts of interest presented by justiciable cases or controversies, insofar as is judicially
possible. Without rules, it is said, judges function like qadis, drawing on their personal notions of how to decide a particular case.
Professor Fuller, as noted, contends that the existence of general
rules of obligation constitute the primary desideratum for establishment and maintenance of a legal system. 44 But rules of law alone
cannot provide sufficient guidance for deciding the type of poly544
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centric problems with which the Court today wrestles. It is quite
easy to assert that "[to practice the requisite detachment and to
achieve sufficient objectivity . . . demands of judges the habit of
self-discipline and self-criticism. .. ."' and that with self-discipline
the Justices can approach a case "without any conclusion, . . . analyze issues, dissect and assemble facts, explore hypotheses, consider
competing arguments, and finally come to a [soundl resolution in
terms of the law as it has been received and understood, and with
as little personal admixture as possible . . . ."" But it is not so
easy to determine how little admixture is possible or desirable, or
the degree to which the Justices ideally ought to feel constrained by
precedent, or ought to make a studied effort to give the appearance
in their opinions that they are so constrained. In the contemporary
jurisprudential climate a sound resolution of the perplexing controversies brought before the Court requires consideration of the pertinent demands of justice, public policy, community values, social
antecedents and consequences, the opinion-making and legitimating
force of the Court's decrees, and a host of other parameters in addition to the text of the Constitution, statutes, precedent, and history.
The virtual impossibility of ascertaining the content, strength, and
interrelation of these variables and their application to a case and
the subsequent justification of that application in a written opinion
compelled us to eschew any extended effort to describe the dimensions of an ideal opinion. But, it can justifiably be concluded that
the Danaides, Tantalus, Janus, and Caligula ploys and the Zuckerkandlites do violate our prescriptive criterion since they clearly erode
the foundations of the Court's authority and power by creating the
impression, in the instances cited, that there really was no guiding
rule or "neutral principle" established. Although it is admittedly
impossible for rules of law alone to provide an adequate basis for
resolution of the perplexing and difficult cases that are heard by a
court of last resort, it does not follow that the opinions that justify
difficult decisions cannot display a rational, comprehensible, and
consistent rule which will provide some degree of "regularity, reckonability, and justice."
The difficulty involved in formulating such a rule, in conjunction with the limited resources of the Court and the relatively irre545 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
546 Griswold, Foreward: Of Time and Attitudes Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 91 (1960). Griswold stresses "the importance of constant
effort to see that decisions are really reached, as far as humanly possible, on intellectually
valid and disinterested grounds." Id. at 91.
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versible nature of judicial constitutional decrees suggests the value
of a prudent exercise of the certiorari power and other rules of judicial self-restraint that avoid constitutional determinations until the
right time. To know when the time is ripe and how to formulate
the rule in a manner that will effectuate the policy goals of the
Justices without detracting from the public confidence in the judiciary requires competence, skill, creativity, devotion - in a word,
craftsmanship. Judicial opinions are more than a report of the
psychological processes that culminated in a decision favoring one
of the litigants before the Court; they are a form of art. It is thus
fitting to conclude with the advice of Joseph Conrad - "A work
that aspires, however humbly, to the condition of art, should carry
its justification in every line." 4'
54t Conrad, Preface to J. CoNRAD, THE NIGGER oF TnE NARCIssus at xi (1914).

